Hawkins, Marcus S. v. State

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 31, 2003 Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 31, 2003. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals ____________ NO. 14-02-00717-CR ____________ MARCUS HAWKINS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 262nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 898,607 M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N A jury convicted appellant Marcus Hawkins of murder and assessed punishment at eighty years= confinement. In four points of error, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm. Background and Procedural History On January 23, 2001, at approximately 8:15 a.m. Houston police officer A.W. Duncan responded to a suspicious activity call from the Crescent City Apartments in Harris County. When Officer Duncan arrived, he found the complainant, Jonus Onwuchuruba, dead in a bathroom in his apartment. The complainant had bled to death after suffering approximately eighty lacerations, abrasions, and contusions caused by blunt and sharp force trauma. Officer Duncan also discovered large amounts of blood throughout the apartment, broken glass from a coffee table, and a trail of bloody shoe prints leaving the apartment. Two witnesses, residents of the Crescent City Apartments at the time of the murder, testified at trial regarding incidents they witnessed between 7:00 and 7:30 the morning of January 23, 2001. Dejuana Thompson lived in an apartment adjacent to the complainant=s apartment. Thompson heard the complainant screaming, saying AHelp me,@ and heard several thumping noises she described as sounding like somebody getting thrown against a wall. She also saw a red Dodge Neon speeding out of the apartment complex parking lot and bloody shoe prints leaving the complainant=s apartment. Irma Garza, who lived in the apartment directly downstairs from the complainant=s apartment, heard an argument, voices screaming, a body falling to the floor, and what sounded like two people leaving the apartment. A tip and a phone number on the complainant=s Caller ID led homicide detectives, Kennedy, Flores, and Garretson, to appellant. Appellant had four outstanding traffic warrants. The detectives went to appellant=s grandmother=s house on January 25, 2001, to arrest him on the traffic warrants. Appellant=s grandmother led the detectives to appellant, who was asleep in his bedroom. The detectives turned on the lights, opened a window shade, and woke up appellant. As appellant reached for a pair of pants, the detectives observed a pair of noticeably bloody tennis shoes. They arrested appellant on the traffic warrants and seized the bloody tennis shoes. They subsequently learned that appellant=s grandmother owns a red Dodge Neon. The detectives located the red Dodge Neon at an apartment complex where the appellant=s girlfriend, Shante Haywood, worked. Haywood was the estranged wife of the complainant. She was arrested as a suspect in the murder of her husband. Appellant gave a statement about his involvement in the murder. In his statement, he admitted to the following: 1) on January 23, 2001, he and Haywood drove his grandmother=s red Dodge Neon to the complainant=s apartment for the purpose of getting some money, 2) he was in the car when Haywood initially entered the complainant=s apartment, 3) he was inside the complainant=s apartment that morning, 4) he held the complainant so that Shante could slap and hit him, 5) when the complainant broke free from his grasp, appellant and Haywood both called for him to come back into the room, and 6) Haywood used a big piece of glass to try to cut the complainant. He stated, however, that he did not know that Athis was going to happen.@ In his statement, appellant also claimed that Haywood asked an individual by the name of AChop@ if he wanted a ride when they were entering the gate at the complainant=s apartment complex. He asserted Chop was in the apartment with them that morning and that Chop grabbed a piece of broken glass and started to stab the complainant. Appellant maintained Haywood started screaming ANo@ and that he then pulled her out of the apartment, leaving Chop alone with the complainant. Appellant said they then ran to the car and drove back to appellant=s grandmother=s house. Appellant was charged with murder. Several detectives, investigators, and forensic experts testified at trial. Officer Duncan, the first investigator to arrive at the scene, testified to seeing bloody shoe prints, one set of large ones and one set of smaller ones, directly in front of the complainant=s apartment. Homicide Detective D. H. Couch, then a member of the Crime Scene Unit, testified to seeing one set of bloody footprints heading away from the complainant=s front door, a broken glass coffee table, and a bloody partial shoe print on the complainant=s stomach. He identified three knives that were recovered from the sceneCone with a broken blade and one with a bent blade. Detective Couch further testified to recovering a knit cap, a pair of gloves that had been turned inside out and left on the bedroom floor, a pair of bloody blue jeans with a ladies= watch in the pocket, and some slacks. Homicide Detective Hale Kennedy testified to the following: 1) the complainant=s ACaller ID@ box listed the phone number registered to appellant=s grandmother, 2) Haywood and the complainant were legally married, 3) Haywood had a child by appellant, 4) appellant and Haywood were living together at appellant=s grandmother=s house, 5) appellant=s grandmother owned a red Dodge Neon, and 6) appellant stated that he was wearing the tennis shoes seized by police on the morning the complainant was murdered. Homicide Detective L.D. Garretson testified that he obtained a statement from appellant. The State read appellant=s statement into evidence. Detective Garretson also testified the police identified ten people who were known to use the alias AChop@ and eliminated nine of them as suspects. He further testified that he interviewed the tenth AChop@ in the Harris County jail. Detective Garretson determined that this AChop@ (whose real name was Caryl Bloomfield or