Latrena Shanna Walker v. State

NO. 12-06-00389-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS LATRENA SHANNA WALKER, § APPEAL FROM THE THIRD APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE § ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Latrena Shanna Walker appeals the revocation of her community supervision, following which she was sentenced to confinement for two years. In one issue, Appellant argues that the trial court’s finding that “all the allegations have been proven by the state” is supported by neither legally nor factually sufficient evidence. We affirm. Background Appellant was charged by indictment with forgery of a financial instrument and pleaded “guilty.” The trial court found Appellant “guilty” and sentenced her to confinement for two years. Thereafter, the trial court suspended Appellant’s sentence and placed her on community supervision for five years. On September 2, 2006, the State filed its first amended motion to revoke Appellant’s community supervision alleging that Appellant had violated certain terms and conditions thereof. Specifically, the State alleged that Appellant violated her community supervision as follows: (1) ... [Appellant unlawfully appropriated], by acquiring or otherwise exercising control over, property, to-wit: beer, of the value of less than $50, from Brianna Hart (Krogers), the owner thereof, without the effective consent of the owner, and with intent to deprive the owner of the property. ... [Appellant] intentionally or knowingly, with intent to defraud or harm another, pass[ed] to Brianna Hart, a forged writing, knowing such writing to be forged, and such writing had been so made; completed; executed; or authenticated that it purported to be the act of Stacy Marcum, who did not authorize the act, and said writing was a check of the tenor following: .... ... [Appellant] failed to abstain from the use of narcotic drugs or other controlled substance in any form except as prescribed by a licensed physician for legitimate medical purposes; to wit: ... [Appellant] submitted to urinalysis drug testing through Anderson County Community Supervision and Corrections Department on 04.12.06 to determine whether or not [she] was using or under the influence of narcotic drugs or any other controlled substances. Moreover, on 04.20.06[,] the results of said urinalysis testing indicated the presence of Cocaine. .... ... [Appellant] failed to pay the cost of urinalysis drug test, a total of $15.00 in arrears. .... ... [Appellant] failed to pay the cost of Substance Abuse Evaluation, a total of $5.00 in arrears. .... ... [Appellant] failed to perform community service restitution each week as ordered by the Court for the months of: February, March, April, May, and June 2006. .... ... [Appellant] failed to pay to the Anderson County Community Supervision and Corrections Department reimbursement for probationer’s appointed counsel at the rate of $20.00 per month, for a total of $120.00 in arrears. .... ... [Appellant] failed to pay to the Anderson County Community Supervision and Corrections Department a supervision fee of $45.00 per month for a total of $405.00 in arrears. .... ... [Appellant] failed to pay to the Anderson County Community Supervision and Corrections Department a court cost of $273.00 at the rate of $6.00 per month, a total of $60.00 in arrears. .... ... [Appellant] failed to pay $50.00 for the benefit of the Anderson County Crime Stoppers within 60 days [of the date of her community supervision order]. ... [Appellant] failed to pay restitution to the Anderson County Community Supervision and Corrections Department in monthly installments of $62.00 each, between the first and tenth day of the month, a total of $620.00 in arrears. On October 19, 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion. Appellant pleaded “not true” to the allegations in the State’s motion. Following the presentation of evidence and argument of counsel, the trial court found all allegations in the State’s motion to be true, revoked Appellant’s community supervision, and sentenced Appellant to confinement for two years. This appeal followed. Revocation of Community Supervision In her sole issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that “all the allegations have been proven by the state” because the finding is supported by neither legally nor factually sufficient evidence. Specifically, Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that she failed to pay her court appointed attorney fees. The only question presented in an appeal from an order revoking community supervision is whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s community supervision. See Lloyd v. State, 574 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). The standard of proof in a revocation proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In order to satisfy its burden of proof, the State must prove that the greater weight of the credible evidence before the trial court creates a reasonable belief that a condition of community supervision has been violated as alleged in the motion to revoke. See Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Proof of one violation alone is sufficient to support revocation. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). As a general matter, a trial court possesses broad discretion in supervising those defendants who are placed on community supervision. See Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Becker v. State, 33 S.W.3d 64, 66 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2000, no pet.). The degree of the trial court’s discretion extends to revocation proceedings such that the trial court has considerable discretion to modify, revoke, or continue the community supervision. Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Becker, 33 S.W.3d at 66. Given the trial court’s wide discretion and the unique nature of community supervision revocation proceedings, examination of a revocation order for factually sufficient evidence is inappropriate. See, e.g., Becker, 33 S.W.3d at 66; Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 642 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Johnson v. State, 2 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); Liggett v. State, 998 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1999, no pet.); Johnson v. State, 943 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex. App.–Waco 1996, pet. ref’d). As such, the trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and determines if the allegations in the motion are sufficiently demonstrated. See Greer v. State, 999 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order. Id. In the case at hand, there is evidence in the record to support that Appellant violated at least one of the terms of her community supervision. For instance, Tracy Meggs, Appellant’s probation officer, testified that on April 12, 2006, she suspected that Appellant was under the influence of something and performed a urinalysis on Appellant. Meggs further testified that the results of the urinalysis came back positive for cocaine use. We iterate that proof of one violation alone is sufficient to support revocation. See Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493. Therefore, since the record supports that Appellant violated a condition of her community supervision, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking her community supervision. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled. Disposition Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s order revoking community supervision. JAMES T. WORTHEN Chief Justice Opinion delivered March 30, 2007. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J. (DO NOT PUBLISH)