Elliot v. Papatones

USCA1 Opinion UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 97-9013 IN RE JAMES N. PAPATONES, Debtor, EDWARD ELLIOTT, ET AL., Appellees, v. JAMES N. PAPATONES, Appellant. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT Before Boudin, Circuit Judge, Bownes and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges. James F. Molleur, with whom Woodman & Edmands, P.A. was on brief for appellant. Robert M. Raftice, Jr., with whom Ainsworth & Thelin, P.A., was on brief for appellee. May 13, 1998 CYR, Senior Circuit Judge. The question before us is whether the "liquidated" unsecured indebtedness owed by appellant James N. Papatones on the date he filed his chapter 13 petition totaled less than $250,000, a prerequisite to eligibility for chapter 13 relief. See Bankruptcy Code 109(e), 11 U.S.C. 109(e). The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit responded in the negative. We conclude that Papatones was ineligible for chapter 13 relief because the amount in which he was indebted to appellee Edward Elliott on the date of the filing of the chapter 13 petition had been adjudicated ÄÄ at $276,606.87 ÄÄ by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the chapter 13 petition and neither the prepetition adjudication itself nor the postpetition docketing of the judgment against Papatones violated the automatic stay which took effect immediately upon the filing of the chapter 13 petition. See Bankruptcy Code 362(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1). I BACKGROUND Following an evidentiary hearing on December 9, 1996, a Maine superior court justice found Papatones liable to Elliott for breach of trust. Prior to the conclusion of the hearing, the presiding justice announced that a money judgment would enter against Papatones in the amount of $276,606.87. Later in the day, Papatones filed a chapter 13 petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine, whereupon the superior court proceedings were stayed pursuant to Bankruptcy Code 362(a)(1). II DISCUSSION Papatones insists that he is eligible for chapter 13 relief notwithstanding the $249,999.99 ceiling on liquidated, unsecured indebtedness because the Elliott debt remained unliqui dated at the time the chapter 13 petition was filed. Elliott demurs on the ground that he was awarded $276,606.87 in damages prior to the chapter 13 petition. Papatones responds that the Elliott indebtedness did not become "liquidated" before the chapter 13 petition was filed at 2:55 p.m. on December 9 because the presiding justice remained free to reconsider his ore tenus ruling at least until the judgment was docketed by the superior court clerk on December 10, one day after the automatic stay took effect. Since the amount owed Elliott had been adjudicated "to the penny" prior to the chapter 13 petition, yet the $276,606.87 judgment was docketed after the chapter 13 petition, we will assume, without deciding, that the Papatones debt did not become "liquidated" until the superior court judgment was docketed. The remaining inquiry, then, is whether the postpetition docketing of the judgment violated the automatic stay. As recently explained, section 362(a)(1) does not stay acts that are "essentially clerical in nature," as for example "when an official's duty is delineated by, say, a law or a judicial decree with such crystalline clarity that nothing is left to the exercise of the official's discretion or judgment. . . ." Soaresv. Brockton Credit Union (In re Soares), 107 F.3d 969, 974 (1st Cir. 1997). See also Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1994); Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. McCarthy Constr. Co. (In re Knightsbridge Dev. Co.), 884 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1989). As Me. R. Civ. P. 58 makes crystal clear, the superior court justice's prepetition adjudication and direction for entry of a money judgment left nothing to the discretion or judgment of the superior court clerk. See, e.g., York Mut. Ins. Co. of Maine v. Mooers, 415 A.2d 564, 566 (Me. 1980) (per curiam). Therefore, even though the oral direction for entry of judgment was not reduced to writing until the next day, neither that clerical act nor the mere ministerial notation of the judgment on the docket contravened the automatic stay. III CONCLUSION As the mere docketing of the Elliott judgment did not violate the automatic stay, see In re Soares, 107 F.3d at 973-74, and it is conceded that an unsecured debt becomes "liquidated" in amount once reduced to judgment, see supra note 3, the $276,606.87 unsecured, liquidated debt owed Elliott on the date of the filing of the chapter 13 petition rendered Papatones ineligible for chapter 13 relief as provided in Bankruptcy Code 109(e). Accordingly, the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit is affirmed. Appellant shall bear all costs. SO ORDERED.