Gilbert Carrizales v. State

NUMBER 13-01-765-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG GILBERT CARRIZALES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee. On appeal from the 214th District Court of Nueces County, Texas. O P I N I O N Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Castillo Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez Following a jury trial, appellant, Gilbert Carrizales, was found guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child and was sentenced to thirty-five years of imprisonment. Appellant filed a motion for new trial alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion without holding a hearing. On appeal, in his sole point of error, appellant contended the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on his motion for new trial. We agreed. See Martinez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 19, 21-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (when an accused presents a motion for new trial raising matters not determinable from the record, the trial court abuses its discretion in failing to hold a hearing); see also King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (motion for new trial must be supported by affidavit showing the "truth of the grounds for attack"). Therefore, we abated the appeal and remanded the cause to the trial court for a hearing on appellant's motion for new trial. The trial court held the requisite hearing on September 30, 2002, and considered testimony from appellant, trial counsel, and a witness for appellant. The trial court denied appellant's motion for new trial. The parties have not filed any supplemental briefing following the trial court's order. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for new trial, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. Standard of Review Whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial is a decision within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Accordingly, we review an order denying a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref'd). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable. Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), sets forth the proper standard of review for effectiveness of counsel. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Strickland requires a two-part inquiry. The defendant must first show that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel's assistance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. Second, the defendant must further prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The determination regarding whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel must be made according to the facts of each case. Id. An appellate court looks to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of the case in evaluating the effectiveness of counsel. Id. The appellant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Id. at 813. There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gutierrez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 739, 749 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). To defeat the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, "any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness." McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (per curiam). The fact that another attorney might have pursued a different course of action or tried the case differently will not support a finding of ineffective assistance. Jimenez v. State, 804 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, pet. ref'd). Any error in trial strategy will be deemed inadequate representation only if trial counsel's actions lack any plausible basis. Howland v. State, 966 S.W.2d 98, 104 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), aff'd, 990 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Analysis At the hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant complained that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. Appellant testified that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to discuss his case with him; failed to notify him regarding a court appearance, which resulted in appellant's incarceration for failure to appear; failed to properly investigate his case; failed to contact and interview two potential witnesses; and failed to note an error in one of the penitentiary packets introduced at sentencing regarding appellant's prior convictions. Trial counsel provided lengthy and detailed testimony regarding each instance of alleged ineffectiveness. Trial counsel testified that he spoke with appellant on numerous occasions and performed all investigation that he deemed necessary to prepare appellant's case. He testified that he did not feel that the case required expert witnesses or a professional investigator. Trial counsel testified, and the trial court noted, that counsel filed various motions for discovery which had been granted by the trial court. According to counsel, appellant identified only one potential witness who might offer favorable testimony, and appellant told him "it was like somebody he'd play pool with, and he would be able to testify that somehow because he'd played pool all the time, he didn't have access to the child" that he allegedly assaulted. Counsel concluded that this testimony would not be helpful and might in fact prove harmful to appellant. Counsel testified that appellant offered testimony at trial regarding friction with his ex-wife, as a potential motive for fabrication of the charges against appellant, but counsel denied that any identified potential witness was able to offer similar testimony. John Gaona, appellant's brother-in law, testified that he was willing to appear at trial, but trial counsel did not contact him until the day of trial, and he was unable to leave work to testify. He testified that he knew "what had happened" between appellant and his former wife, but did not offer further testimony regarding the relevance of "what had happened" or whether it could have had any effect on the outcome of the trial. With regard to the missed court appearance, counsel testified that he attempted to contact appellant regarding the appearance, but appellant's phone had been disconnected, and appellant failed to furnish counsel with a current address or telephone number. Counsel filed a writ to obtain appellant's release on bond, appeared at the hearing, and obtained appellant's release on bond. Appellant further contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to note an error in one of the "pen" packets introduced at sentencing. However, any potential error in the admission of the penitentiary packets regarding appellant's other convictions was rendered harmless when appellant pleaded true to the prior convictions. See Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (substantial rights are not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence if, after examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had only a slight affect on the jury). In the instant case, the district court was presented with conflicting testimony regarding the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. A trial court enjoys broad discretion to consider the credibility of the witnesses at a hearing on a motion for new trial, and may consider the interests and bias of any witness. See Valle v. State, 963 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd); Dusenberry v. State, 915 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). In this respect, we note that appellant himself presented inconsistent testimony regarding his meetings with counsel. In an attempt to substantiate his claim that counsel failed to discuss his case with him, appellant testified that he met with him on only two occasions. Later, with regard to his allegations that he had repeatedly identified potential witnesses to counsel, appellant testified that he had discussed the potential witness testimony with counsel on at least four occasions. Further, appellant's testimony regarding counsel's filings in the trial court was in several instances directly contradicted by the documents contained in the court's file. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in considering the conflicting testimony and the interests and biases of the witnesses. See Valle, 963 S.W.2d at 908. Conclusion Appellant failed to meet his burden to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He has not shown that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that his assistance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812, or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See id. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment. Rogelio Valdez Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). Opinion delivered and filed this 19th day of June,2003.