Anthony Joseph Richard v. Douglas Dretke

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 7, 2009 Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 7, 2009. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals ____________ NO. 14-08-00714-CV ____________ ANTHONY JOSEPH RICHARD, Appellant V. DOUGLAS DRETKE, ET AL., Appellees On Appeal from the 349th District Court Houston County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 07-0076 M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N Appellant Anthony Joseph Richard appeals the trial court=s dismissal of his claims under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We affirm. I. Factual and Procedural Background Appellant is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division. On April 7, 2007, appellant filed a pro se, in forma pauperis lawsuit against numerous individuals alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Without conducting a hearing, on May 7, 2008, the trial court dismissed appellant=s claims without prejudice, finding that the claims were frivolous and malicious and not in compliance with sections 14.004 and 14.005 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In two issues, appellant challenges the dismissal of his claims, alleging that (1) by dismissing his claim under Chapter 14, the trial court violated the Article 6 Aoath@ to uphold the United States Constitution; and (2) the trial court denied appellant=s ADue Process@ rights to access to the courts under the Texas Constitution. II. Standard of Review Because appellant is an inmate, his suit is governed by Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.002(a) (Vernon 2002); see Hickman v. Adams, 35 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). We review a trial court=s dismissal of an inmate=s claims under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep=t of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). A trial court has broad discretion to dismiss an inmate=s suit if it finds that the claim asserted is frivolous or malicious. See Martinez v. Thaler, 931 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). A trial court abuses this broad discretion if it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. See id. III. Analysis A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing appellant=s claims under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code? 1. Section 14.004 Appellant complains the dismissal of his claim was improper. Section 14.003[1] of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that a trial court may dismiss a claim if the court finds that the suit is frivolous or malicious. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.003(a)(2) (Vernon 2002). In determining whether a suit is frivolous or malicious, the court may consider, among other things, whether the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. See id. ' 14.003(b)(4). To enable the trial court to determine whether a claim arises from the same operative facts as a previous claim, the legislature enacted section 14.004. Hickman, 35 S.W.3d at 124; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.004 (Vernon 2002). Section 14.004, entitled AAffidavit Relating to Previous Filings,@ requires an inmate who files an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs to file a separate affidavit or declaration setting out the following information: (1) identifying each suit, other than a suit under the Family Code, previously brought by the person and in which the person was not represented by an attorney, without regard to whether the person was an inmate at the time the suit was brought; and (2) describing each suit that was previously brought by: (A) stating the operative facts for which relief was sought; (B) listing the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought; (C) identifying each party named in the suit; and (D) stating the result of the suit, including whether the suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious under Section 13.001 or Section 14.003 or otherwise. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.004(a). The record contains no affidavits or unsworn declarations in compliance with section 14.004. Appellant filed a declaration listing previous lawsuits filed, but failed to set forth in sufficient detail the operative facts upon which relief was sought in each suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.004(a)(2)(A) (requiring description of operative facts of previous litigation). Moreover, in his declaration appellant does not identify the parties named in the previous suits. See id. ' 14.004(a)(2)(C). Without a more detailed description of the operative facts surrounding each of appellant=s previous lawsuits and identifying those parties involved, the trial court was in no position to evaluate whether appellant=s current claim was substantially similar to his previous claims. See Bell v. Tex. Dep=t of Criminal Justice-Inst. Div., 962 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). When, as in this case, an inmate files an affidavit or declaration that fails to comply with the requirements of section 14.004, the trial court is entitled to presume that the suit is substantially similar to one previously filed by the inmate, and therefore, frivolous. Bell, 962 S.W.2d at 158. Accordingly, the trial court may dismiss an indigent inmate=s suit as frivolous or malicious without holding a hearing when an inmate fails to comply with the statutory requirements of section 14.004. See Gowan v. Tex. Dep=t of Criminal Justice, 99 S.W.3d 319, 321 (Tex. App.CTexarkana 2003, no pet.). For this reason, the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant=s suit without a hearing. 2. Section 14.005 The trial court also found that appellant failed to file his Aclaims before the 31st day after receiving a written decision from the grievance system as required under section 14.005.@ Appellant indicates he properly complied, although he does not explain how he did so, and he complains that he Acannot control when unit indigent officials or county clerk[s] apply by their duties.@[2] Section 14.005(b) provides that A[a] court shall dismiss a claim if the inmate failed to file the claim before the 31st day after the date the inmate receives the written decision from the grievance system.@ Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.005(b) (Vernon 2002). To enable the trial court to determine whether the inmate=s suit was filed within the period prescribed by section 14.005(b), the inmate must file (1) an affidavit or unsworn declaration stating the date the grievance was filed and the date the inmate received the written decision, and (2) a copy of the written decision from the grievance system. See id. ' 14.005(a); Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex. App.CBeaumont 2004, pet. denied). The record reflects that appellant filed the suit on April 2, 2007, and on the same date, appellant filed with the trial court numerous inmate AStep 1" and AStep 2" grievance forms showing that an administrative body had denied his grievances in writing. Some of the forms indicate the date on which appellant received the written decision, but others do not. None of the forms indicates appellant=s receipt of the written decisions within the thirty-one days preceding the date appellant filed suit. Therefore, it is not clear from the face of the grievance forms that appellant acted within the thirty-one day period. See Francis v. TDCJ-CID, 188 S.W.3d 799, 804B05 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2006, no pet.). On May 7, 2008, appellant filed a declaration, entitled AAdministrative Remedy Grievance Declaration Pursuant to ' 14.005,@ but the declaration does not include the specific dates that appellant received the written decisions from the grievance system, and it does not state that appellant received a written decision. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.005(a); Moore, 153 S.W.3d at 264; see also Kelley v. Scott, No. 14-01-00696-CV, 2003 WL 21229275, at *3 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] May 29, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, appellant has not substantially complied with the requirements of section 14.005. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.005(a); Moore, 153 S.W.3d at 264. Although it is arguable that circumstances may arise in which an inmate is prevented from acting within the thirty-one day period, the record does not indicate that such circumstances were present in this case. See Randle v. Wilson, 26 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex. App.CAmarillo 2000, no pet.). Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that the State or conditions of appellant=s confinement prevented appellant from complying with section 14.005. See id. Because appellant did not comply with the requirements of section 14.005, the trial court was obligated to dismiss the suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.005(b); Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 516. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the order of dismissal. B. Did the trial court=s application of Chapter 14 to appellant=s suit violate the United States Constitution or the Texas Constitution? 1. United States Constitution Appellant contends that in making its Chapter 14 ruling the trial court violated the Aoath@ of Article 6 of the United States Constitution to uphold the constitution, namely the Supremacy Clause and the First Amendment, because the trial court applied the procedural provisions of Chapter 14 instead of constitutional law in dismissing appellant=s claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Under the Supremacy Clause, a state law is without effect if it conflicts with federal law. Thomas v. Wichita Gen. Hosp., 952 S.W.2d 936, 939B40 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 1997, pet. denied). States may apply neutral procedural rules, such as sections 14.004 and 14.005, to federal claims to discourage frivolous litigation as long as the rules are not pre-empted by federal law. See Thomas v. Bush, 23 S.W.3d 215, 217B18 (Tex. App.CBeaumont 2000, pet. denied); Wichita Gen. Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 939B40. Claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, such as those alleged by appellant, are subject to federal provisions, including a bar on frivolous lawsuits and a requirement to exhaust remedies. Bush, 23 S.W.3d at 218 (citing 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(g) (West Supp. 2000) and 42 U.S.C. ' 1997e(a) (West Supp. 2000)). Because federal law imposes substantially similar requirements on inmates who file suits in forma pauperis, sections 14.004 and 14.005 do not conflict with the Supremacy Clause. See id.; see also Wichita Gen. Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 940. The trial court=s application of Chapter 14 neither conflicts with federal law nor affects an inmate=s right to file a federal claim in Texas courts. See Wichita Gen. Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 940. Rather, sections 14.004 and 14.005 impose neutral procedural requirements on pro se indigent inmates who file civil claims in state court; the purpose of the statutory provisions is to enable the trial court to discern whether the claims are frivolous. Bush, 23 S.W.3d 215, 217B18; Wichita Gen. Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 940. Therefore, sections 14.004 and 14.005 do not violate the Supremacy Clause. See Bush, 23 S.W.3d at 218; Wichita Gen. Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 940. As for appellant=s claim that the trial court=s application of Chapter 14 violates his First Amendment rights to redress grievances, the procedural requirements of Chapter 14 do not restrict an inmate=s right to file suit and the provisions do not authorize the court to refuse to hear meritorious claims. Wichita Gen. Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 940. Rather, these procedural requirements assist a trial court in determining whether an inmate=s suit is frivolous and compel a litigant to act so that a court may timely address legitimate claims. Id.; see Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 516. Therefore, application of these statutory provisions do not violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Wichita Gen. Hosp., 952 S.W.2d at 940. Accordingly, appellant=s argument that the trial court did not uphold its oath in applying Chapter 14 is without merit.[3] 2. Texas Constitution Appellant claims that the trial court denied him rights guaranteed under the ADue Process@[4] and Open Courts provisions of the Texas Constitution by dismissing his claims under Chapter 14. As part of this argument, appellant complains that the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his lawsuit despite his request, although he admits the appellate record does not indicate whether his request for the hearing was received or filed with the trial court.[5] We presume that Chapter 14 is constitutional. