Darryl Williams v. State

NUMBER 13-00-118-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI ___________________________________________________________________ DARRYL WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. ___________________________________________________________________ On appeal from the 24th District Court of Victoria County, Texas. ___________________________________________________________________ O P I N I O N Before Justices Hinojosa, Chavez, and Rodriguez Opinion by Justice Chavez Appellant Darryl Williams was convicted of aggravated assault in the knife attack of Cheryl Williams, his former girlfriend or common-law wife. By a single point of error, he argues that the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient. Specifically, Darryl contends that he acted in self-defense because Cheryl struck him first and her sister LaTasha was also attacking him, that he was too drunk to have the requisite mens rea, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was the one who used the knife in the attack. We overrule these arguments and affirm the trial court's judgment. To commit the offense of aggravated assault, a person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (2) commits an assault that either (3) causes serious bodily injury or (4) is effected by use of a deadly weapon. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02 (Vernon 1994); Gonzales v. State, 762 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In a legal sufficiency review, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979); Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence without the prism of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution" and set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The jury, as the trier of fact, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. [panel op.] 1981). The jury, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, is free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence presented by either party. Wilkerson v. State, 881 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Prior to the incident giving rise to this prosecution, Cheryl had obtained a restraining order against Darryl and had found a new boyfriend, Michael Coleman. Cheryl was in the process of moving out of her apartment when Darryl appeared. Cheryl asked Darryl to leave, but he refused. All of the witnesses agreed that Darryl was drunk. Cheryl testified that Darryl hollered at her that he was going to kill her, and "if he couldn't have me, nobody could." Cheryl testified that LaTasha, who was helping her move her things, yelled at her that Darryl was coming through the apartment with a knife, and when Cheryl turned around Darryl stabbed her in the face. Cheryl testified that LaTasha then came and tried to pull Darryl away, and the three of them struggled for awhile with Darryl continuing to stab and cut her with the knife. Darryl left when he realized that the police had been called. Cheryl testified that, although Darryl was drunk, she believed he "knew what he was doing," and acted intentionally. LaTasha testified that she heard screaming coming from inside Cheryl's apartment and went inside to investigate. She found Darryl swinging a knife at Cheryl, and tried to grab Darryl and pull him away. She testified that she thought Darryl was going to kill Cheryl. Michael Coleman, who was also present to help Cheryl move, testified that he also saw Darryl cutting Cheryl with a knife, and that he thought Darryl was acting intentionally. Darryl testified that he had drank two twenty-four ounce cans of beer before coming to see Cheryl, and acknowledged that, given his small physical stature, that was probably enough to intoxicate him. He insisted that Cheryl initiated the physical confrontation by slapping him first. He admitted that he slapped her back, but denied ever using a knife against her. He also denied threatening her. Darryl testified that LaTasha grabbed him from behind and dug her fingernails into him, and that he had cuts and deep bruises as a result of the struggle. He acknowledged that he had a knife with him and that the knife may have come out during the struggle and cut Cheryl, but he denied intentionally pulling out the knife or intentionally using it against Cheryl. He admitted that he could have stabbed Cheryl "accidentally." He testified that, because he had been drunk at the time, his memory of the events was "hazy." The jury was free to disbelieve Darryl's testimony that he did not intentionally use a knife against Cheryl and to believe the testimony of Cheryl, LaTasha, and Michael Coleman that Darryl did intentionally use a knife against Cheryl. Wilkerson v. State, 881 S.W.2d at 324. Furthermore, the jury was free to believe the witnesses who testified that Darryl was the aggressor, and that Cheryl and LaTasha struggled against Darryl only to try to stop Darryl's attack.(1) Darryl's argument that he was too drunk to have acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly must fail because, under Texas law, voluntary intoxication is not available as a defense to negate the mens rea element of a criminal offense. Tijerina v. State, 578 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). We conclude that the testimony offered by Cheryl, LaTasha, and Michael Coleman was sufficient for a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Darryl was guilty, and the jury's determination of guilt is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. MELCHOR CHAVEZ Justice Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.3. Opinion delivered and filed this the 31st day of August, 2000. 1. Darryl also did not request a jury instruction or jury question on self-defense.