7.02 Acres of Land v. State

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-08-00262-CV No. 10-08-00263-CV 7.02 Acres of Land and $10,000 in united states currency, Appellants v. The State of Texas, Appellee From the 220th District Court Bosque County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 07-07-19807-BCCV and 07-07-19707-BCCV MEMORANDUM Opinion The parties have filed agreed motions to dismiss these appeals. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). FELIPE REYNA Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Vance, and Justice Reyna Appeal dismissed Opinion delivered and filed October 1, 2008 [CV06] .3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Legal Sufficiency A person involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to another commits the offense of failure to render assistance by failing to: (1) immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to the scene as possible; (2) immediately return to the scene of the accident if the vehicle is not stopped at the scene of the accident; and (3) remain at the scene of the accident until the operator complies with the requirements of Section 550.023. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.021(a) (Vernon 1999). Section 550.023 requires the driver to: (1) give the operator’s name and address, the registration number of the vehicle the operator was driving, and the name of the operator’s motor vehicle liability insurer to any person injured or the operator or occupant of or person attending a vehicle involved in the collision; (2) if requested and available, show the operator’s driver’s license to a person described by Subdivision (1); and (3) provide any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including transporting or making arrangements for transporting the person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary, or if the injured person requests the transportation. Id. § 550.023 (Vernon 1999). Rigard testified that on the evening of June 20, 2004, he stopped at a convenience store to purchase cigarettes. While at the store, he had an altercation with a group of men which quickly escalated to the men shooting at him. Rigard fled from the gunfire and jumped into his car. He tried to back out of the parking lot but he had to pull forward and then back out again to maneuver around the gas pumps and a security gate. When he finally was able to exit the parking lot, the men were still shooting and he “put [his] head down and hoped for the best.” As Rigard sped out of the parking lot, he hit a pedestrian, Reginald George, with his vehicle. Although Rigard claims that he did not see what happened, he knew he had hit someone. He testified that he did not stop because he was afraid of being shot and that “in [his] heart, he believed [George] to be dead.”[1] Witnesses called for emergency assistance; however, George died before paramedics arrived. Rigara argues that he was only required to act out of “practical necessity” and that he was not required to stop at the scene of the accident because he knew that George died as a result of the impact. He relies on Bowden and Powell to support the proposition that the requirements of the statute are met simply by the driver’s ascertaining whether medical assistance is necessary. See Bowden v. State, 361 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962); Powell v. State, 341 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961). He argues that although the drivers in Bowden and Powell stopped and remained at the scene long enough to make this determination, he “ascertained what had occurred without returning to the scene” and “what he knew was an objectively reasonable, logical deduction from the circumstances, not merely an assumption.” As the driver of the vehicle, Rigard was obligated not only to assist George but to stop the vehicle. Galvan v. State, 846 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.) In Moore v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated the following about what is required of a driver: The stop demanded … does not mean a stop for an instant, enabling but a cursory examination of the surroundings, but does mean a definite cessation of the movement for a sufficient length of time for a person of ordinary powers of observation to fully understand the surroundings of the accident and to possess himself of an accurate knowledge of the results of the accident. We further observe that the mere fact that the injured person was found to be dead some few minutes after the accident, would not be a sufficient excuse to absolve appellant from blame on account of a failure to stop an appreciable length of time. Moore v. State, 145 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940).[2] The fact that George died shortly after the accident and was not in need of assistance does not excuse Rigard’s failure to stop or to comply with the other provisions of the statute. Galvan, 846 S.W.2d at 164 (citing Moore, 145 S.W.2d at 888). As it is undisputed that Rigard failed to stop or to offer any assistance to George, we find that the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the conviction. We overrule Rigard’s sole issue. Conclusion Having overruled Rigard’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. BILL VANCE Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Vance, and Justice Reyna Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed December 20, 2006 Do not publish [CR25] [1] Rigard acknowledges that he does not address the defensive issue of necessity. Rather, he argues that “the evidence is legally insufficient to support the elements of the charged offense, without regard to any facts concerning the circumstances of Appellant’s fleeing the gunfire.” [2] The statute in effect in 1940 is similar to Texas Transportation Code Section 550.021(a).