Carlos Gonzales-Cantu v. State

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 26, 2008 Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 26, 2008. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals ____________ NO. 14-07-00611-CR ____________ CARLOS GONZALES-CANTU, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 351st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1073631 M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N Appellant Carlos Mario Gonzales-Cantu appeals his conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine. In six issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm. I. Background In June of 2006, members of the Secret Service Agency=s Houston Area Fraud Task Force received information regarding a stolen credit card. The card was being used to purchase and ship items to a post office box in Houston. On June 12, 2006, while two special agents were waiting to speak with the Postal Inspector of the facility containing the box, appellant entered and signed for the contents of the box under the name of David Lopez. An agent initiated conversation with appellant and asked for identification. Appellant presented a Texas driver=s license bearing the name Edwin David Lopez, but when asked if that was actually him, appellant admitted that he was not Lopez. Appellant told the agents that he did not have any identification with him, but that he had come in his car, which was outside the facility. Appellant and the agents went out to appellant=s car, and appellant retrieved a rental car receipt showing that the car had been rented in his name. The agents noticed a variety of items in the backseat of the vehicleCclothing, backpacks, file folders, pillows, and a laptop computer. Appellant=s companion, Christopher Cox, was sitting in the driver=s seat, but he could not produce identification or a driver=s license. Appellant was searched and found to be in possession of two credit cards, one issued to Brandon Aldridge and one issued to Michael Black. Unauthorized purchases had been made on these two accounts. The agents released Cox but arrested appellant in conjunction with the stolen credit cards and impounded the vehicle. In the process of searching the vehicle, the agents discovered locked luggage in the trunk. The luggage was lined with sheets of fabric softener.[1] Inside the luggage, the agents found a black safe containing 129.3 grams of methamphetamine, 316.6 grams of Ketamine, and 1.9 kilograms of GHB.[2] Numerous drug paraphernalia items were found along with the controlled substances, including a syringe, pipe, and scale. The agents discovered more drug paraphernalia, a crack pipe and razor blades, in the passenger compartment. The agents also found approximately $1400 in cash in the vehicle. Most of the money was in a money bag under the front passenger seat; the remainder was discovered in the luggage in the trunk. Appellant was charged with possession with intent to deliver more than four grams but less than two hundred grams of methamphetamine. After a bench trial, the court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to forty-five years in prison. This appeal followed. II. Standard of Review Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. In evaluating a legal sufficiency claim attacking a jury=s finding of guilt, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We do not ask whether we believe the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318B19 (1979). Rather, we determine only whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In our review, we accord great deference Ato the responsibility of the trier of fact [to fairly] resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.@ See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. In conducting a factual sufficiency review of the jury=s determination, we look at all evidence in a neutral light and will reverse only if (1) the evidence is so weak that the finding seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or (2) considering conflicting evidence, the finding, though legally sufficient, is nevertheless against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414B15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). It is not enough that we may harbor a subjective level of reasonable doubt to overturn a finding that is founded on legally sufficient evidence. See id. at 417. We cannot conclude that a finding is Aclearly wrong@ or Amanifestly unjust@ simply because, on the quantum of evidence admitted, we would have voted differently had we been the factfinder. See id. Nor can we declare that a conflict in the evidence justifies a new trial simply because we may disagree with the factfinder=s resolution of that conflict. See id. Rather, before ordering a new trial, we must first be able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the (albeit legally sufficient) evidence contradicts the verdict. See id. Appellant was charged with the offense of knowingly or intentionally possessing four or more grams but less than two hundred grams of methamphetamine. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. '' 481.102(6), 481.115(d) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2007). When an accused is charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove (1) the defendant exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the contraband and (2) the accused knew the object he possessed was contraband. See Linton v. State, 15 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref=d). The element of possession may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). When the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances affirmatively linking the accused to the contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Circumstantial evidence relevant to establish an affirmative link between appellant and the contraband includes (1) the defendant=s presence when a search is conducted, (2) whether the contraband was in plain view, (3) how close and accessible the drugs were to the defendant, (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested, (5) the defendant=s possession of other contraband or narcotics when arrested, (6) any incriminating statements the defendant made when arrested, (7) whether the defendant made furtive gestures or attempted to flee, (8) any odor of contraband, (9) the presence of other contraband or drug paraphernalia, (10) the defendant=s ownership or right to possess the place where the drugs were found, (11) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed, (12) the defendant=s possession of a large amount of cash, and (13) any conduct by the defendant indicating a consciousness of guilt. