Wray v. City of New York

05-3341-cv W ray v. City of New York 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS [2] 3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [4] 5 August Term, 2005 [6] 7 (Argued: February 7, 2006 Decided: June 18, 2007) [8] 9 Docket No. 05-3341-cv [10] 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 12 RAYMOND WRAY, [13] 14 Plaintiff-Appellee, [15] 16 - v.- [17] 18 CITY OF NEW YORK, DANIEL MARTORANO, 19 WILLIAM WELLER, JAMES MCCAVERA and 20 NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, [21] 22 Defendants-Appellants. [23] 24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x [25] 26 Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, POOLER, and GIBSON, 27 Circuit Judges.* [28] 29 Interlocutory appeal from an order of the United States 30 District Court for the Eastern District of New York 31 (Weinstein, J.) denying motions for summary judgment by 32 defendants-appellants City of New York and New York City 33 Police Officer William Weller. * The Honorable John R. Gibson, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. [1] 1 Vacated and Remanded. [2] 3 ALAN BECKOFF, Assistant 4 Corporation Counsel (Michael A. 5 Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of 6 the City of New York, on the 7 brief; Stephen J. McGrath, Liora 8 Jacobi, of counsel), New York, 9 New York, for Defendants10 Appellants. [11] 12 DAWN M. CARDI (Robert Rosenthal, 13 on the brief), New York, New 14 York, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 15 DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge: 16 Having prevailed in federal habeas proceedings and 17 avoided retrial on the charge of armed robbery, Raymond Wray 18 brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various parties 19 he deemed responsible for the constitutional violation that 20 led to his conviction. The United States District Court for 21 the Eastern District of New York (Weinstein, J.) granted the 22 defendants summary judgment on all claims but two. In 23 denying summary judgment on those two claims--Wray’s claims 24 against Officer William Weller of the New York City Police 25 Department and the City of New York--the district court 26 recited that immediate appellate review of that ruling is 27 desirable because they involve controlling questions of law 28 as to which there is substantial ground for difference of [2] 1 opinion. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b), we accepted 2 defendants’ interlocutory appeal. 3 This interlocutory appeal raises two controlling issues 4 of law: where the admission of testimony at trial regarding 5 a witness identification violated a defendant’s right to due 6 process and a fair trial, whether the defendant [i] can 7 establish a § 1983 claim against the officer who conducted 8 the identification procedure; and [ii] can establish a § 9 1983 “failure to train and supervise” claim against the 10 police department. We answer both questions in the 11 negative. The district court’s denial of summary judgment 12 is therefore reversed and we remand to the district court 13 with instructions to enter judgment for defendants on Wray’s 14 remaining two claims. [15] 16 BACKGROUND 17 A detailed background of Wray’s arrest, prosecution, 18 and conviction is found in our opinion reversing the denial 19 of Wray’s habeas petition. See Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 20 515, 517-24 (2d Cir. 2000). We summarize only the facts 21 that bear on the issues presented on this appeal, construing 22 the evidence in the light most favorable to Wray, as the [3] 1 non-moving party. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d 2 Cir. 2005). 3 Three New York City police officers were conducting a 4 stakeout observation from the roof of a Queens restaurant in 5 November 1990, when they saw a man wearing a long black coat 6 and a hat who was pointing a gun at another man and took his 7 jacket. The victim and the robber were each accompanied by 8 another man. 9 Officers William Weller and James McCavera left the 10 rooftop and apprehended on the street the person who was 11 with the robber (Dennis Bailey). Having learned that the 12 man in the coat and hat had gone inside the restaurant, 13 Officers Weller and McCavera went in, found the stolen 14 jacket, and arrested Raymond Wray, who was wearing a long 15 black coat and a hat. 16 The victim of the robbery, Melvin Mitchell, and Craig 17 Williams (who accompanied him) were no longer at the scene; 18 but Mitchell was told shortly thereafter by another officer 19 that the robbers had been apprehended and that he should go 20 to the police station. Within hours of the arrests, 21 Mitchell and Williams went to the station. According to the 22 police, each was taken to look at Wray, who was in a holding [4] 1 cell, and each independently confirmed that Wray was the 2 gunman. Williams later testified that he believed the name 3 of the officer who conducted the showup identification 4 “starts with a W. Wellie”--which could reasonably be found 5 to be Officer Weller. 