Broomfield) (hereinafter, AChop@) did meet with both Haywood and appellant. Chop submitted to a blood test. After interviewing Chop, Garretson eliminated him as a suspect. A latent print examiner compared appellant=s bloody tennis shoes with photos of the shoe prints found outside of the complainant=s apartment and determined the shoe prints in the crime scene photos were made by appellant=s shoes or shoes just like them. A criminalist with the HPD crime lab performed a DNA analysis in which he compared the DNA of appellant, Chop and the complainant. The criminalist determined that the blood found on appellant=s tennis shoes belonged to the complainant. An assistant medical examiner testified to finding shards of glass embedded in the complainant=s body. Chop testified to knowing both Haywood and appellant. He denied any involvement in the complainant=s murder. Appellant did not testify at the guilt/innocense phase of his trial and the defense rested without calling any witnesses. The jury charge permitted conviction if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant either acting alone, or as a party with Haywood and/or Chop, caused the death of complainant by stabbing him with a deadly weapon in the form of either a knife or a piece of glass or that appellant either acting alone, or as a party with Haywood and/or Chop, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life by stabbing complainant with a deadly weapon in the form of either a knife or a piece of glass and did thereby cause the death of complainant. The jury was instructed to acquit appellant if they found he was acting in self-defense or defense of Haywood. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. This appeal followed. Legal and Factual Sufficiency In four points of error, appellant claims the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for murder either as a principal or as a party. We apply different standards when reviewing the evidence for legal and factual sufficiency. Standards of Review When reviewing legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318‑19 (1979); Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If a reviewing court determines the evidence is insufficient under the Jackson standard, it must render a judgment of acquittal because, if the evidence is insufficient under Jackson, the case should never have been submitted to the jury. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 307. In a legal sufficiency challenge, we do not reweigh the evidence. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Evidence can be factually insufficient in one of two ways: (1) the evidence is so weak as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, or (2) the finding of a vital fact is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). These standards encompass the complete civil appellate law formulation for factual insufficiency. Id. Which standard applies generally depends on whether the complaining party had the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 9‑10. If the complaining party did not have the burden of proof at trial, then the first or Amanifestly unjust@ standard applies. Id. at 10. If the complaining party on appeal had the burden of proof at trial, then the second or Aagainst the great weight and preponderance@ standard applies. Id. If the defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the elements of the offense on appeal, even though the State has the burden of proof, the reviewing court must review the evidence using both standards. Id. at 11; see also Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In other words, the reviewing court asks whether Aa neutral review of all the evidence . . . demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury=s determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof.@ Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Additionally, when a general verdict is returned, the reviewing court will examine the record to determine if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt under any of the allegations submitted. If so, the verdict will be upheld. Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W. 2d 555, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Thus, the State need only have sufficiently proven one of the allegations to support the guilty verdict. Fuller, 827 S.W. 2d at 931. Therefore, we must determine whether sufficient evidence supports the finding of guilt based upon any one of the allegations submitted to the jury. Id. Because we conclude the evidence supports a finding that appellant is guilty as a party under section 7.01(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code, and that a deadly weapon in the form of broken glass was used, we need not address whether he is guilty of acting individually or whether the evidence is sufficient to find the deadly weapon used was a knife. See Ahrens v. State, 43 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref=d.) Analysis A person commits the offense of murder if he: 1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or 2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 19.02(b)(1)-(2) (Vernon 1994). A person commits an offense under the law of parties if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1994). The thrust of appellant=s complaint is the State failed to prove he intended to inflict serious bodily injury or death upon the complainant. We find no merit in appellant=s argument. Evidence is legally sufficient to convict under the law of parties when the defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages its commission by acts, words, or other agreement. Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The evidence must show that, at the time of the offense, the parties were acting together, each contributing some part towards the execution of their common purpose. Id. