L.C. Dixon v. State

11th Court of Appeals Eastland, Texas Opinion L. C. Dixon Appellant Vs. No. 11-04-00239-CR -- Appeal from Taylor County State of Texas Appellee L.C. Dixon, appellant, appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, cocaine. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (Vernon 2003). After the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, appellant pleaded guilty to the offense. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement and appellant’s plea of “true” to one prior conviction, the trial court sentenced appellant to 20 years confinement. Appellant’s sole point of error is that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search. More specifically, appellant argues that the officers illegally detained him and that the warrantless search of the vehicle was illegal because it was not based on probable cause or exigent circumstances. We affirm. Background Facts Abilene Police Officer David (D. D.) Gray received a tip from a confidential informant that appellant was in possession of an off-white, rock-like substance purported to be crack cocaine. The confidential informant gave a detailed description of appellant, including his name, the vehicle that he was in, and the license plate number of that vehicle. The confidential informant also gave Officer Gray the general location where he could find appellant. Officer Gray recognized that area as a location where illegal drug transactions frequently occurred. Officer Gray had known the confidential informant for over one year and knew that the informant had provided information in the past that always proved to be true. The confidential informant had given information that led to the arrest of at least five known drug offenders. After the confidential informant called Officer Gray with the information, Officer Gray met with the informant in order for the informant to identify appellant by photograph. After it was clear that Officer Gray and the informant were talking about the same person, Officer Gray contacted other agents, and they all began searching for appellant. While they did not have a specific address, they did have a general area to search. Officer Gray knew appellant had a history of dealing drugs. An officer located appellant in the area described by the informant and in the car described by the informant. Officer Gray told appellant that they were with the Abilene Police Department, advised appellant of his constitutional rights, and relayed the information that Officer Gray thought that appellant was in possession of controlled substances. Officer Gray asked appellant if he had any controlled substances or any items that he wanted to surrender. Appellant answered that he did not have anything he wished to surrender. After this exchange took place and without appellant’s consent, appellant was handcuffed, and Officer Gray searched appellant’s vehicle. Officer Gray found cocaine in a film cannister located inside a toboggan sitting on the console between the two front seats. Standard of Review In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must give great deference to the trial court’s findings of historical facts as long as the record supports the findings. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). Because the trial court is the exclusive fact- finder, the appellate court reviews evidence adduced at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Cr.App.2000). We also give deference to the trial court’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact when those rulings turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, supra. Where such rulings do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we review the trial court’s actions de novo. Guzman v. State, supra; Davila v. State, 4 S.W.3d 844, 847-48 (Tex.App. - Eastland 1999, no pet’n). Analysis The federal and state constitutions both guarantee the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 2005). Searches conducted without a warrant are unreasonable per se, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex.Cr.App.2003). The State bears the burden to show that the warrantless search falls within one of these exceptions. McGee v. State, supra at 615. The automobile exception permits officers to conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1970); Powell v. State, 898 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex.Cr.App.1994). A warrantless seach of an automobile based on probable cause is justified under the United States and Texas Constitutions because an automobile can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction making obtaining a warrant impractical. See Scott v. State, 531 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Where there is probable cause to search a vehicle, exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search are not required. State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex.Cr.App.1998). Although the instant search falls under the automobile exception, the amount of probable cause required to justify the search is the same as if a warrant had been sought. See Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). Probable cause for a search exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer would lead a person of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime will be found. McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Barber v. State, 611 S.W.2d 67 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). We examined the information that the trial court considered in upholding the presence of probable cause under the “totality of the circumstances” approach. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). We find that the informant gained information concerning appellant’s identity, his whereabouts, and his future actions in a reasonable manner. All the details provided by the confidential informant were verified prior to appellant being handcuffed, except for the actual presence of cocaine. We conclude that Officer Gray’s personal knowledge along with the reliable indicia of the confidential informant’s tip satisfies the totality of the circumstances test. Therefore, Officer Gray had probable cause and properly searched appellant’s vehicle. The trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s sole point of error is overruled. This Court’s Ruling The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. TERRY McCALL JUSTICE August 18, 2005 Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, J., and McCall, J.