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 725 (Tex. 1995); see also Kelley, 2003 WL 21229275, at *4. To establish violation of the Open Courts Clause, a party must establish (1) that the party has a cognizable common law cause of action that is being restricted, and (2) the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute. Bush, 23 S.W.3d at 218 (reviewing whether sections 14.004 and 14.005 violate the Open Courts provision); see also Spellmon v. Sweeney, 819 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. App.CWaco 1991, no writ) (providing that a law is unconstitutional and violates due process Awhen it is arbitrary or unreasonable,@ which occurs when the Asocial necessity@ the law is intended to serve is not a Asufficient justification of the restriction of the liberty or rights involved@) (holding that dismissal of grievances under section 13.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code did not violate Due Course of Law provision). The litigant has the burden of establishing that the limitation was unreasonable. See Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 515; see also Kelley, 2003 WL 21229275, at *4B5 (placing burden on the appellant to show section 14.005 was unconstitutional as violating Due Course of Law and Open Courts provisions of Texas Constitution). Appellant filed a statutory claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and argues only that he could not comply with Chapter 14. Sections 14.004 and 14.005 impose procedural requirements on pro se indigent inmates to enable the trial court to discern whether a claim is frivolous, thereby curbing Aconstant, often duplicative, inmate litigation,@ or to compel a litigant to take action to enable a trial court to timely and efficiently address legitimate claims. See Bush, 23 S.W.3d at 218; Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 516. Appellant has made no effort to establish that these procedural limitations were unreasonable. See Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 515; see also Kelley, 2003 WL 21229275, at *4. Appellant=s claims that he could not adhere to the requirements of sections 14.004 and 14.005 do not defeat the reasonableness of these provisions in light of their purposes, nor is the trial court=s application of Chapter 14 unreasonable in light of these provisions= purposes in this case. See Bush, 23 S.W.3d at 218; Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 516 (determining that appellant has not demonstrated that time restrictions on filing claims were unreasonable). Therefore, we reject appellant=s argument that Chapter 14 is unreasonable and violates the Due Course of Law and Open Courts provisions of the Texas Constitution. See Sanders v. Palunsky, 36 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 515B16; see also Kelley, 2003 WL 21229275, at*4. IV. Conclusion The trial court=s application of Chapter 14 to appellant=s claims did not violate either the United States or Texas Constitutions. See Bush, 23 S.W.3d at 218; Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 515B16. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed appellant=s suit under Chapter 14. See Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 515B16; Bell, 962 S.W.2d at 158. Therefore, we overrule appellant=s two issues on appeal. Having overruled all of appellant=s issues, we affirm the trial court=s judgment. /s/ Kem Thompson Frost Justice Panel consists of Justices Frost, Brown, and Boyce. [1] Unless otherwise stated, all references in this opinion to a section are to the corresponding section of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. [2] We presume this argument refers to appellant=s complaint that he filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing, although this motion, as indicated by appellant in his appellate brief, is not reflected in the record. [3] As for appellant=s arguments that the trial court violated the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4(D)(2) or that Acounsel/clerk@ did not comply with Rule 303 of the State Bar Rules, appellant has not provided analysis or citations to the record or legal authorities for these arguments. Therefore, appellant has waived these complaints. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h); San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.CHouston [14 Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding that, even though courts interpret briefing requirements reasonably and liberally, parties asserting error on appeal still must put forth some specific argument and analysis citing the record and authorities in support of the parties= argument). Similarly, appellant refers to Aproperty rights@ as a vested right and that a Acourt cannot use a procedural state law to take appellant=s property without a [sic] adequate compensation guaranteed by the Texas Bill of Right[s].@ He cites the following cases: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982) (involving employee rights under the Fair Employment Practices Act); Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex. 2002) (involving, among other things, jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Gutierrez v. Elizondo, 139 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (involving, among other things, nunc pro tunc judgment and sufficiency of the evidence); Cozby v. City of Waco, 110 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. App.CWaco 2002, no pet.) (involving a plea to the jurisdiction and summary judgment). However, the legal authority cited by appellant is not on point for the issues presented, and appellant has not demonstrated how any property rights were affected by the dismissal of his claims. [4] The Supreme Court of Texas has stated that the language of the Due Course of Law Clause of the Texas Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is Anearly identical@ and that there is no meaningful distinction between Adue course@ and Adue process.@ See Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995). [5] The record does not reflect whether the trial court ruled on any such request. When the record contains no such motion and no record of the trial court=s ruling on the motion, a reviewing court presumes that the record supports the judgment. See Thomas v. Bilby, 40 S.W.3d 166, 168B69 (Tex. App.CTexarkana 2001, no pet.) (citing Conely v. Peck, 929 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. App.CAustin 1996, no writ)). Assuming arguendo that the trial court received appellant=s motion, a trial court is not required to hold a hearing before dismissing a suit as frivolous under section 14.003(a), when the party failed to file documents in compliance with section 14.004. Id. at 168; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.003(c) (Vernon 2002).