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to show that a person is a party to an offense; and, in determining whether a defendant participated as a party, a court may examine events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense. Thomas v. State, 915 S.W.2d 597, 599‑600 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref=d). Moreover, the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances may be sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt. See id. The jury may infer the intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). See also Holiday v. State, 14 S.W.3d 784, 787 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref=d). Appellant was a party to the murder if he was physically present during the commission of the offense and encouraged its commission by acts, words, or other agreement. Appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction as a party because the State failed to prove he intended for any party to inflict serious bodily injury or death upon the complainant. To the contrary, the State was required to prove appellant had the intent to promote or assist Haywood and/or Chop in the offense and actually solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Haywood and/or Chop to commit the offense. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1994). To prove a party=s intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense, the evidence must reflect that at the time of the offense the parties acted together, each doing some part to execute the common design. Burdine v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The jury can infer knowledge and intent from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. State, 32 S.W.3d 388, 393 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.). Moreover, proof of a culpable mental state generally relies on circumstantial evidence. Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). The evidence indicated that two people were involved in the complainant=s murder: a neighbor testified to hearing two people leaving the apartment and Officer Duncan testified to seeing two sets of bloody footprints leaving the apartment. Appellant admitted to fleeing the murder scene with Haywood and to wearing the bloody tennis shoes the morning of the murder. A latent print examiner testified that the bloody shoe prints were left by appellant=s shoes or shoes just like them. The complainant=s blood was positively identified on appellant=s tennis shoes. Appellant admitted restraining the complainant while Haywood assaulted him and further admitted that after the complainant escaped appellant=s clutches, both he and Haywood tried to lure the complainant back into the living room. According to appellant=s testimony, Haywood broke a large piece of glass in her hand and attempted to stab the complainant with it. The complainant suffered eighty wounds; shards of glass were found throughout his body, including his scalp. The police were unable to find any evidence placing Chop at the scene of the murder. While appellant claimed in his statement that Chop must have stabbed the complainant after he and Haywood left the apartment, a rational jury could have disbelieved that statement and found that appellant encouraged, aided, or attempted to aid Haywood and/or Chop to stab the complainant. A rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, could have found that appellant was a party to the offense of murder. We hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support the murder conviction. Appellant=s first and third points of error are overruled. Appellant contends that the State=s evidence showing his intent was factually insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree. In a factual sufficiency analysis, the reviewing court is required to consider the evidence that the appellant claims undermines the jury=s verdict. See Sims v. State, 99 S. W. 3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The evidence appellant cites as most supportive of his claim that he did not have the requisite intent as a party is his own statement that he Adid not know this was going to happen.@ The defense did not present evidence during the guilt/innocense phase of the trial. As the State correctly notes, the evidence is not rendered insufficient simply because the defense presents a different version of the events. See Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 284‑87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Moreover, the jury could choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of the witnesses= testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). From its verdict, it is clear that the jury chose to disbelieve appellant=s statement regarding his intent. We must now proceed to review the evidence considered by the jury to prove the existence of appellant=s intent. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. The State=s evidence clearly showed that appellant was intimately involved in the murder: 1) his tennis shoes were covered in the complainant=s blood, 2) bloody shoe prints from his shoes or shoes just like his and a set of smaller shoe prints left a trail of blood from the complainant=s apartment, and 3) he and Haywood fled the scene of the crime in the same car. In addition, the following evidence specifically points towards appellant=s intent to assist Haywood and/or Chop in the offense: 1) he actively restrained the complainant while Haywood hit and slapped him, and 2) he assisted Haywood in luring complainant back into the living room after the complainant escaped from their grasp. Because appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of a guilt finding, we review the record using both standards, giving due deference to the jury=s assessment of the witnesses= credibility and resolution of evidentiary conflicts, and determine that the State=s evidence taken alone is neither too weak to support the finding nor that the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Zuliani, 97 S. W. 3d at 589; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11. Therefore, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant=s conviction. Appellant=s second and fourth points are overruled. The trial court=s judgment is affirmed. /s/ Leslie Brock Yates Justice Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed July 31, 2003. Panel consists of Justices Yates, Hudson, and Frost. Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).