6 Wray was indicted on multiple counts of first-degree 7 robbery and weapons possession. Bailey pled guilty to one 8 count of criminal possession of a weapon, but went to trial 9 on the robbery and other weapons charges. At the start of 10 his trial in New York Supreme Court, Queens County, in April 11 1992, the trial court held a Wade hearing on Wray’s motion 12 to suppress the stationhouse showup identifications. 13 Mitchell, Williams, and Officer Daniel Martorano (the third 14 officer at the scene) testified as to the identification 15 procedure. After the hearing, the trial court granted 16 Wray’s motion to suppress Mitchell’s stationhouse 17 identification, but ruled that Williams could testify as to 18 his identification of Wray at the stationhouse. 19 Williams so testified, and the jury convicted Wray of 20 two counts of first-degree robbery, one count of second- 21 degree criminal possession of a weapon, and one count of 22 third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. [5] 1 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, 2 ruled that the trial court had erred in admitting testimony 3 regarding Williams’s stationhouse showup identification, 4 because it was the product of unduly suggestive police 5 procedures; but the Appellate Division nonetheless confirmed 6 the conviction on the ground that the error was harmless. 7 People v. Wray, 640 N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 1996). Leave to 8 appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. People 9 v. Wray, 88 N.Y.2d 1025 (1996). 10 Wray petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus in 11 the Eastern District of New York, arguing that the admission 12 of testimony regarding Williams’s showup identification 13 violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair 14 trial. The district court denied the petition on the ground 15 of harmless error. Wray v. Johnson, No. 96 CV 5139, 1998 16 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10625 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 1998). On 17 February 2, 2000, this Court concluded that the error was 18 not harmless and reversed, granting the petition 19 conditionally unless Wray was retried Wray within 90 days. 20 Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515 (2d Cir. 2000). The Queens 21 District Attorney’s Office declined to retry Wray, and he 22 was released after eight years in prison. [6] 1 On July 20, 2001, Wray filed this § 1983 action in the 2 Eastern District of New York. His second amended complaint 3 was filed on August 8, 2003 naming as defendants Officers 4 Weller, Martorano, and McCavera, the New York City Police 5 Department, and the City of New York. The complaint alleges 6 violations of the United States Constitution and state law, 7 including denial of due process, false arrest, malicious 8 prosecution, and failure to train and supervise police 9 officers. 10 On April 14, 2004, defendants moved for summary 11 judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing probable 12 cause, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. By 13 opinion and order dated October 18, 2004, the district court 14 granted summary judgment to defendants on all but two of 15 Wray’s claims, but noted the desirability of an 16 interlocutory appeal of its decisions with respect to the 17 two remaining claims against: [i] Officer Weller for 18 performing an unduly suggestive showup, and [ii] the City of 19 New York for failing to adequately train and supervise its 20 police officers on proper identification procedures. Wray 21 v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 22 Both parties sought interlocutory review of the [7] 1 district court’s opinion and order. On June 30, 2005, this 2 Court denied Wray’s motion but granted defendants’. [3] 4 DISCUSSION 5 We review de novo the district court’s denial of 6 summary judgment. Maxwell v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 7 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1996). In doing so, we construe the 8 evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 9 and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Maguire v. 10 Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 11 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 12 255 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriate only where 13 “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . 14 the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 15 law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). [16] 17 A. The Suggestive Showup Identification 18 Wray alleges that Officer Weller violated his 19 constitutional due process and fair trial rights by 20 conducting the unduly suggestive showup identification, and 21 seeks damages under § 1983 for his conviction and 22 incarceration. Officer Weller argues that he cannot be held [8] 1 liable for Wray’s conviction or incarceration because, even 2 assuming (as we must on summary judgment) that Officer 3 Weller conducted the suggestive showup identification, 4 superseding acts by both the prosecutor and trial judge 5 broke the chain of causation between Weller’s conduct and 6 the violation of Wray’s constitutional rights. 7 As we explained when we conditionally granted Wray’s 8 habeas petition, we have not held that a suggestive 9 identification alone is a constitutional violation; rather, 10 the constitutional violation is that Wray’s right to a fair 11 trial was impaired by the admission of testimony regarding 12 the unreliable identification: 13 In the context of an identification following a 14 police procedure that was impermissibly 15 suggestive, the due process focus is principally 16 on the fairness of the trial, rather than on the 17 conduct of the police, for a suggestive procedure 18 “does not itself intrude upon a constitutionally 19 protected interest.” [20] 21 Wray, 202 F.3d at 524 (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 22 U.S. 98 , 113, n.13 (1977)) (emphasis added); see also Wray, [23] 340 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (explaining that there is no 24 constitutional right not to be subjected to an 25 unconstitutionally suggestive identification). “Suggestive 26 procedures are disapproved ‘because they increase the [9] 1 likelihood of misidentification,’ and it is the admission of 2 testimony carrying such a ‘likelihood of misidentification 3 which violates a defendant’s right to due process.’” Wray, 4 202 F.3d at 524 (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 198 5 (1972)). 6 The question is whether Wray can establish a claim 7 against Officer Weller for the erroneous admission at trial 8 of testimony regarding the unduly suggestive identification. 9 We agree with the defendants that extending liability to 10 Officer Weller is unprecedented and unwarranted. In the 11 absence of evidence that Officer Weller misled or pressured 12 the prosecution or trial judge, we cannot conclude that his 13 conduct caused the violation of Wray’s constitutional 14 rights; rather, the violation was caused by the ill- 15 considered acts and decisions of the prosecutor and trial 16 judge. [17] 18 * * * 19 Our analysis of constitutional torts--like any other 20 tort--is guided by common-law principles of tort. See, 21 e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (“As we 22 stated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), [10] 1 [overruled on other grounds by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, [2] 515 U.S. 200, 233 (1995),] § 1983 ‘should be read against 3 the background of tort liability that makes a man 4 responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.’ 5 Since the common law recognized the causal link between the 6 submission of a complaint and an ensuing arrest, we read § 7 1983 as recognizing the same causal link.”); Lombard v. 8 Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 280 F.3d 209, 216 (2d Cir. 9 2002) (quoting Palka v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 83 10 N.Y.2d 579 (1994)); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 351 (2d 11 Cir. 2000) (collecting cases); Townes v. City of New York, [12] 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999) (same). 13 Our conclusion follows from our previous holding in 14 Townes, a § 1983 case brought by a plaintiff whose 15 conviction was reversed on the ground that the trial court 16 had erroneously denied a motion to suppress illegally-seized 17 evidence. The plaintiff sued the officers who conducted the 18 illegal search, seeking damages for his conviction and 19 incarceration. We ruled that the officers’ conduct violated 20 the plaintiff’s right to privacy, but that damages for this 21 violation had not been sought and were likely nominal. We 22 declined, however, to allow recovery against the officers [11] 1 for the conviction and incarceration, holding that the trial 2 judge’s decision to admit the evidence constituted a 3 superseding cause. Townes, 176 F.3d at 147 . 4 The causation alleged by Wray is even more tenuous than 5 the causation alleged in Townes. In Townes, the officers 6 conducted an illegal search that both [i] was in itself a 7 violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and [ii] 8 contributed to the events that led to plaintiff’s conviction 9 and incarceration; of these, only the former was deemed a 10 possible claim, albeit for nominal damages (and attorney’s 11 fees). In Wray’s case, the alleged conduct of Officer 12 Weller was not in itself illegal or unconstitutional. The 13 constitutional harm occurred when the showup was 14 impermissibly used to compromise the fairness of Wray’s 15 trial--at behest of the prosecutor, by order of the trial 16 court, and beyond Officer Weller’s control. 