David C. Devora v. State

NUMBER 13-00-041-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTIBEDINBURG DAVID C. DEVORA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. On appeal from the 56th District Court of Galveston County, Texas. O P I N I O N Before Justices Hinojosa, Yañez, and McCormick[1] Opinion by Justice Yañez Appellant, David Carl Devora, was arrested and charged with the felony offense of failure to stop and render aid.[2] Appellant pled not guilty to the offense and requested a jury trial on guilt/ innocence and elected to proceed before the trial court on punishment. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial court assessed punishment at five years. By four points of error, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm. Background It is undisputed that on July 2, 1998, appellant and his common-law wife, Janie Garcia, were traveling south on interstate forty-five from Houston to Galveston. Shortly before two in the morning, La Marque police discovered Janie=s body on the side of the freeway. The police observed no pulse at the scene, and a later autopsy revealed that she had died from massive head trauma. Appellant gave three separate statements about what occurred on that drive. The remainder of this account is based on these statements and the appellant=s testimony. Earlier in the evening, the appellant and Janie had been at a night club where they were drinking and arguing. Apparently, Janie wanted to go to Galveston with some friends. Appellant did not want to go and did not want her to go with anyone else. Janie left with her friends and appellant followed them to a gas station. Afterwards, Janie got in the car with appellant. While appellant was driving at a high rate of speed on the interstate, he began to look for an exit to turn around and head home. It was at this time that Janie jumped from the passenger side of the car. Appellant claims that he immediately stopped and approached the body. Then he left, drove to a closed gas station, and remained there for approximately twenty-five minutes. At trial, appellant could not remember if there was a pay phone at that location or not. An officer testified that there was a pay phone at the gas station, and an additional twenty more pay phones in the vicinity. When appellant made his way back to the scene, other drivers, paramedics and the police had arrived at the scene. Analysis In his third and fourth points of error, appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove that an accident occurred or that he was involved in an accident. We disagree. Claims of legal insufficiency of evidence are reviewed by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). As for a review of factual sufficiency, the appellate court must review all of the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or if the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The gist of appellant=s argument on these points is that he believes what occurred on the fateful night in question does not qualify as an Aaccident@ under the applicable statutes. The Transportation Code provides: ' 550.021. Accident Involving Personal Injury or Death (a) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of a person shall: (1) immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to the scene as possible; (2) immediately return to the scene of the accident if the vehicle is not stopped at the scene of the accident; and (3) remain at the scene of the accident until the operator complies with the requirements of Section 550.023. . . . ' 550.023. Duty to Give Information and Render Aid The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the injury or death of a person or damage to a vehicle that is driven or attended by a person shall: . . . (3) provide any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including transporting or making arrangements for transporting the person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary, or if the injured person requests the transportation. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. ' 550.021, 550.023 (Vernon 1999). Remarkably, the code fails to define the term Aaccident.@ Appellant contends that, since only one car is involved, the State must show that the death resulted from his negligence or unsafe driving in order to satisfy the Ainvolved in an accident@ requirement of these statutes. We are not persuaded by the case appellant offers in support of this argument. In Rivas v. State, the appellant/driver=s actions could logically be said to have set in motion the sequence of events that led to the jumping victim=s death. Rivas v. State, 787 S.W.2d 113, 115-16 (Tex. App.BDallas 1990, no writ). In that case, the driver approached a railroad crossing as the warning lights and bells went off. See id. at 114. The driver decided he could beat the approaching train across the tracks. See id. The front seat passenger jumped out of the car, apparently in fear of a collision, while the driver and back seat passenger passed through the crossing unscathed. See id. The Rivas court held the driver was involved in accident for the purposes of the statute, even though only one car was involved and no collision occurred. See id. at 115-16. However, the Rivas court did not explicitly hold that it was imperative that the driver be at fault in order for the incident to be classified as accident. See id. While the transportation code and Rivas fail to specifically define Aaccident,@ we are not without direction. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that Aif the language of a statute is unambiguous, we give effect to its plain meaning unless doing so would lead to absurd results.@ Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Here, the statutes make no mention at all of fault, negligence, or liability. Thus, the statutes= plain meaning is that they apply to any operator of a vehicle, not only a negligent or unsafe driver, who is involved in an accident, regardless of whether one car is involved or several. In addition, A[r]esort to legal or other well accepted dictionaries is [another] way to determine the ordinary meanings of certain terms.@ Rivas, 787 S.W.2d at 116. In interpreting the word Aaccident,@ Black=s Law Dictionary provides several definitions, including: Aa happening,@ Aan incident,@ Aan occurrence or event,@ Asome sudden and unexpected event taking place without expectation,@ and Asomething unforeseen.@ Black=s Law Dictionary 9 (6th ed. 1991). This case may not resemble the stereotypical car accident, but it certainly fits these definitions. The intent of the statute would be defeated if we were to hold otherwise. Furthermore, any other reading of these statutes leads to an absurd result. Appellant=s argument, which would exempt him from responsibility under the statutes on the basis that there was no Aaccident@ and reverse the conviction, is an absurd result we decline to embrace. After examining all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the State proved the Ainvolved in an accident@ element of offense of failure to stop and render aid. See Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186. The evidence is therefore adequate to defeat appellant=s claim of legal insufficiency on this point. Moreover, after reviewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that there is enough evidence to support that an accident in fact occurred to withstand appellant=s factual sufficiency challenge. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129. Appellant=s third and fourth points of error are overruled. In his first and second points of error, appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove that appellant had a duty to provide assistance. Appellant=s argument on both of these points is that his wife, the passenger, was responsible for her own actions and resulting injuries, and as such, he had no duty to assist in the aftermath. It also appears that appellant believes he had no duty because he could not have changed the outcome, since his wife was deceased by the time paramedics arrived. We disagree. Appellant=s contention that he had no duty because he was not at fault, and did not cause the accident, is false. Assuming appellant=s claim that his wife jumped from their speeding car is true, the negligence of the deceased prior to the accident is not a defense to the actions and/or non-action of appellant in failing to render reasonable assistance to his wife after the accident. See Rains v. Heldenfels Bros., 443 S.W.2d 280, 294-95 (Tex. Civ. App.BCorpus Christi 1969, writ ref=d n.r.e.). Furthermore, evidence that his wife was dead or that her condition was hopeless does not exonerate appellant. In Moore v. State, the Texas Supreme Court approved the following sentiments of a California appellate court: Certainly decency and common respect dictate that mutilated humans should not be allowed to lie around in the street as mute evidence . . . There was at least such assistance to be rendered as would comply with the respect due from one human to another who has passed beyond the veil of materiality. . . . [Appellant] certainly cannot be heard to say that he is guilty of no offense because the woman was killed instead of injured. Justice would indeed be Ablind@ and deaf and dumb to heed such specious arguments. Moore v. State, 145 S.W.2d 887, 888-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940) (quoting People v. McKee, 251 P. 675, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1926)). In Texas, the mere fact that an injured person died, and was therefore not in need of assistance, does not excuse the failure of the driver to stop or comply with other provisions of the statute. See Moore, 145 S.W.2d at 888; Galvan v. State, 846 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). In conclusion, we hold that a reasonable jury could have reviewed the evidence presented in this case and found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State proved the duty element of failure to stop and render aid. See Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186. Therefore, the evidence is adequate to defeat appellant=s claim of legal insufficiency. Also, because the State demonstrated that appellant was driving the car when the accident occurred, there is enough evidence supporting the existence of appellant=s duty to withstand his factual sufficiency challenge on this point. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129. Appellant=s first and second points of error are overruled. We have considered all of appellant=s arguments, and they are all overruled. The trial court=s judgment is affirmed. LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ Justice Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.3. Opinion delivered and filed this the 12th day of September, 2002. [1]Retired Judge Michael J. McCormick assigned to this Court by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' ' 74.003 and 75.002 (Vernon 1998). 2Tex. Transp. Code Ann. '' 550.021, 550.023 (Vernon 1999).