Alexander Lionel Brown v. State

NUMBERS 13-05-711-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG ALEXANDER LIONEL BROWN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. On appeal from the 232nd District Court of Harris County, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza Appellant, Alexander Lionel Brown, was convicted by a jury of theft by a public servant and assessed punishment of three years' imprisonment, with a recommendation of probation. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.03(f)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2006). By three issues, appellant contends that (1) the alleged bias of the trial court denied him the right to a fair trial, (2) the trial court's exclusion of evidence of the university's grievance committee's findings of inadequate record keeping denied him his constitutional right to present a defense, and (3) alternatively, the trial court erred in sustaining the State's relevance and hearsay objections to evidence of an internal audit. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. Background In December 2003, appellant was the Academic Coordinator for the Department of Athletics at the University of Houston. One of his duties included running the department of athletics' book distribution program. Through this program, the university would loan textbooks to students on athletic scholarships, with the books being returned at the end of the semester. Appellant was responsible for overseeing the process of selling used books back to bookstores. Maria Peden was serving as an Assistant Director of Athletics for the University of Houston during this time. On December 22, 2003, she noticed discrepancies between the cash paid out by the bookstores for used books and the amounts that had been deposited for those books with the athletic department's business office. A meeting with appellant in order to address the discrepancies was scheduled for the next day, but appellant was unable to attend. Following the university's holiday break, around January 6th or 7th, 2004, the matter was referred to the university's internal auditors. Appellant returned to work on January 14, at which time he left a voicemail with Peden stating, "whatever was discovered, we'll make it right." That same day, appellant made a deposit of $6,000 with the business office. An investigation by a fraud examiner at the District Attorney's Office revealed appellant's roommate had withdrawn exactly $6,000 from his bank account on January 13, 2004. Appellant was arrested on January 14th and subsequently charged with theft by a public servant. At trial, the State presented evidence of multiple discrepancies between the cash payout receipts from two bookstores and the deposit slips from the department of athletics' business office. These records showed that between December 5, 2003, and December 19, 2003, the bookstores had paid appellant and his assistant, Keon Banks, $7,510 more than appellant had deposited with the athletic department. (1) Appellant tried to introduce documentary and testimonial evidence which he claimed would show that the record keeping procedures used in the book distribution program were inadequate, but the trial court excluded most of this evidence as irrelevant and hearsay. Appellant was convicted by jury of theft by a public servant. At the punishment phase of his trial appellant admitted that he stole from the university and showed remorse for his acts. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. This appeal ensued. II. Right to Fair Trial In his first issue, appellant claims that the bias of the trial court against his lead counsel denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial and amounted to a violation of Canon 3 of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. Tex. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3, reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. B (Vernon 2005). Appellant did not object to this alleged error at trial. (2) Generally, to preserve error for appellate review, an objection must be made in the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 81-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Even though appellant did not object in the trial court, we need not decide whether an objection was required to preserve error because the record does not reflect the partiality of the trial court or that a predetermined sentence was imposed. See Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 644-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)); Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, pet. dism'd). (3) Due process requires that the hearing body or officer be neutral and detached. Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645. Where no clear bias can be shown, the actions of the trial court will be presumed to have been correct. Id. Echoing this due process standard, Canon 3(B)(5) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge should perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. Id. at Canon 3(B)(5). Furthermore, Canon 3(B)(4) states that "a judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity." Id. at Canon 3(B)(4). Specifically, appellant complains of the trial court's comments toward his lead counsel on several occasions, both in and outside of the presence of the jury. For example, in the presence of the jury, the trial court denied appellant's lead counsel an opportunity to respond to a relevancy objection made by the State on two separate occasions, and denied counsel's request to approach the bench regarding the first of those objections. With the jury in recess, the trial court told appellant's lead counsel, in response to counsel's alleged "theatrics," that the court was "just so sick of that I could almost throw up." The trial court also refused to have counsel's question read back during a bench conference which had been called to determine whether counsel had opened the door to evidence of cash shortages that were discovered prior to the time frame covered by the indictment. In response to this request, the trial court stated: "This is a waste of time." The final incident, again with the jury in recess, took place when appellant's lead counsel reported that appellant had been vomiting and had passed out in the restroom, and that an ambulance had been called for him. Counsel became frustrated with the court's attempt to continue the trial in appellant's absence. Counsel said, "it's bothersome to me that the court seems not to be concerned that my client has a major illness," to which the court responded, "Right. I'm not concerned about your client's illness. That is not my concern. My concern is