Debra Liles Watson v. State of Texas

11th Court of Appeals Eastland, Texas Opinion Debra Liles Watson Appellant Vs. No. 11-01-00204-CR -- Appeal from Jones County State of Texas Appellee Debra Liles Watson waived her right to a jury trial, and the trial court convicted her of driving while intoxicated and assessed punishment at confinement for 120 days. We affirm. Appellant presents three points of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. In the first point, she contends that the State failed to prove venue. In the second point, she contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to show that she was driving while intoxicated. In the third point, she contends that the evidence was factually insufficient to show that she was driving while intoxicated. In order to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.2000). In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence in support of a vital fact is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the finding of a vital fact is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283 (Tex.Cr.App.2001); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Cr.App.2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Cr.App.1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). The record shows that Officers Sammy Zapata and John Clayton were investigating a report that appellant had been harassing Don Caffey. While at Caffey=s house, they saw appellant driving toward them. She was about a block away and suddenly turned and sped off. In order to question her concerning the harassing phone calls, the officers tried to follow her. They could not catch her. In the meantime, appellant jumped a curb while she was driving on the wrong side of the road and almost ran over a small child. Shortly thereafter, the officers located appellant at her residence and determined that she was extremely intoxicated. Appellant=s eyes were red and bloodshot. Her speech was slurred. Her movements were slow, groggy, and unsteady. There was a strong smell of alcoholic beverage about her person. Appellant could not perform any of the field sobriety tests, and she also failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Appellant would not blow properly into the intoxilyzer, and the results were invalid. The evidence shows clearly that appellant was intoxicated at the time that she was contacted at her home. Appellant had driven up to her house less than 2 minutes before being contacted by Officer Clayton, and the officers had seen her driving near Caffey=s house only 12 minutes earlier. Appellant admitted that she had had 2 bourbon and cokes and that she had been driving. We hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support appellant=s conviction for driving while intoxicated. The second and third points of error are overruled. As for the venue challenge, we will presume that venue was proven in the trial court unless venue was made an issue in the trial court or unless it otherwise affirmatively appears to the contrary from the record. TEX.R.APP.P. 44.2(c)(1); Williams v. State, 924 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.App. - Eastland 1996, pet=n ref=d). When venue is made an issue in the trial court, failure to prove venue in the county of prosecution constitutes reversible error. Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Williams v. State, supra. Appellant first challenged the issue of venue in her appellate brief. She did not challenge the issue of venue in the trial court, and no affirmative evidence showed venue to be to the contrary. There was no evidence that the offense occurred in another county. The evidence showed that the offense occurred in Stamford, including the 300 and 400 blocks of Davenport in Stamford. Under TEX.R.EVID. 201, we may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is: [N]ot subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Both the trial court and this court may take judicial notice that the address in Stamford is located in Jones County. Thus, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to prove that the offense occurred in Jones County. See Williams v. State, supra; see also Grant v. State, 33 S.W.3d 875, 878-79 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet=n ref=d). Appellant=s first point of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. W. G. ARNOT, III CHIEF JUSTICE June 27, 2002 Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.3(b). Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and Wright, J., and McCall, J.