Christopher Ray Blanton v. State

NO. 12-05-00014-CR NO. 12-05-00015-CR NO. 12-05-00016-CR NO. 12-05-00017-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER RAY BLANTON, § APPEAL FROM THE 420TH APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, § NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION In one issue, Appellant Christopher Ray Blanton appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to reduce bond. We reverse and remand. Background Appellant was arrested on four charges on October 1, 2004. Bond was set at $120,000 for the four charges. On January 3, 2005, Appellant filed a motion to reduce bond. In his motion, Appellant requested that the court grant bail on personal bond or reduce his bond to no more than $10,000 pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.151 because the State was not ready to proceed to trial within ninety days. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion. This appeal followed. Article 17.151 A defendant who is detained in jail pending trial of a felony accusation against him must be released, either on personal bond or by reducing the amount of bail required if the State is not ready for trial of the criminal action for which he is detained within ninety days from the commencement of his detention. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151 § 1(a) (Vernon 2005); Rowe v. State, 853 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). “The Legislature couched [article] 17.151 in unmistakably mandatory terms: ‘[I]f the State is not ready for trial within 90 days after commencement of detention for a felony . . . the trial court has two options: release upon personal bond or reduce the bail amount.’” Ex parte Ancira, 942 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (citing Rowe, 853 S.W.2d at 582). The court of criminal appeals has recognized the continued viability of article 17.151 despite the unconstitutionality of the Speedy Trial Act, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 32A.02 (Vernon 1989), which was passed as part of the same Senate Bill. See Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In declaring article 17.151 constitutional, the court noted the purpose of the legislation: “The statute at least guarantees an accused will not be detained pretrial for an inordinate length [of time] on account of a lack of diligence by the State in preparing its case.” Id. at 717. When, as here, a defendant complains the State was not ready for trial within the statutory time period, the State has the burden to make a prima facie showing that it was. See id.; Moreno v. State, 845 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d). The State may satisfy its burden either by announcing ready within the allotted time or by announcing retrospectively that it had been ready within the allotted time. Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 717. In this case, the State did neither. Appellant was arrested on October 1, 2004; thus, the State must have announced that it was ready for trial by December 30, 2004. At the hearing held on January 6, 2005, ninety-seven days after Appellant had been detained, the State did not show that it was ready for trial on December 30. Therefore, pursuant to article 17.151, Appellant was entitled to release, either on personal bond or by reducing the amount of bail. Accordingly, we sustain Appellant’s sole issue. Disposition Having sustained Appellant’s sole issue, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JAMES T. WORTHEN Chief Justice Opinion delivered June 22, 2005. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J. and DeVasto, J. (DO NOT PUBLISH)