the jury and this case. And evidently that is of not much concern to anybody on your side of the table to the extent that you can delay things." The comments complained of by appellant do not reflect bias, partiality, or that the trial judge did not consider the full range of punishment. See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 644-45. The trial court may have been annoyed, spoken rudely to lead counsel, and even shown callous disregard for appellant's health, all outside the presence of the jury. Yet, none of the comments made in the presence of the jury were made with regard to the guilt or innocence of appellant. The comments that were made in front of the jury, although perhaps rudely made, were in reference to points of procedure. See Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (stating "a trial judge has broad discretion in maintaining control and expediting the trial."). Furthermore, a trial court's irritation with a defense attorney does not indicate the court's views on the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. The comments of the trial court here do not reflect bias, partiality, or that the trial judge did not consider the full range of punishment. As far as appellant's contention that the trial court's comments amounted to a violation of the code of judicial conduct, assuming without deciding that they were, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that mere violations of the code by a trial judge do not by themselves constitute reversible error. Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Because none of the trial court's comments rose to such a level as to bear on the presumption of innocence or vitiate the impartiality of the jury, we overrule appellant's first issue. III. Exclusion of Evidence By his second issue, appellant argues he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense because he was not allowed to introduce evidence of the grievance committee's findings and the university's audit regarding the department of athletic's book distribution program. (4) Appellant argues that exclusion of this evidence as irrelevant and hearsay was constitutional error because it prevented him from effectively presenting his defense. See Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Appellant further argues, alternatively, in his third issue, that even if we were to find that the exclusion of the evidence was not constitutional error, the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objections to the evidence because the evidence was relevant and qualified under the public record hearsay exception. The State responds that because appellant admitted guilt during the punishment phase of the trial, the DeGarmo doctrine, as modified by Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), prevents him from challenging the verdict on these grounds. See Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 722; DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). (5) We agree. (6) The DeGarmo doctrine provides that a defendant who has been found guilty of a crime and who admits his guilt during the trial's punishment phase is barred from contesting on appeal an error that occurred during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. DeGarmo, 691 S.W.2d at 661; Resendez, 160 S.W.3d at 184 (citing Reyes v. State, 971 S.W.2d 737, 737 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998)). The rationale for the DeGarmo doctrine flows from the immediate functional goal of a trial-determining the truth. See Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 724. According to the doctrine, once a defendant admits his guilt to the charged offense, a trial's truth-seeking function is effectively concluded; hence there is no purpose in reviewing any errors that may have occurred because they no longer have any bearing on the determination of truth. See id. In 1998, the court of criminal appeals restricted the applicability of the DeGarmo doctrine. Id. at 724-26. In doing so, the court based its curtailment on an understanding that "ascertainment of truth is not the only objective of our law of criminal procedure." Id. at 724-25. The court stated, "We as a people have deliberately chosen to adopt laws which interfere with the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial. 'Due process and those individual rights that are fundamental to our quality of life co-exist with, and at times override, the truth-finding function.'" Id. (quoting Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). The court outlined a non-exclusive list of guaranties that were "made to preserve a value that was seen to be more important than the discovery of the truth in a trial." Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 725. Included in those guaranties are the freedoms from unreasonable searches and seizures and from self-incrimination, the right to due process, and the prohibition against commenting on a defendant's failure to testify. See id. The list of guaranties set out in Leday is neither exclusive nor final. Thus, post-Leday, when issues are raised on appeal by an appellant who admitted his guilt during the punishment phase of his trial, a reviewing court must "determine if appellant asserts fundamental rights or guaranties [which he cannot be estopped from asserting], or whether the truth-finding function prevails to estop appellant from raising them." See id.; Houston v. State, 208 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, no pet.) (citing Gutierrez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.)); Kelley v. State, 22 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd) (holding that alleged jury charge error did not implicate a fundamental right and DeGarmo doctrine prevented review). Here, appellant unequivocally admitted his guilt during the punishment phase of trial. Thus, he is estopped from raising his complaint on appeal unless we determine that exclusion of the complained-of evidence implicates a fundamental right. We conclude that appellant has not shown that the trial court's exclusion of this evidence at guilt/innocence infringed upon a fundamental right. (7) Recently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has ruled that "the exclusion of a defendant's evidence will be constitutional error only if the evidence forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes defendant from presenting a defense." Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 665. During his murder trial, Potier claimed that he shot the victim in self defense, but was not allowed to testify at trial about rumors he had heard from two people in his neighbor that the victim was looking for him, and either wanted to kill or hurt him. Id. at 665-66. Despite these exclusions, Potier was able to present a good deal of evidence to support his claim of self defense, including testimony about a prior incident in which the victim had allegedly robbed him and attempted to shoot him. Id. at 665. Potier also testified that right before he shot the victim, the victim said he was going to kill him and reached into his pants where Potier thought there was a gun. Id. Based on this evidence, the court of criminal appeals held that the exclusion of the complained-of evidence did not amount to constitutional error, because Potier was nonetheless able to present the substance of his defense to the jury. Id. at 666. In Ray v. State, one of Ray's acquaintances was not allowed to testify about the circumstances immediately preceding Ray's arrest for possession of crack cocaine. See Ray, 178 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The State alleged at trial that Ray had care, custody, and control of the drugs. See id. at 835. Ray contended that the excluded testimony would have shown that just before she and the driver were stopped by police, the driver took one rock of crack cocaine from a container similar to the one found in the car and gave it to the acquaintance. See id. However, Ray was still able to testify that the drugs belonged to the driver of the car, not to her. Id. at 836. Because she was not completely prevented from presenting her defense on this point, the court ruled that, though the testimony that was excluded was in fact relevant, the error committed by the trial court was not of a constitutional dimension. Id. The instant case is similar to the two cases discussed above. In presenting his defense, appellant was able to introduce some evidence of the inadequacies of the university's record keeping and of the grievance committee's findings. Peden testified that there were "many problems with the book procedures" and that the record keeping was "woefully inadequate." The university's athletic director also testified, with regard to the book distribution program that, "the audit found . . . that the procedures could be improved upon." (8) Because appellant was still able to present some evidence to support his "poor accounting" defense that the book distribution program's record keeping was inadequate, we hold that exclusion of the complained-of evidence did not "significantly undermine fundamental elements of the accused's defense," and therefore was not constitutional error. See Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 666 (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315 (1998)). In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that application of the DeGarmo doctrine, as modified by Leday, precludes appellant from raising his complaints on appeal. Because appellant is estopped from raising these points on appeal, we overrule his second and third issues. IV. Conclusion The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. _________________________ DORI CONTRERAS GARZA, Justice Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed this the 12th day of July, 2007. 1. Both appellant and Banks were fired. Banks was later reinstated as an employee of the university. 2. Appellant relies on holdings from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in arguing that the comments by the trial judge here constitute fundamental error, relieving appellant of the requirement to object below. See Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). However, when deciding whether this Court may address unassigned error, the applicable test is set forth in Marin. See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 278; see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. 3. However, if the alleged bias of the trial court had risen to the level of fundamental error, appellant would not have waived his right to appellate review by his silence. See Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 131 (citing Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 278. Prejudicial comments or actions by a trial court constitute fundamental error when they (1) taint the presumption of innocence in front of the jury, or (2) indicate that the trial court has imposed a predetermined sentence. Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 132; Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, pet. dism'd). 4. The audit was requested by the grievance committee that convened to evaluate the case of Keon Banks, who was also fired (prior to appellant's firing) as a result of the alleged thefts in the book distribution program. The record reflects that when appellant attempted to offer this evidence the State successfully objected on relevance and hearsay grounds. Appellant proceeded to conduct a bill of exceptions claiming that the grievance committee made a number of findings about the shortcomings of the record keeping procedures used in the book distribution program. 5. In Resendez v. State, 160 S.W.3d 181,184 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.), this Court addressed the De Garmo doctrine and its subsequent abrogation by the court of criminal appeals in Leday. In Resendez, we held that a defendant admitting guilt during the punishment phase does not waive the right to challenge sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. See id. Our holding and application in the present case is not affected by and does not affect our holding in Resendez. 6. A trial court's decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex. Crim. App.1996). If the trial court's evidentiary ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, no abuse of discretion has occurred and the trial court's ruling must be upheld. Id. The erroneous exclusion of evidence does not result in reversible error unless it affects a substantial right of the accused. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Alexander v. State, 137 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd). 7. In reaching our conclusion, we point out that appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, he complains only of the trial court's discretionary determination to not admit evidence regarding the university's grievance committee findings and evidence of an internal audit. See Resendez, 160 S.W.3d at 184 (holding that defendant admitting guilt during punishment phase does not waive right to challenge sufficiency of evidence on appeal). 8. In addition, during closing arguments, appellant made the uncontested argument that whether he gave back all of the money in question could not be proved "in light of the University of Houston's shotty [sic] accounting practices."