King, Christian Dsean v. State

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 17, 2003 Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 17, 2003. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals _______________ NO. 14-02-01247-CR _______________ CHRISTIAN DSEAN KING, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ________________________________________ On Appeal from 177th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 923,691 ________________________________________ M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N Appellant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, he pled no contest to the charge. In his sole issue, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1) the stop of his car was improper; (2) he was arrested without probable cause in violation of his constitutional rights; and (3) the firearms were the fruit of a search incident to an unlawful arrest. We affirm. I. Background While on patrol, a Houston Police officer stopped at a red light behind appellant’s car. He entered appellant’s license plate number into the patrol car computer. The police database indicated that appellant’s car was listed as a “wanted” vehicle. After verifying this information with the dispatcher, the officer decided to stop appellant’s car, but first called for back up. While waiting for back up to arrive, the officer saw appellant run a red light. When additional officers arrived, the officer made a “felony traffic stop,” ordering appellant and the passenger out of the car at gunpoint. Appellant and the passenger were then handcuffed and placed in the back of separate patrol cars. While confirming there were no other occupants in the car, one of the officers saw a pistol butt protruding from underneath the driver’s seat. The officers also saw a firearm protruding from underneath the front passenger seat. After the firearms were discovered, appellant was formally placed under arrest. II. The Stop of Appellant’s Car To stop a motorist for investigative purposes, an officer must have reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the person being detained has been, is, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts which, in light of the police officer’s experience and personal knowledge, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). When determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, we look at the totality of the circumstances. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d. 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause de novo. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this review, we afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts, especially when the trial court’s findings are based on an evaluation of the demeanor and credibility of witnesses. Id. Appellant contends that the patrol car computer report did not give the officer sufficient justification to stop his car. However, we do not reach this point because appellant’s violation of a traffic law provided an independent ground for the officer to stop his car. An officer may stop a motorist who commits a traffic violation in the officer’s presence. Armitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). At the motion to suppress hearing, the officer testified that he saw appellant run a red light. Appellant, however, testified that the light was yellow when he went through the intersection. At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial judge is the sole finder of fact and may believe all or any part of a witness’s testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The trial judge resolves all conflicts in the testimony. State v. Fecci, 9 S.W.3d 212, 218–19 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). The trial court did not make explicit findings of fact in support of its ruling at the motion to suppress hearing. However, we assume that the trial court implicitly found the facts needed to support its ruling, so long as those implied findings are reasonably supported by the record. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude that the trial court believed the officer’s testimony and consequently found that appellant ran a red light in the officer’s presence. See id. Failure to stop at a red light is a traffic violation under Texas law. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.007(d) (Vernon 1999). Although the officer conceded that the traffic violation did not constitute his basis for stopping appellant, the officer’s state of mind need not provide the legal justification for an objectively valid action. Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 100–01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). As the officer in this case saw appellant run a red light, he had an objective basis to stop appellant’s car regardless of the subjective motive he expressed for making the stop. See id. Because appellant committed a traffic violation in the officer’s presence, we find that reasonable suspicion existed for the officer to stop appellant’s car. III. Discovery of Prohibited Firearms Appellant argues that his initial detention was a warrantless arrest rather than an investigative detention. He contends that this warrantless arrest was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution and that the firearms were the fruit of a search incident to the unlawful arrest.[1] Because a warrantless arrest is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, it must be supported by probable cause. See Kaupp v. Texas, 123 S. Ct 1843, 1846 (2003). Any evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Lewis v. State, 737 S.W.2d 857, 862 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d). We do not decide, however, whether appellant’s detention escalated into an arrest. Regardless of the nature of appellant’s detention, two separate grounds support the trial court’s ruling. If appellant were merely detained, the discovery of the firearms was permissible because they were in plain view at the time of the traffic stop. When police seize an item that is in plain view, the Fourth Amendment is not offended because there is no invasion of privacy. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Specifically, the plain view doctrine requires that (1) an officer see an item in plain view at a vantage point where he has a right to be and (2) the officer immediately recognize that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Franklin v. State, 855 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.). Here, after ordering appellant and the passenger from the car, some of the officers restrained the two individuals. Other officers approached the car to ascertain whether there were any remaining occupants who could pose a threat to the officers’ safety. During a traffic stop, officers are entitled to approach the car and detect any items that are in plain view. See Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 544; cf. Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 560 (Tex. Crim. App 1989) (holding that evidence in plain view must be suppressed where the initial stop was not based on reasonable suspicion). Additionally, officers have a right to take reasonable precautions to ensure their own safety. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109–11 (1977) (holding that an officer may ask a driver to step out of the car if it is necessary to ensure the officer’s safety); Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 771 (holding that officer may handcuff driver and place him in patrol car if necessary to ensure the officer’s safety); Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding that to ensure an officer’s safety during an investigative stop, the officer may move a suspect from one location to another). Thus, the police had the right to approach the car to check for other occupants. Furthermore, the record reflects that the police saw the firearms in plain view and immediately recognized that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Therefore, if appellant were merely detained, the motion to suppress was properly denied. Alternatively, even if appellant had been arrested, the officer testified that he saw appellant run a red light. An officer may make a warrantless arrest for a traffic offense committed in his presence or within his view. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 1977). Therefore, if the officer did in fact arrest appellant, he had an objectively valid reason to do so. See Williams, 726 S.W.2d at 101. Because appellant committed a traffic offense in the presence of the officer, any arrest was lawful, and the officers were permitted to conduct a search incident to arrest. See id. at 100–01. Therefore, appellant’s attempt to suppress the firearms was properly denied. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. /s/ Charles W. Seymore Justice Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed July 17, 2003. Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Seymore, and Guzman. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). [1] Appellant contends that the officers’ conduct violated his rights under both the Texas and United States Constitution. However, he does not indicate how his rights under the Texas Constitution exceed or differ from his rights under the United States Constitution. Therefore, we will only consider his federal constitutional argument. See Arnold v. State, 873 S.W.2d 27, 33 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).