Charles Delmon Peoples v. State of Texas

Opinion filed November 15, 2007 Opinion filed November 15, 2007 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-06-00319-CR __________ CHARLES DELMON PEOPLES, Appellant V. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 350th District Court Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 7663-D O P I N I O N The trial court convicted Charles Delmon Peoples, upon his plea of no contest, of possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver. Appellant also entered a plea of true to both enhancement allegations. Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, the trial court imposed a sentence of confinement for seventeen years. We affirm. Argument on Appeal In his sole point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Appellant contends that the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not establish probable cause because it failed to state any information concerning the confidential informant=s experience in identifying controlled substances, did not contain any information concerning appellant=s activities at the location to be searched, did not establish who owned the property, did not contain information concerning when the surveillance had been conducted or what the surveillance revealed about appellant=s behavior, did not address if appellant lived at the location or if appellant had been observed engaging in prior illegal behavior, did not estimate the amount of contraband the confidential informant had purportedly seen in appellant=s possession, and did not state that the affiant had any information that corroborated the informant=s information. Therefore, appellant contends that the affidavit did not reflect sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. We disagree. Standard of Review A trial court=s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In reviewing a trial court=s ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must give great deference to the trial court=s findings of historical facts as long as the record supports the findings. Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Because the trial court is the exclusive fact‑finder, the appellate court reviews evidence adduced at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court=s ruling. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We also give deference to the trial court=s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact when those rulings turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Where such rulings do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we review the trial court=s actions de novo. Id.; Davila v. State, 4 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.CEastland 1999, no pet.). While the legal issue of probable cause to arrest is reviewed de novo, Dixon v. State, 206 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the determination of that issue turns on mixed questions of law and fact. See Myers v. State, 203 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tex. App.CEastland 2006, pet. ref=d). Probable cause is a Afluid@ rather than a Arigid@ concept and exists where the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that there is a fair probability that the contraband is at the location to be searched. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 616; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-38 (1983). Proceedings in Trial Court In his affidavit, Abilene Police Department Narcotics Officer Tommy Pope stated that, Ajust prior to making@ his application for the search warrant, he had received information from a credible confidential informant that appellant was in possession of a controlled substance at the location; that the confidential informant had observed appellant during the preceding forty-eight hours at the location with a rock-like, off-white, substance appellant represented to be crack cocaine; that the same confidential informant believed this substance was crack cocaine; that Officer Pope had observed appellant at the location before; and that Officer Pope believed the location was occupied and under the control of appellant. Officer Pope further stated that he had known this informant for at least four years, that this informant had supplied him with information that had Aalways proven true and correct,@ and that this informant had provided information that led to the arrests of at least seven drug offenders. Officer Pope=s testimony confirmed the information in his affidavit. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that the information established that the confidential informant and the information provided were reliable, that the location was sufficiently described, that there was sufficient information connecting appellant to the location, that the requirements of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2007), art. 18.04 (Vernon 2005) had been met, and that the search warrant was lawfully executed. Did the Trial Court Abuse Its Discretion? The trial court=s findings and conclusions are supported by the record. Appellant=s contention that a per se independent corroboration by law enforcement of information provided by a reliable confidential informant is required to establish probable cause has been rejected by both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231; Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 618. The cases cited by appellant are factually distinguishable. Appellant has not established that the trial court erred. The issue is overruled. This Court=s Holding The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. PER CURIAM November 15, 2007 Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., McCall, J., and Strange, J.