Fidel Sabedra and Eva Sabedra Castillo v. Tori Anderson

NUMBER 13-04-222-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG FIDEL SABEDRA AND EVA SABEDRA CASTILLO, Appellants, v. TORI ANDERSON, ET AL., Appellees. On appeal from the 24th District Court of Jackson County, Texas. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Yañez Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez In this accelerated interlocutory appeal,[1] appellants, Fidel Sabedra and Eva Sabedra Castillo, contend the trial court abused its discretion in denying their request for temporary injunction. We affirm. As this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of our decision and the basic reasons for it.[2] Background At issue in the underlying lawsuit is a property dispute between appellants and appellee, Tori Anderson. Appellants claim an interest in a 15.89 acre tract of land located in Jackson County, Texas. Anderson contends she purchased the property in question by warranty deed in January 2004. Appellants requested that the trial court order Anderson to remove any personal property from the property and prohibit her from interfering with appellants= use and enjoyment of their property. Standard of Review A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter of right.[3] A decision on whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court and should only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion.[4] The appellate court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, indulging every reasonable inference in its favor, and determine whether the decision was so arbitrary as to exceed the bounds of reasonable discretion.[5] The reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for the trial court=s judgment unless the trial court=s order is so arbitrary, unreasonable, or based on so gross and prejudicial an error of law as to establish an abuse of discretion.[6] The trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence and evidence in the record reasonably supports the trial court=s decision.[7] The appellate court cannot resolve the merits of the underlying case.[8] Elements of Temporary Injunction Although the purpose of a temporary injunction is preservation of the status quo, to obtain a temporary injunction, an applicant must generally plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.[9] The probable injury element requires a showing that the harm is imminent, the injury would be irreparable, and that the plaintiff has no other adequate legal remedy.[10] The showing of irreparable harm requires proof that the injury is of such a nature that the injured party cannot be adequately compensated for it by damages.[11] An applicant for a temporary injunction may prove irreparable harm by showing that damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard.[12] For purposes of injunctive relief, no adequate remedy at law exists if damages are incapable of calculation or if the defendant is incapable of responding in damages.[13] Although an injunction is a preventive device, injunctive relief is improper when the party seeking the injunction has mere fear or apprehension of the possibility of injury.[14] In this case, the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law pertaining to the three elements of appellants= application for temporary injunction. Therefore, we will review the record to determine if the order of the court may be upheld under any legal theory supported in the record.[15] Analysis In their sole issue, appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant their temporary injunction. Appellants contend that they seek to maintain the status quo of their possession of the property pending the outcome of a trial on the merits of their suit. In their petition, appellants argue harm is imminent because Anderson has moved a trailer onto the property and Awill in all likely hood [sic] attempt to further develope [sic] Plaintiffs property.@ They contend they have no adequate remedy at law because AAnderson=s going and coming out of plaintiffs [sic] land may cause injury and/or theft too [sic] plaintiffs= and to plaintiffs livestock.@ At the hearing, Sabedra testified that in entering onto the property, Anderson had damaged his corral and fence and had broken locks on the gate. In support of their claim for injunctive relief, appellants offered as evidence (1) a warranty deed to property described as tracts 7, 8, and 10 Aout of Section D, SE 1/4, City of La Ward, Jackson County, Texas@[16] and (2) a partition deed partitioning certain property held by the Sabedra family into ten parcels. After considering the evidence adduced at the hearing, the trial court sent a letter to the parties suggesting that they retain a local title company to obtain a title opinion. After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court=s decision,[17] we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants= application for a temporary injunction. Appellants= sole issue is overruled. We affirm the trial court=s order denying the temporary injunction. _______________________ LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ, Justice Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed this the 14th day of July, 2005. [1] See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (providing an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order that grants or refuses a temporary injunction); Qwest Comms. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. 2000); Wyatt v. Cowley, 74 S.W.3d 576, 577 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2002, pet. dism=d w.o.j). [2] See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. [3] Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002) (citing Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam)). [4] Id.; Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58. [5] Kaplan v. Tiffany Dev. Corp., 69 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2001, no pet.). [6] Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Johnson v. Fourth Ct. App., 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding). [7] Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978); Harbor Perfusion, Inc. v. Floyd, 45 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2001, no pet.). [8] Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 861-62. [9] Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 57; Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968). [10] Harbor Perfusion, 45 S.W.3d at 716. [11] Haq v. America=s Favorite Chicken Co., 921 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1996, writ dism=d w.o.j.). [12] Id. [13] Id. [14] Harbor Perfusion, 45 S.W.3d at 716. [15] See Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 862. [16] We note that Anderson=s warranty deed describes the property she purchased as ALots 22, 23, & 24, Block 26 SE D, Townsite of La Ward, Jackson County, Texas.@ [17] Kaplan, 69 S.W.3d at 219.