Ex Parte: Sergio Castillo

NUMBER 13-07-00128-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG EX PARTE: SERGIO CASTILLO On appeal from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Vela Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez Appellant, Sergio Castillo, appeals from the trial court's denial of his pre-trial writ of habeas corpus. We affirm. I. Background On July 1, 1994, appellant was convicted of the offense of attempted murder. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § § 15.01, 19.02 (Vernon 2003). He was sentenced to 25 years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In an unpublished opinion this Court affirmed appellant's conviction. On September 11, 2002, appellant, pursuant to article 11.07 of the code of criminal procedure, filed a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon 2005). In his writ, appellant asserted both an actual innocence claim and prosecutorial misconduct premised on the State's withholding of exculpatory evidence. On June 4, 2003, appellant's writ was received by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. § 3(a). On March 14, 2006, the trial court entered "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Recommendations for Relief to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals." The trial court determined that (1) the State failed to disclose material evidence favorable to the accused in violation of due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) evidence of appellant's guilt is far outweighed by the evidence of appellant's innocence. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals delivered its opinion on June 21, 2006. See Ex parte Castillo, No. AP-74,460. In its opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the recommendations of the trial court, holding that appellant had been denied exculpatory material by the State and granted relief as follows: "Relief is granted. Appellant is remanded to the sheriff of Cameron County to answer the indictment." Id. The opinion is silent with regard to appellant's actual innocence claim. On remand, the State sought to schedule appellant's case for retrial. Appellant, in order to prevent his retrial, filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, appellant alleged that the State's attempt to re-prosecute him is barred by the principle of collateral estoppel. The trial court denied relief. This appeal ensued. II. Analysis In a single issue, appellant argues that the State is barred from proceeding to trial on the offense of attempted murder because the trial court made a judicial finding that appellant "unquestionably establish[ed] his actual innocence" of the act of shooting Sergio Garcia, Jr. with a firearm. Appellant asserts that the court of criminal appeals' decision is irrelevant to appellant's straightforward claim that the district court's initial fact finding bars relitigation of those findings. We disagree. The theory of collateral estoppel is embodied in the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and precludes the State from twice litigating issues of ultimate fact. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Collateral estoppel only applies after an issue of fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment. See id. at 444; Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Gongora v. State, 916 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. App-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Here, however, there is no valid and final judgment. When a trial court's judgment is reversed on appeal, the trial court's judgment is no longer valid for purposes of collateral estoppel. See Garcia v. State, 768 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Shute v. State, 945 S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd); Ex parte Campbell, 872 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tex. App.-Forth Worth 1994, pet. ref'd). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted appellant's claim for relief and, in effect, vacated his original conviction and sentence. A new trial is then not barred. See Ex parte Mitchell, 977 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that the proper remedy after a finding of prosecutorial misconduct is a reversal of conviction and remand for new trial). A claim of collateral estoppel cannot flow from an invalid judgment of conviction which is not final. See Garcia, 768 S.W.2d at 729. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, therefore, is inapplicable. Further, appellant's reliance on the trial court's findings of fact to support his collateral estoppel claim is clearly incorrect. By legislative mandate, after final conviction in a felony case, any writ of habeas corpus must be made returnable to the court of criminal appeals. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, § 3(a) (Vernon 2005). State trial courts are without jurisdiction to grant relief sought in a post-felony conviction writ of habeas corpus, and any order purporting to do so is void. Ex parte Alexander, 685 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Parr v. State, 206 S.W.3d 143, 145 (Tex. App.-Waco, 2006 no pet.). Appellant cites to no authority to support his position that a trial court's findings of fact are deemed a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel. On the contrary, it is well established that the Court of Criminal Appeals is not bound by the finding of a trial court in a habeas corpus proceeding and may make contrary findings when the record will not support the trial court's findings. See, e.g., Ex parte Olivares, 202 S.W.3d 771, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Ex parte Bagley, 509 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). Thus, without a final judgment to support his collateral estoppel claim, appellant's argument on appeal is without merit. Appellant's sole issue is overruled. III. Conclusion We affirm the trial court's order denying appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus. ROGELIO VALDEZ Chief Justice Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed this the 30th day of August, 2007.