Richard Charles Mengel v. State

NUMBER 13-02-618-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG RICHARD CHARLES MENGEL, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. On appeal from the 357th District Court of Cameron County, Texas. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Castillo Memorandum Opinion by Justice Castillo Appellant Richard Charles Mengel appeals pro se from an order denying his petition to expunge an arrest record. By two issues, Mengel asserts that the trial court erred in denying his petition to expunge and in failing to file requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND Mengel was arrested on September 7, 1997. He was indicted in cause numbers 97-CR-1438-D (attempted murder and aggravated assault), 97-CR-1439-D (aggravated assault), 97-CR-1440-D (aggravated assault); 97-CR-1441-D (aggravated assault), and 97-CR-1442-D (aggravated robbery). Mengel admits he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in cause number 97-CR-1438-D pursuant to a plea agreement and received a sentence of eight years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Mengel filed his petition for expunction of records on June 3, 2002. In prison after his guilty plea and conviction, Mengel participated by telephone in the bench trial of this matter. He testified that his criminal history record showed an arrest on September 7, 1997 for attempted murder, but he was convicted of aggravated assault, not attempted murder. He acknowledged that his conviction arose out of the same circumstances as the attempted-murder charge. The trial court took judicial notice of its file and denied the petition for expunction. The trial court stated, "So based upon that plea of guilty and/or finding of guilt, you're not eligible for expunction. So your motion for expunction is hereby denied, sir." The trial court signed the order on August 2, 2002. Mengel timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which we construe as a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a). A docket entry shows that the trial court denied Mengel's motion on September 3, 2002. No order appears in the record. On September 4, 2002, Mengel filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. On September 30, 2002, Mengel filed a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297. The trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mengel filed a notice of appeal on October 31, 2002. II. EXPUNCTION 1. The Law The purpose of the expunction statute is to allow wrongfully arrested persons a fresh start. Harris County Dist. Attorney's Office v. J.T.S., 807 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1991); see also Heine v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 92 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. App.–Austin 2002, pet. filed). Article 55.01 provides in relevant part: (a)A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if: * * * (2)each of the following conditions exist: (A)an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony has not been presented against the person for an offense arising out of the transaction for which the person was arrested or, if an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony was presented, the indictment or information has been dismissed or quashed, and: * * * (C)the person has not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the date of arrest. A petitioner is entitled to expunction only on proof of satisfaction of each statutory requirement. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Williams, 76 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). 2. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review Although section 55.01 is included in the code of criminal procedure, an expunction proceeding is civil in nature. Heine, 92 S.W.3d at 646. Thus, the petitioner bears the burden of proof. Id. Expunction does not lie if the petitioner does not show compliance with each of the statutory requirements. Perdue v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 35 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2000, no pet.). We review a trial court's ruling on a petition for expunction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Heine, 92 S.W.3d at 646. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles or if its actions were arbitrary and unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). A trial court deciding a petition for expunction has no equitable power to extend the meaning of section 55.01. Herron v. State, 821 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1991, no writ). 3. Analysis In his first issue, Mengel contends he is entitled to expunction because his arrest for attempted murder did not result in a conviction for that offense. However, he admitted that his conviction for aggravated assault arose out of the same circumstances as the attempted-murder charge that resulted in his arrest. Accordingly, we find that Mengel has not met his burden of proving that an indictment charging him with commission of a felony was not presented against him for an offense arising out of the transaction for which he was arrested. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Further, Mengel did not adduce any evidence that he had not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding his arrest for attempted murder. We also find that Mengel did not carry his burden of proof on condition (C) of article 55.01(a)(2). See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2)(C) (Vernon Supp. 2004). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mengel's petition to expunge his attempted-murder arrest record. See Heine, 92 S.W.3d at 646. We overrule Mengel's first issue. III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW By his second issue, Mengel complains that the trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rule 296 requires requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law to be filed within twenty days after the final judgment is signed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. The filing of a motion for new trial does not extend the period within which a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law must be filed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a; see also Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. La Villa I.S.D., 779 S.W.2d 102, 110 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1989, no writ). The record reflects that the trial court signed the judgment on August 2, 2002. Mengel did not file his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law until September 4, 2002. Thus, his request was untimely. See Commercial Union Ins. Co., 779 S.W.2d at 110. We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id. We overrule Mengel's second issue. IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court's order denying expunction. Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed ERRLINDA CASTILLO this 31st day of August, 2004. Justice