17 Townes involved a Fourth Amendment claim, but there is 18 no reason to read Townes as so limited. The holding in 19 Townes rests on the broad principles that [i] “the goal of 20 the Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence has been to tailor 21 liability to fit the interests protected by the particular 22 constitutional right in question,” and [ii] “§ 1983 damages [12] 1 should be made available only for risks that are 2 constitutionally relevant.” Townes, 176 F.3d at 148 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Zahrey, 221 4 F.3d at 350-51 (stating that a § 1983 court is concerned 5 with the “legally cognizable result” of misconduct). Wray 6 advocates a distinction between Fourth Amendment violations 7 (which result in a violation of privacy) and the admission 8 of testimony regarding an impermissibly suggestive 9 identification (which may result in unreliable convictions). 10 But that distinction bears only on damages, and particular 11 consequences of a violation (if there is one). Since 12 Officer Weller’s conduct was not itself a constitutional 13 violation, there is a “gross disconnect” between the conduct 14 and the injury for which Wray seeks to recover. Townes, 176 15 F.3d at 148. 16 Wray also relies on Zahrey, a § 1983 case against an 17 Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) who allegedly 18 conspired to fabricate evidence and then used the fabricated 19 evidence to prosecute Zahrey, who was indicted by a grand 20 jury but later acquitted. The district court dismissed the 21 claim. In reversing, we held that Zahrey adequately pled a 22 deprivation of liberty. Although an AUSA enjoys absolute [13] 1 immunity in introducing evidence before the grand jury 2 (regardless of its veracity), the evidence in Zahrey was 3 fabricated in the course of an investigation, as to which 4 that AUSA’s immunity was merely qualified. The absolutely 5 privileged act did not break the chain of causation because, 6 under our line of cases extending liability where the 7 wrongdoer misled or coerced the intervening decision-maker, 8 the AUSA would have been liable even if the fabricated 9 evidence had been adduced by another prosecutor. Zahrey, [10] 221 F.3d at 353 & n.10 (“It would be a perverse doctrine of 11 tort and constitutional law that would hold liable the 12 fabricator of evidence who hands it to an unsuspecting 13 prosecutor but exonerate[s] the wrongdoer who enlists 14 himself in a scheme to deprive a person of liberty.”). 15 Wray’s claim against Officer Weller is readily 16 distinguishable from Zahrey on two sufficient grounds: [i] 17 Officer Weller’s conduct, which later formed the basis of 18 the constitutional deprivation, was not in itself a 19 violation of Wray’s constitutional rights; and [ii] the 20 constitutional deprivation was caused by an intervening 21 actor, not by Officer Weller. See id. at 353-54 22 (emphasizing that “the same person” committed the initial [14] 1 wrong and then used the tainted evidence at trial). Weller 2 testified at Wray’s trial, but there is no allegation that 3 Wray misled the persons whose acts effected the 4 constitutional violation. 5 Wray seizes on language in Zahrey that notes tension in 6 § 1983 jurisprudence between cases, such as our discussion 7 in Townes, in which the chain of causation was broken by the 8 intervening exercise of independent judgment, and cases in 9 which defendants were liable for consequences caused by 10 reasonably foreseeable intervening forces. The latter cases 11 typically involve situations in which the defendant misled 12 or coerced the intervening decision-maker such that the 13 decision-maker’s conduct was tainted; but the Zahrey opinion 14 wondered aloud why such misconduct would be necessary under 15 the doctrine of reasonable foreseeability: 16 Even if the intervening decision-maker (such as a 17 prosecutor, grand jury, or judge) is not misled or 18 coerced, it is not readily apparent why the chain 19 of causation should be considered broken where the 20 initial wrongdoer can reasonably foresee that his 21 misconduct will contribute to an “independent” 22 decision that results in a deprivation of liberty. [23] 24 Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 352 . The court declined to decide that 25 issue because Zahrey involved “the unusual circumstance that 26 the same person took both the initial act of alleged [15] 1 misconduct and the subsequent intervening act,” so that the 2 case could be decided “[h]owever the causation issue is to 3 be resolved in the law enforcement context in cases where an 4 initial act of misconduct is followed by the act of a third 5 person.” Id. The causation analysis in that case therefore 6 did not reach or decide the causation issues raised by Wray 7 here. 8 In Zahrey, we posed the question why an “initial 9 wrongdoer” may escape the reasonably foreseeable 10 consequences of his actions. It is always possible that a 11 judge who is not misled or deceived will err; but such an 12 error is not reasonably foreseeable, or (to use the phrase 13 employed in Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 350-51 ) it is not the 14 “legally cognizable result” of an investigative abuse. 