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). It is not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. No court has required that any specific combination of these factors be present to support a conviction for drug possession. See Wootton v. State, 132 S.W.3d 80, 87 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref=d). Instead, courts are to look to the totality of the circumstances and whether the factors establish the elements of the offense. See id. III. Analysis In six related issues, appellant claims the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to link him to the methamphetamine, to show he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and to show that he had care, control, or management of the methamphetamine. The basis of all appellant=s issues is that the evidence is insufficient because the only factor linking him to the methamphetamine is that he rented the vehicle in which the drugs were found. As appellant acknowledges, the fact that he signed the rental agreement is a factor linking appellant to knowing possession of the drugs. Myles v. State, 946 S.W.2d 630, 637 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (finding fact that appellant rented vehicle linked him to knowledge of drugs in car). However, contrary to appellant=s assertion that this is the only factor linking him to knowledge of the drugs found in the trunk, we find several additional linking factors present in this case. Appellant misrepresented his identity to the special agents, and one agent testified that appellant panicked when he caught appellant using David Lopez=s name, indicating a consciousness of guilt. See Hargrove v. State, 211 S.W.3d 379, 387 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 2006, pet. ref=d) (inferring consciousness of guilt partly from fact that defendant gave false name when caught). A general consciousness of guilt does not prove an accused guilty of the specific crime with which he is charged, but it may be considered in combination with other linking factors.[3] Roberson v. State, 80 S.W.3d 730, 740 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref=d). In addition, appellant=s name on the rental agreement put him in possession and control of the vehicle, and the trial court could have logically inferred from this that appellant also had access to the keys to the car, giving him access to and control over the trunk. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 419 (stating factfinder may draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts); Davis v. State, 923 S.W.2d 781, 786 (Tex. App.CBeaumont 1996) (concluding appellant had convenient access to trunk, where drugs were stored, based on his possession of car during road trip), rev=d on other grounds, 947 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The methamphetamine, Ketamine, and GHB were found in an enclosed place, a safe located inside a locked suitcase, which was in the trunk. See Hudson v. State, 128 S.W.3d 367, 374 (Tex. App.CTexarkana 2004, no pet.) (finding suitcase in trunk of car where drugs were discovered an enclosed space). Other narcotics were also discovered in the trunk, as well as a large quantity of fabric softener for concealing the odor of the narcotics. See Grant v. State, 989 S.W.2d 428, 434 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (considering fact that marijuana was securely wrapped to disguise odor circumstantial evidence linking appellant to knowledge of drugs). Drug paraphernalia was found in both the trunk and the passenger compartment of the car. See Cole v. State, 194 S.W.3d 538, 549 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref=d) (finding drug paraphernalia hidden in trunk a linking factor). Based on appellant=s statement to the special agent that he came in his car and the fact that Cox occupied the driver=s seat, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that appellant occupied the front passenger seat, putting him in close proximity to the $1400 located under the seat. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 419. Finally, the State produced evidence that 129.3 grams of methamphetamine and the quantity of other narcotics were large amounts and not intended for personal use. See Roberson, 80 S.W.3d at 740 (stating that power of this linking factor increases as amount of drugs increases). Based on the rental agreement showing the car was rented to appellant, appellant=s nervousness and use of a false name when speaking with the agents, the large quantity of cash hidden under the front passenger seat, the presence of drug paraphernalia in both the trunk and the passenger compartment, the large amount of fabric softener used to conceal the odor, and the large quantity of drugs hidden in an enclosed space, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that appellant knew of the methamphetamine in the trunk of the car and exercised control over it.[4] We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense of possession with intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sauceda v. State, No. 01‑04‑00247‑CR, 2005 WL 497325, at *3 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2005, pet. ref=d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding evidence legally sufficient where, among other factors, appellant was passenger in vehicle, was carrying a large amount of cash, a substantial amount of contraband was found in vehicle, and drug paraphernalia was found in trunk); Morales v. State, No. 13‑96‑423‑CR, 1997 WL 33642957, at *2B3 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi July 24, 1997, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding evidence legally sufficient where linking factors included drugs found in bags in trunk, appellant appeared nervous, and appellant was passenger in car rented to him). Moreover, viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the jury=s verdict was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Garner v. State, No. 05‑98‑01802‑CR, 2000 WL 36321, at *3 (Tex. App.CDallas Jan. 19, 2000, pet. ref=d) (not designated for publication) (concluding evidence was factually sufficient because among other factors, appellant was passenger in rental car, large quantity of drugs was found in trunk, and appellant=s access to trunk could be inferred from rental agreement listing him as a designated driver). We overrule appellant=s six issues. We affirm the trial court=s judgment. /s/ Leslie B. Yates Justice Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed August 26, 2008. Panel consists of Justices Yates, Anderson, and Brown. Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). [1] The State introduced testimony from one of the police offers who assisted in searching the vehicle that fabric softener is often used to conceal the odor of narcotics. [2] Ketamine is a veterinary anesthetic, and GHB is gamma hydroxybutric acid, an illegal narcotic. A narcotics expert for the State testified that Ketamine is used as a sedative. [3] Appellant argues that his conduct indicated a consciousness of guilt regarding the credit card thefts but not the possession of methamphetamine. Because appellant was caught with stolen credit cards and a large quantity of illegal narcotics, his nervousness could have been related to either the credit card theft, his knowledge of the methamphetamine and other drugs in the vehicle, or both offenses. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the trier of fact resolved any conflicts in favor of the prosecution. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. The trial court chose to resolve this evidence in favor of the prosecution, and we defer to that resolution. See id. [4] Appellant relies on Roberson v. State, 80 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref=d), and Jenkins v. State, 76 S.W.3d 709, 717B19 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi 2002, pet. ref=d), for his assertion that where only one linking factor is present, the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show possession. However, because we find several additional linking factors present in this case, Roberson and Jenkins are distinguishable.