Robert Wayne Mayfield v. State

MARY'S OPINION HEADING NO. 12-06-00424-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS ROBERT MAYFIELD, § APPEAL FROM THE APPELLANT V. § COUNTY COURT AT LAW #3 THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Robert Mayfield was charged by information with driving while intoxicated. After the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Appellant pleaded guilty. The trial judge assessed Appellant’s punishment at confinement in the county jail for one year, probated for twenty months, conditioned on his spending three days in the county jail. The trial judge also assessed a fine of $850.00. In his sole issue presented, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm. Background The Tyler Police Department received a call from a private citizen identifying himself as Matthew Caldwell who reported that he was following a black Ford Explorer that had run red lights and was weaving all over the road. Caldwell maintained contact with the Tyler Police dispatcher, providing the license number of the black Ford Explorer. Caldwell followed the vehicle until it pulled into a driveway. Caldwell parked approximately seventy-five yards from the driveway. He saw the driver of the Explorer, later identified as Appellant, get out of the vehicle and then return to it and drive it into the garage attached to the residence. The garage door remained open. The dispatcher relayed the information provided by Caldwell to Officer Forby who contacted Caldwell when he arrived at the scene. Caldwell pointed out the open garage where the driver had parked the black Ford Explorer. Officer Forby approached the open garage door. While still outside the garage, he could see Appellant slumped over behind the wheel of the Explorer with one leg hanging out of the vehicle. Suspecting that Appellant was intoxicated, but also concerned that his loss of consciousness might be the result of a medical condition, Officer Forby entered the garage without knocking or otherwise announcing his presence and shook the driver to wake him. He determined that Appellant’s unconscious state was due to intoxication unconnected with any medical condition. No medical personnel were summoned. Appellant was placed under arrest. Denial of Motion to Suppress In his sole issue, Appellant contends that Forby’s entry into the garage without a warrant was illegal and therefore the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Standard of Review In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, the court of appeals gives almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Id. Applicable Law Under both the United States and Texas constitutions, a warrantless search of either a person or property is presumed unreasonable subject to certain exceptions. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006); Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 608 & n.12 (2005). Exigent circumstances may serve to obviate the warrant requirement. Id. In Laney, the court of criminal appeals described the exigent circumstances doctrine applicable when exigencies are encountered by the police in their “crime fighting role.” Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 861. The court distinguished this from the “emergency doctrine” applicable when the emergency justifying warrantless entry arises outside or independent of a criminal investigation, and the police act in their limited community caretaking role to protect or preserve life or avoid serious bodily injury. Id. In order to support a warrantless search or entry under the exigent circumstances doctrine, probable cause in combination with some sort of exigent circumstances must exist. See Estrada, 154 S.W.3d at 608-09; McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 106-07 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). If probable cause is present, situations creating exigent circumstances usually include factors pointing to some danger to the officer or victims, an increased likelihood of apprehending a suspect, or the possible destruction of evidence. McNairy, 835 S.W.2d at 107. When the destruction of evidence is the exigency relied upon, the State must show that the police could have reasonably concluded that evidence would be destroyed or removed before they could obtain a search warrant. Id. The necessity of preserving evidence of a DWI suspect’s blood alcohol level may constitute an emergency making the securing of a warrant impracticable. See Winters v. State, 902 S.W.2d 571, 575-76 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). An objective standard is used in determining if the officers reasonably relied upon the exigency in question to justify a warrantless entry. Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 404, 126 S. Ct. at 1948; Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The emergency aid doctrine may justify a warrantless entry when the police are acting, not in their crime fighting role, but in their limited community caretaker role, and they therefore have no probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed or is in progress.1 See Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 861. The community caretaking function is “totally divorced” from the detection or investigation of the violation of a criminal statute. Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973)). Therefore, a police officer may not ignore the warrant requirement relying on his community caretaking function if he is primarily motivated by a noncommunity caretaking purpose. Id. The officer must have an immediate reasonable belief that he or she must act to “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 861. The courts look to a nonexclusive list of four factors in evaluating whether the officer reasonably believes that a person needs help: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance other than that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others. Id. Probable cause exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer at the scene would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence of a crime will be found. McNairy, 835 at 107; Estrada, 154 S.W.3d at 609. The factual basis for probable cause need not arise from the officer’s personal observation, but may be supplied from other sources corroborated by sufficient indicia of reliability. See Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The basis of the informant’s knowledge is highly relevant in determining the value of the caller’s report. