Robert Marks v. Medford Starratt, Jr., Genesis Properties, L.P., Bright Star Homes, Inc., Brighton Enterprises, Ltd., Belvedere Enterprises, L.L.C., Dabo Investments, Inc., and Rab Equities, L.L.C.

Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 7, 2009 Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 7, 2009. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals ____________ NO. 14-09-00269-CV ____________ ROBERT MARKS, Appellant V. MEDFORD STARRATT, JR., GENESIS PROPERTIES, L.P., BRIGHT STAR HOMES, INC., BRIGHTON ENTERPRISES, LTD., BELVEDERE ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., DABO INVESTMENTS, INC., and RAB EQUITIES, L.L.C., Appellees On Appeal from the 506th District Court Waller County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 08-03-19294 M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N This is an attempted appeal from an order signed February 25, 2009, cancelling and setting aside certain notices of lis pendens. The clerk=s record was filed on April 8, 2009. Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har‑Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Interlocutory orders may be appealed only if permitted by statute. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001); Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). On April 9, 2009, notification was transmitted to the parties of this court=s intention to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction unless appellant filed a response demonstrating grounds for continuing the appeal on or before April 20, 2009. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). Appellant=s response fails to demonstrate that this court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Appellant claims that an order cancelling notices of lis pendens is an appealable order, citing to Khraish v. Haden, 762 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. App.BDallas 1988, writ denied), Hughes v. Houston Northwest Med. Center, 647 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ dism=d), and Moran v. Midland Farms Co., 282 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App.BEl Paso 1926, no writ). We find Hughes and Moran distinguishable because they involved orders enjoining the appellant from filing notices of lis pendens. By statute, temporary injunctions are appealable interlocutory orders. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon 2008). The order in this case does not grant a temporary injunction. Khraish did involve an order with language that enjoined future actions, but the appellate court found this was not an appealable temporary injunction. 762 S.W.2d at 909. The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the notices of lis pendens were void as they were not in compliance with the requirements of section 12.007 of the Texas Property Code. Id. Appellant interprets Khraish to hold that an order cancelling notices of lis pendens is appealable if those notices complied with section 12.007. We disagree with this interpretation because it would allow an appeal from an interlocutory order without statutory authority. We find no statutory authority for an appeal of an interlocutory order cancelling notices of lis pendens. See Werneke v. Seabury, 720 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1986, no writ)(dismissed appeal for want of jurisdiction where appellants attempted to appeal an interlocutory, partial summary judgment order that cancelled a notice of lis pendens); Nwangwu v. Dinkins, No. 14-97-01100-CV, 1997 WL 688943 at *1 (Tex. App.BHouston [14th Dist.] Nov. 6, 1997, no pet.)(holding that appellate court had no jurisdiction in appeal from order cancelling lis pendens, but noting it could be subject of mandamus proceeding). Because no statute allows appeal from an interlocutory order that cancels a lis pendens, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Guzman, and Boyce.