Ida Lee Howard Coats v. State

r02366.nt1 NUMBER 13-02-519-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG IDA LEE HOWARD COATS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. On appeal from the 24th District Court of De Witt County, Texas. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Hinojosa, Yañez, and Garza Opinion by Justice Yañez Following a hearing on the State’s petition for the revocation of community supervision, the trial court reimposed the suspended ten-year sentence and $1,000 fine previously assessed to appellant Ida Lee Howard Coats. We affirm. The trial court has certified that this is not a plea-bargain case. Accordingly, Coats has a right to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2 (a)(2). Standard of Review A trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App.1984). Moreover, once a single violation of community supervision has been proven and established, the court need not consider whether any other allegations of probationary violations on the part of the defendant are supported by evidence. Chaires v. State, 704 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1985, no pet.). Analysis In a single point of error, Coats contends the trial court erred by failing to properly admonish her. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court failed to explain that, by choosing to testify, she consented to questioning by the State that could be used against her in an adverse manner. Appellant cites Carroll v. State, 68 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2002, no pet.), and argues that a waiver of rights is meaningless without proper and adequate warning of the protection that the person waiving those rights is giving up. However, the defendant in Carroll was called by the State to testify. Id. at 252. In this case, appellant’s counsel called her to testify. Also, the trial judge in Carroll advised the defendant that his failure to testify would be considered against him by the court. Id. at 252. Here, appellant took the stand voluntarily after her own counsel called her to testify. Considering these important differences, we hold Carroll to be distinguishable and inapplicable to the present case. Appellant also cites Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W. 2d 732, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), for the proposition that the right against self-incrimination must be interpreted very broadly and very generously. However, the right against self-incrimination can be waived, Chavez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), as will be seen below. Here, appellant voluntarily entered a plea of “true” to the State’s allegations, which alone is sufficient evidence to revoke community supervision. See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App.1980); Bush v. State, 506 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. Crim. App.1974). In addition, appellant took the stand on her own behalf and was represented by counsel. Under these circumstances, we presume this act was undertaken voluntarily and with full knowledge of her rights. See Mullane v. State, 475 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). “It is well settled that when a defendant chooses to waive his privilege against self-incrimination by voluntarily taking the witness stand [she] is generally subject to the same rules as any other witness.” Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Once on the witness stand, a person “may be contradicted, impeached, made to give evidence against himself, cross-examined as to new matter, and treated in every respect as any other witness.” Id. Furthermore, the State established that appellant violated not one, but two conditions of her community supervision. For all of the above reasons, the trial court did not err by revoking appellant’s community supervision. Thus, appellant’s sole point of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ Justice Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). Opinion delivered and filed this the 13th day of May, 2004.