Allen, Samuel Monroe v. State

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 27, 2003 Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 27, 2003. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals ____________ NO. 14-02-00542-CR ____________ SAMUEL MONROE ALLEN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ___________________________________________ On Appeal from the 182nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 863,881 ___________________________________________ M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N Appellant, Samuel Monroe Allen, pled guilty to the offense of sexual assault. After a bench trial, the trial court assessed punishment at fifteen years’ confinement. On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure[1] and contends the trial court committed fundamental error in entering judgment without a waiver of his constitutional rights to compulsory process. We affirm. Constitutionality of Article 1.15 In his first two issues, appellant specifically contends that in accepting his guilty plea and proceeding to enter judgment when he was not allowed under article 1.15 to present any evidence in his defense, the trial court committed fundamental error and violated his rights of compulsory process.[2] Appellant’s argument is faulty because: (1) article 1.15 does not prevent a defendant who pleads guilty from presenting any evidence; and (2) the trial court is not required under the article to accept the State’s evidence as a sufficient showing of guilt regardless of the quality or quantity of that evidence. Apparently prompting appellant’s notion that a defendant cannot present evidence and that the judge must accept the State’s evidence is the following language in article 1.15: “[I]t shall be necessary for the state to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment . . . .” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. In response to arguments substantially similar to those raised by appellant, both this Court and the First Court of Appeals have held that the procedures set forth in article 1.15 do not violate the right to compulsory process. See Lyles v. State, 745 S.W.2d 567, 567–68 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d); Vanderburg v. State, 681 S.W.2d 713, 716–18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d).[3] In Vanderburg, we stated: After a defendant has entered a plea of guilty and after he has waived his right to a jury trial, the state is required to produce sufficient evidence before a judgment of guilty can be entered. Even though federal common law allows a conviction upon a guilty plea alone, Texas does not. Texas requires the judgment be supported by sufficient evidence from the state . . . . Appellant alleges the trial court is barred from considering testimony elicited on cross-examination. However he cites no cases for this contention nor can we find any. Nothing in Article 1.15 prohibits the court from considering testimony produced through cross-examination of the state’s witnesses or by the defense putting on its own evidence through rebuttal witnesses . . . . 681 S.W.2d at 718. In Lyles, the First Court of Appeals stated: Appellant misconstrues both the purpose and the effect of article 1.15. The purpose of the article is to ensure that no person may be convicted of a felony on a plea of guilty without sufficient evidence being introduced to show guilt. Crawford v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. R. 554, 278 S.W.2d 845 (1955). The effect of the article is to maintain the burden of proof on the State even where a plea class=Section2> of guilty or nolo contendere has been entered by the defendant. Thornton v. State, 601 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The article neither prohibits the defendant from offering evidence nor prohibits the court from considering the evidence offered by the defendant. In this case, appellant offered evidence during the punishment phase of the trial. 745 S.W.2d at 567–68. Therefore, under this line of precedent article 1.15 neither prevents a defendant from adding evidence nor requires the trial judge to accept the State’s evidence as sufficient proof of guilt. Appellant acknowledges the holding in Vanderburg, but cites to opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and interprets those cases as requiring a trial court to conduct a full trial on a guilty plea, citing Thornton v. State, 601 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); and Bolton v. State, 59 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933). However, all of the cases cited by appellant predate Vanderburg and Lyles, and most are specifically analyzed in the courts of appeals’ opinions in reaching the conclusion that procedures under article 1.15 do not violate a defendant’s right to compulsory process. The opinions cited by appellant do not conflict with the holdings in Vanderburg or Lyles. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not commit fundamental error in utilizing the procedures under article 1.15. For the reasons expressed in Vanderburg and Lyles, appellant’s first two issues are overruled. Waiver of Compulsory Process In his third and fourth issues, appellant maintains the trial court erred in entering judgment where the record does not reflect a waiver by appellant of his constitutional right to compulsory process. This same argument was made by the appellants in Vanderburg and Lyles, and as stated in those cases, neither federal nor Texas law requires that a defendant who pleads guilty must expressly waive the right to compulsory process. Lyles, 745 S.W.2d class=Section3> at 568; Vanderburg, 681 S.W.2d at 717.[4] Appellant cites no Texas statutes, cases, or rules proffered or amended since Lyles and Vanderburg were issued that would change the analysis contained in those opinions. He does, however, cite to older cases from other jurisdictions. See State v. Avila, 617 P.2d 1137 (Ariz. 1980); State v. Offing, 551 P.2d 556 (Ariz. 1976); Bunnell v. Superior Court, 531 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1975); State v. Crowley, 528 P.2d 834 (Cal. 1975); In re Mosely, 464 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1970). These cases dealt not with procedures after a plea of guilty but with procedures and judgments based on stipulations of evidence in lieu of full trial. They are, therefore, not directly on point with the issue in the present case. As a prior decision of this court, Vanderburg is controlling authority, and as a decision of our sister court, Lyles is certainly persuasive authority.[5] Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in Vanderburg and Lyles, appellant’s third and fourth issues are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. /s/ Eva M. Guzman Justice Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed February 27, 2003. Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Seymore, and Guzman. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). [1] The article states, in full: No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly rendered and recorded, unless the defendant, upon entering a plea, has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing in accordance with Articles 1.13 and 1.14; provided, however, that it shall be necessary for the state to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same. The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and further consents either to an oral stipulation of the evidence and testimony or to the introduction of testimony by affidavits, written statements of witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of the judgment of the court. Such waiver and consent must be approved by the court in writing, and be filed in the file of the papers of the cause. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. [2] The right to compulsory process is guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”); Tex. Const. art. I, § 10 (“[the accused] shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”). Compulsory process has been defined as “the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.” Coleman v. State, 966 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)). It is an integral component and a core interest of due process law. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19. Although appellant raises his state and federal constitutional claims as separate issues, he does not argue that his rights under the Texas Constitution are any different than his rights under the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we will not address his state claims separately. See Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 772 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). [3] The courts have consistently followed these precedents in a host of unpublished cases. See, e.g., Morrison v. State, No. 14-00-00111-CR, 2000 WL 1785017 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); Tucker v. State, No. 01-95-00022-CR, 1996 WL 54012 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication). [4] The United States Supreme Court has held that, when a defendant enters a guilty plea, three constitutional rights must be specifically waived: (1) the right to trial by jury; (2) the privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) the right to confrontation. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1960); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) (requiring the same three rights in guilty plea admonitions); Lyles, 745 S.W.2d at 568 (discussing Boykin). The record in the present case reflects that, in open court, appellant waived his rights to a jury trial, against self-incrimination, and to confrontation of witnesses. [5] As the Court of Criminal Appeals has observed, “the doctrine of stare decisis should generally be followed, because it promotes judicial efficiency and consistency, it fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).