Katrina Runnels v. Wells Fargo Bank

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-07-00377-CV Katrina Runnels and Linda Lewis, Appellants v. Wells Fargo Bank, Appellee From the County Court at Law Ellis County, Texas Trial Court No. 07C4098 ORDER Katrina Runnels and Linda Lewis appeal an adverse judgment rendered in the trial court below. Neither Runnels nor Lewis are represented by counsel. Initially, only Runnels signed the notice of appeal. We notified her by letter dated December 10, 2007, that she could not represent Lewis on appeal. See Steele v. McDonald, 202 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, order). We also notified Runnels that if her interest and Lewis’s interest in the appeal were aligned, the notice of appeal may be amended to file a joint notice of appeal and that all future documents be filed as joint documents signed by every party joining in the document. The notice of appeal was amended to reflect a joint notice of appeal which was signed by both Runnels and Lewis. Later, a docketing statement was filed and signed by Runnels only. By letter dated January 31, 2008, we explained the contents of the December 10th letter sent to Runnels and included a copy of that letter to Lewis. Lewis was informed that she must either file her own documents in the appeal or jointly sign with Runnels each document filed on her behalf. Lewis was further informed that her docketing statement had not been filed and that she had been notified previously by letter dated January 2, 2008 that her docketing statement must be filed within 21 days from the date of that letter. In the letter dated January 31, 2008, Lewis was warned that if her docketing statement was not filed within 21 days from the date of that letter, the appeal as to Lewis would be dismissed. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b), (c) and 44.3. More than 21 days have passed and we have not received a docketing statement from Lewis. Therefore, the appeal as to Lewis is dismissed. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b), (c) and 44.3. PER CURIAM Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Vance, and Justice Reyna Appeal dismissed as to Linda Lewis Order issued and filed March 12, 2008 [CV06] span style='font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"CG Times"'> Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee From the 52nd District Court Coryell County, Texas Trial Court # FAM-02-16,357 MEMORANDUM Opinion The court convicted Charles Gugliotta in a bench trial of aggravated assault and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. Gugliotta contends in two issues that (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to support the court’s finding that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon and (2) the court erred by rejecting his self-defense claim because the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that he used deadly force. We will affirm. Gugliotta’s conviction stems from a barroom fight with Ronnie Shulz, with whom Gugliotta had had at least one prior altercation. As Shulz was leaving the bar, words were exchanged. Gugliotta hit Shulz in the head with a beer bottle because he believed Shulz was going to assault him. The bottle broke upon impact, and Shulz fell to the ground, bleeding from where the bottle hit him. Both of Gugliotta’s issues hinge on whether his use of a glass bottle to hit Shulz in the head constitutes the use of a deadly weapon. Several courts have upheld findings that a bottle used in this manner is a deadly weapon. See Hayes v. State, 728 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Enriquez v. State, 826 S.W.2d 191, 192-93 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no pet.); Compton v. State, 759 S.W.2d 503, 503-04 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.). The fact that the State did not call a witness to testify that the bottle was a deadly weapon is irrelevant. Cf. Hayes, 728 S.W.2d at 808 (“The complainant’s own testimony reveals that he struck appellant with the Coke bottle, clearly an object capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”). Expert testimony is not required. English v. State, 647 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Bailey v. State, 46 S.W.3d 487, 491-92 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref’d); Charleston v. State, 33 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d). Rather, each case must be examined on its own facts and circumstances. Id. After viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gugliotta used the beer bottle in a manner which was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. See Jackson v. Va., 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 753-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Accordingly, we overrule Gugliotta’s issues. We affirm the judgment. FELIPE REYNA Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Vance, and Justice Reyna Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed December 8, 2004 Do not publish [CR25]