Bank of Boston v. Wallace

USCA1 Opinion [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 98-1551 BANK OF BOSTON, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. WILLIAM B. WALLACE AND JOAN M. WALLACE, Defendants, Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lipez, Circuit Judge. Matthew J. McGowan and Salter, McGowan, Swartz & Sylvia on brief for appellant. December 2, 1998 Per Curiam. Upon careful review of appellant's brief and the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing this appeal from a bankruptcy court order. The appeal was moot for the reasons stated in the district court's Memorandum and Order dated March 6, 1998. Further, the appeal was not excused from the requirement of a live case or controversy. Although the bankruptcy court proceeding of which appellant complained may be "capable of repetition," we cannot say that appellant's underlying issue will "yet evade review." See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). Appellant may yet be able to litigate the issue in other cases, in particular ones where the bankruptcy court rejects the reaffirmation agreement. Other avenues may conceivably exist. Compare Whitehouse v. United States District Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1353 (1st Cir. 1995) (declaratory judgment action was the "proper method" to challenge a local rule); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 623 F.2d 720, 723 (1st Cir. 1980) (suggesting contempt proceedings as a possible method to obtain appellate review). As an additional ground for dismissal, it appears that appellant lacks standing to appeal from the order at issue here. The show cause order on its face was addressed to another party, did not require any action of appellant, and did not threaten or impose any sanction against appellant, and so the denial of appellant's motion to vacate that order had no practical effect on appellant. Although appellant has complained of various costs — 2 — incurred to prepare for and attend such show cause hearings and also of a general "chilling effect" arising from the possibility of such hearings, it does not appear that the show cause order or the denial of appellant's motion to vacate had any direct, adverse, pecuniary effect on appellant, as required to vest appellant with standing to appeal. See In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 154-56 (1st Cir. 1987). We intend no comment on the merits, if any, of appellant's underlying issue. Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.