15 Moreover, in the absence of evidence that Officer Weller 16 misled or pressured the prosecution or trial judge, he was 17 not an “initial wrongdoer.” Id. at 352 . And if his conduct 18 amounted to a wrong under state common law or statutory law, 19 it would still not constitute a violation of a federal 20 constitutional right enforceable under § 1983. We therefore 21 conclude that Officer Weller cannot be held liable under § 22 1983 for Wray’s conviction and incarceration. [16] 1 B. Failure to Train and Supervise 2 “[T]o hold a city liable under § 1983 for the 3 unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is 4 required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official 5 policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be 6 subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” 7 Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983). The 8 failure to train or supervise city employees may constitute 9 an official policy or custom if the failure amounts to 10 “deliberate indifference” to the rights of those with whom 11 the city employees interact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 12 U.S. 378 , 388 (1989). To establish “deliberate 13 indifference,” a plaintiff must show that: [i] a policymaker 14 knows “to a moral certainty” that city employees will 15 confront a particular situation; [ii] the situation either 16 presents the employee with “a difficult choice of the sort 17 that training or supervision will make less difficult” or 18 “there is a history of employees mishandling the situation;” 19 and [3] “the wrong choice by the city employee will 20 frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s 21 constitutional rights.” Walker v. City of New York, 974 22 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992). “[A] policymaker does not [17] 1 exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to train 2 employees for rare or unforeseen events.” Id. at 297 . 3 Moreover, where (as here), a city has a training program, a 4 plaintiff must--in addition--“identify a specific deficiency 5 in the city’s training program and establish that that 6 deficiency is ‘closely related to the ultimate injury,’ such 7 that it ‘actually caused’ the constitutional deprivation.” 8 Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 129 (2d 9 Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391). 10 In light of our conclusion that there was a break in 11 the chain between Officer Weller’s alleged conduct and the 12 denial of Wray’s constitutional rights, Wray’s claim 13 regarding the City’s failure to train or supervise its 14 police officers likewise fails for lack of causation. 15 Officer Weller’s conduct was not itself the cause of the 16 constitutional deprivation; the City’s alleged failure to 17 train him adequately--a step even further removed--cannot, 18 therefore, be the “actual cause” of the constitutional 19 deprivation. 20 Moreover, Wray has failed to adduce evidence that any 21 failure to train reflected “deliberate indifference” to the 22 rights of others. “Deliberate indifference” involves the [18] 1 conscious disregard of the risk that poorly-trained 2 employees will cause deprivations of clearly established 3 constitutional rights. Amnesty Am., 361 F.3d at 127 n.8. 4 The record evidence establishes that, since 1988, the New 5 York City Police Department has engaged in extensive 6 training on how to conduct identifications. Although Wray 7 posits defects in the Department’s testing procedures, Wray 8 has put forth no evidence that these defects are the result 9 of deliberate indifference. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 10 391 (“Neither will it suffice to prove that an injury or 11 accident could have been avoided if an officer had had 12 better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid 13 the particular injury-causing conduct.”). Wray submitted a 14 list of New York cases in which suggestive show-up 15 identification evidence was impermissibly admitted by 16 courts; but only one post-dates 1992--a telling datum when 17 one considers the thousands of identifications conducted by 18 each New York City Police Department precinct each year. 19 The police training thus appears to be largely successful. [20] 21 Conclusion 22 For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of [19] 1 the district court and REMAND the case to the district court 2 with instructions to enter judgment as a matter of law in 3 favor of defendants on the remaining claims.