Vincent G. Woodard v. State

NUMBER 13-01-524-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI VINCENT G. WOODARD, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. On appeal from the 377th District Court of Victoria County, Texas. O P I N I O N Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Castillo Opinion by Justice Yañez Appellant, Vincent G. Woodard, was tried before a jury and found guilty of intoxication manslaughter as a habitual felon with a finding of a deadly weapon, and sentenced to life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Through one issue, appellant contends that he was illegally searched when his blood was drawn without consent. We overrule the issue and affirm the trial court. Appellant drove his motor vehicle into a severe accident resulting in the death of Kein Sanford. After the accident, appellant was rushed to the emergency room of Citizens Medical Center. The medical center staff drew the appellant=s blood as a part of its medical procedure. Hospital personnel performed a number of tests on the blood, including one for blood alcohol concentration. The hospital tests revealed that appellant had a blood alcohol content level of .226. Subsequently, the criminal district attorney=s office presented two grand jury subpoenas for the appellant=s medical records and four tubes of the appellant=s blood. The tubes of blood were analyzed by the Department of Public Safety lab and found to have a blood alcohol content of .22. Appellant now contends he was illegally searched when the blood was drawn without his consent. While an appellate court must view the historical facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination, whether those facts give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. See State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). As a general rule, the taking of a blood sample is a "search and seizure" within the meaning of Article I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Tex. Const. art. I, ' 9; see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Weaver v. State, 721 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st District] 1986, pet. ref=d.). However, where the State is not involved in obtaining the blood sample, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply. See Vargas v. State, 542 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Weaver, 721 S.W.2d at 497. Moreover, this Court visited this issue in Clark v. State, 933 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1996, no pet.). In Clark, appellant was involved in an automobile accident and taken to Memorial Medical Center in Corpus Christi. Id. The emergency room doctor "called out a trauma code" and, in accordance with hospital protocol, an emergency room technician drew blood from appellant. Id. Part of the trauma protocol was to check for blood-alcohol concentration. Id. Sometime thereafter, a grand jury subpoena was issued for the blood test results. Id. The State then obtained the results as a result of the subpoena. Id. On appeal, the appellant alleged that his blood was seized without a warrant and without his consent. Id. Under these circumstances, this Court held there was no illegal search and seizure of the appellant=s blood, as the sample was drawn for medical purposes. Id. The facts in the instant case are no different. In this case, as in Clark, after a severe motor vehicle accident, appellant was taken to a medical care facility. See id. As part of the standard care for his condition, blood was drawn by medical personnel. A blood-alcohol concentration test was performed by hospital staff as part of the standard procedure. At no time did the State participate in the drawing of blood or the testing of the blood at the hospital. Furthermore, the State did not order the hospital to take the sample. The results were obtained by the State through a grand jury subpoena. Therefore, just as in Clark, there was no illegal search and seizure of appellant=s blood. See id. We hold that there was no illegal seizure of the appellant=s blood and overrule the issue. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ Justice Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.3. Opinion delivered and filed this the 15th day of August, 2002.