Jeffrey Torres v. State

13-02-070- CR; TORRES V STATE NUMBER 13-02-070-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG JEFFREY TORRES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. On appeal from the County Court of Wharton County, Texas. O P I N I O N Before Justices Hinojosa, Yañez and Castillo Opinion by Justice Yañez Pursuant to an agreed punishment recommendation, Jeffrey Torres pled guilty to the offense of driving while intoxicated. The trial court followed the recommendation and gave Torres permission to appeal the denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress. Torres contends that all evidence seized should be suppressed because: (1) his custodial interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure; and (2) there was no probable cause to arrest him for driving while intoxicated. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and remand. At about 2:38 a.m. on October 5, 2000, DPS trooper William Sulak was awakened and directed to investigate a vehicular accident that had occurred in a rural part of Wharton County. Upon his arrival, Sulak found Torres seated in the back seat of a deputy sheriff’s car. Two deputies who had arrived earlier were detaining Torres pending Sulak‘s investigation of the accident. In Wharton County, the DPS troopers investigate traffic accidents in rural areas. After arriving at the scene, Sulak determined that a car had left the roadway and traveled some 150 feet before crashing into the front porch of a residence. After speaking with the owners of the residence, Sulak questioned Torres. Torres stated that he was not familiar with the road and had made a wrong turn. Sulak took Torres into custody and left the scene. As they traveled away from the scene, Sulak noticed that Torres was favoring one of his arms. Sulak inquired and Torres said his arm was hurting. Sulak took Torres to the hospital, where it was determined he had a broken arm and injured rib. Following treatment at the hospital, Sulak took Torres to the sheriff’s office, where his interrogation was videotaped. Torres refused to take a breathalyzer test and asked to see his attorney. At that point, the interrogation ceased and Torres was booked for DWI. Torres filed a motion to suppress statements he allegedly made to Sulak while in the deputies’ car, arguing that failure to give him his constitutional and statutory warnings required suppression. Torres also argued that the motion should be granted because no probable cause was established to arrest him without a warrant. After the motion was denied, Torres pled guilty but preserved his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we afford “almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts,” especially when the trial court’s fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The same amount of deference should be afforded to a trial court’s rulings on “application of law to fact questions,” also known as “mixed questions of law and fact,” if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. Appellate courts may review de novo “mixed questions of law and fact” not falling within this category. Id. The State may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Id. In determining whether an individual is in custody, the ultimate inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam). The determination depends on the objective circumstances, not on the subjective views of either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Id. at 323. Custody is established if the manifestation of probable cause, combined with other circumstances, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has held that in light of the atmosphere surrounding questioning at an ordinary traffic stop, which is exposed to public view and is unlike the frequently prolonged interrogation at a station house, persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1984). In this case, the trial court did not make any explicit findings of historical fact. Therefore, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume the trial court made findings that are supported by the record and buttress its conclusion. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In his first point of error, appellant argues that the suppression motion should have been granted because Sulak’s interrogation of him while he was in the deputies’ car was a custodial interrogation in violation of his U.S. Constitutional and statutory rights. The State responds that Torres was only temporarily detained until Sulak arrived to conduct the accident investigation. Such detention, the State argues, was based on a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity might have occurred. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Specifically, the information that officers must have in order to justify a Terry-type stop is “specific, articulable facts, which in light of their experience and general knowledge, together with rational inferences from those facts, would reasonably warrant [the] intrusion [on the freedom of the citizen].” Glass v. State, 681 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In this case, the deputies placed Torres in their car to await Sulak’s arrival. Because Sulak was the only officer testifying at the suppression hearing, there is no evidence regarding his condition or where he was when the deputies found him. Sulak was called out of bed at 2:38 a.m. and arrived at 3:07 a.m. Torres’s car was still against the residence. Shortly after speaking with the owners of the house, Sulak interviewed Torres, and Torres said he had “made a wrong turn.” There is no evidence that Sulak, up to that point, manifested any intention of arresting Torres. Although Sulak testified that the deputies were keeping Torres “in custody for me” until he arrived, there is no evidence that Torres had been exposed to any “custodial interrogation” while sitting in the deputies’ car. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that this was an unreasonable length of time to be temporarily detained while Sulak conducted his investigation. We hold that Torres was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when initially questioned by Sulak. Thus, his responses are admissible against him. We overrule appellant’s first point of error. In his last two points of error, Torres contends that because there was no probable cause for his arrest, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section nine of the Texas Constitution require granting his suppression motion. We have already held that Torres’s initial detention was lawful because the deputies placed him in their car to await Sulak’s arrival, and Sulak conducted an investigation upon his arrival. An arrest, on the other hand, occurs when a person’s liberty of movement is restricted or restrained. Hoag v. State, 726 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The “totality of the circumstances” test applies in Texas for determining probable cause for a warrantless search and seizure. Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The burden is on the State to prove the existence of probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest or search. Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a particular individual has committed or is committing an offense. See, e.g., Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181 (1985). Sulak testified that at some point after arriving at the scene of the accident, the deputies told him that Torres was very intoxicated. The record does not reflect how the deputies came to this conclusion. Sulak did not remember whether the occupants of the residence also mentioned Torres’s condition. At the scene, Sulak did not ask Torres whether he had been drinking and did not otherwise administer any field sobriety tests. There was no testimony concerning Torres’s physical appearance at the scene. After Torres was treated and released from the hospital, Sulak took him to the sheriff’s office for questioning and to solicit a breathalyzer test. The State argues that the fact that Torres lost control of his car and ran into the front porch of a residence in the early morning hours, combined with the deputies’ statement that Torres was intoxicated, gave Sulak sufficient probable cause to arrest Torres for DWI. In support of its arguments, the State cites Terry and Sandoval v. State, 35 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2000, pet. ref’d). We disagree. In Sandoval, Jara Torres and her family were home celebrating her birthday when a car crashed into a family member’s car, which was parked in front of the house. Sandoval, 35 S.W.3d at 765. Jara ran outside and confronted the driver, who ignored her, backed up, and drove away. Id. Jara’s husband, Ismael, and others followed the car while Jara’s sister called the police. Id. As Ismael followed the car, at times it drove against the flow of traffic. Id. at 766. When the car pulled into a driveway, Ismael followed. Id. Ismael asked Sandoval, the driver, what had happened. Id. Sandoval replied he had no recollection of the collision. He had to be helped by his wife into the house because he could not stand without assistance. Id. When the police arrived, Ismael and the others told police what had happened, that the driver had gone into the house, and that he appeared to be intoxicated. Id. Sandoval’s wife confirmed to police that her husband had been driving the car and was in the back yard. Id. She invited the police in, and they found Sandoval sitting in a chair. Id. Sandoval confirmed he had been driving and appeared to the officers to be intoxicated. Id. The police observed he had bloodshot eyes and unsteady balance. Sandoval was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Id. Unlike the case before us, there were ample articulated facts in Sandoval from lay witnesses and the police that clearly showed that under the totality of the circumstances, Sandoval’s warrantless arrest for driving while intoxicated was reasonable. See id. at 768-69. The State further argues that even if there was no probable cause to arrest Torres, Sulak, acting in his capacity as a community caretaker, was justified in seizing him. See Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Even without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an offense has been committed, a police officer may reasonably seize an individual through the exercise of his community caretaking function. Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The community caretaking function, however, is “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v. Drombowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). Accordingly, a police officer may not properly invoke his community caretaking function if he is primarily motivated by a non-caretaking purpose. See Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151. The State argues that at the scene, Sulak was concerned with Torres’s injuries, rather than whether Torres was intoxicated. The record, however, shows the following exchange during the State’s questioning of Sulak about Torres’s injuries: [State]: All right. At what point did you determine that he was injured physically? [Sulak]: I noticed he was supporting his shoulder when we were – after we left the scene of the accident. In the patrol – in my patrol car, he advised me that his arm was hurting and we decided to go to the hospital. Later, the following took place: [State]: Was there any reason you didn’t take him directly from the accident scene directly to the intoxilizer room? [Sulak]: He was complaining of, of injuries so that had to be addressed. It is obvious from the record that when Sulak removed Torres from the deputies’ car and placed him in his car, he did so to take Torres to the intoxilizer room at the sheriff’s office. On the way to the sheriff’s office, however, Sulak first noticed that Torres was injured. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Sulak was primarily motivated by his community caretaking function when he first took custody of Torres. Sulak’s caretaking function began after he had already arrested Torres by placing him in his unit to take him to the sheriff’s office. We hold that the trooper did not articulate sufficient facts to support probable cause to arrest appellant. His warrantless arrest was therefore illegal. We hold that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. We REVERSE and REMAND to the trial court for further proceedings. LINDA YAÑEZ Justice Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). Opinion delivered and filed this the 17th day of June, 2004