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415-16, 146 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990). A detailed description of the wrongdoing accompanied by a statement that he or she observed the event firsthand entitles the information to greater weight. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 234, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2330, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). In Brother, probable cause arose from a detailed description of the appellant’s car, location, and erratic driving given to the police by a citizen eyewitness and relayed to the arresting officer by the dispatcher. Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 257. The citizen kept in contact with the dispatcher throughout the incident and remained at the scene until after the appellant’s car was stopped by police. Id. When an informant places himself in a position to be held accountable for his intervention, the reliability of the information he provides increases. United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936, 99 S. Ct. 333, 58 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1978). Corroboration by the police of any of the information related by the informant will ordinarily enhance its reliability. State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d). Discussion Appellant contends the State is relying on the emergency aid doctrine, one of the three community caretaker doctrines developed by the United States Supreme Court that may serve to render a warrant unnecessary. Appellant argues that his attached garage was part of his residence, and that the officer’s entry into the garage without a warrant and without announcing his presence violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution. Appellant points out that the officer’s primary reason for coming to his home was to investigate a crime; hence, the community service emergency aid doctrine is not applicable. Moreover, he contends that the officer lacked an objectively reasonable belief that his warrantless entry was necessary to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury. The officer learned from the citizen caller before approaching the house that Appellant had driven into the driveway, gotten out of his car, reentered it, and drove it into the garage. In Appellant’s view, sleeping in your own car in your own house does not rise to the level of a threat to yourself or others. Appellant maintains he did not exhibit that level of distress justifying a warrantless entry. The officer made no effort to ascertain if there were others in the house who might have helped him. Appellant argues that, given these facts, the community service emergency aid doctrine is inapplicable and cannot serve to justify a warrantless entry into his garage. We agree that the community service emergency aid doctrine is inapplicable. Appellant’s argument assumes that Officer Forby lacked probable cause. However, we are convinced that Officer Forby had probable cause, and, therefore, the exigent circumstances doctrine does apply. The exigent circumstances doctrine will support a warrantless entry when probable cause exists in combination with exigent circumstances. See Estrada, 154 S.W.3d at 608-09. The citizen eyewitness related to the police a detailed description of Appellant’s driving and his vehicle, and remained in contact with the police while he followed Appellant home. The police dispatcher relayed the information to Officer Forby. When Officer Forby arrived at the scene, he checked with Caldwell who pointed out the open garage door through which Appellant had driven his car shortly before. The detailed information provided by a citizen eyewitness who identified himself and placed himself in a position to be held accountable for his report was verified at least in part by Officer Forby when he arrived where Caldwell parked near Appellant’s house. As Officer Forby approached Appellant’s open garage, he saw Appellant slumped over the steering wheel, his left leg dangling from the car door. Considering all of the information available to Officer Forby, we conclude that Officer Forby had probable cause to believe that a crime had been or was being committed, and that evidence of that crime would be found, before he entered Appellant’s garage. See Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 257. We also conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, exigent circumstances existed justifying the officer’s warrantless entry into the open garage. Appellant’s apparently unconscious condition was consistent with intoxication. Viewed objectively, however, his condition was also consistent with a number of serious medical problems such as heart attack or stroke reasonably requiring emergency attention. Although apparently unconscious, his position behind the steering wheel and the open garage door also made it possible for him to quickly drive from the garage onto the street endangering both himself and the public. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled. Disposition The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. BILL BASS Justice Opinion delivered April 30, 2008. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Bass, Retired Justice, Twelfth Court of Appeals, Tyler, sitting by assignment. (DO NOT PUBLISH) 1 The community caretaker role is the basis for three separate doctrines created by the Supreme Court as exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment: (1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2) the automobile impoundment and inventory doctrine, and (3) the public servant doctrine. See Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 279-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Cochran, J., concurring).