Williams v. Meyer

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0344P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0344p.06 GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John A. Shea, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Brad H. Beaver, OFFICE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ OBERDORFER, D. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAUGHTREY, J., joined. BOGGS, J. (p. 18), THEODORE G. WILLIAMS, X delivered a separate dissenting opinion. Petitioner-Appellant, - - _________________ - No. 01-1951 v. - OPINION > _________________ , WILLIAM MEYER, - OBERDORFER, District Judge. Theodore G. Williams, Respondent-Appellee. - the petitioner, appeals the district court’s order denying his N motion for relief from judgment. The district court entered Appeal from the United States District Court judgment, denying Williams’ petition for habeas relief, after for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. Williams failed to timely file objections to the magistrate’s No. 93-75495—Paul D. Borman, District Judge. report and recommendation. Williams has demonstrated that his failure to timely file his objections was the result of Argued: May 8, 2003 “excusable neglect,” entitling him to relief. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. Decided and Filed: September 25, 2003 I. BACKGROUND Before: BOGGS and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; OBERDORFER, District Judge.* A. Relevant Statutory Provisions

_________________ 1. Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act

COUNSEL Until its repeal, effective August 1, 1968, Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act (the “Sexual Psychopath ARGUED: John A. Shea, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Act”), Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 780.501-.509 (West Appellant. Brad H. Beaver, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 1968), repealed by 1968 Mich. Pub. Acts 143 (Aug. 1, 1968), provided that a criminal defendant in Michigan who was designated a “criminal sexual psychopathic person” would be committed to the custody of the state hospital commission to * be confined in an appropriate state institution. Id. § 780.505. The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation. A criminal sexual psychopathic person was defined as “[a]ny

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 3 4 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

person who is suffering from a mental disorder and is not understand the need for treatment and whose continued feeble-minded, which mental disorder is coupled with behavior can reasonably be expected, on the basis of criminal propensities to the commission of sexual offenses.”1 competent clinical opinion, to result in significant physical Id. § 780.501. After the Sexual Psychopath Act was repealed, harm to himself or herself or others. Id. § 330.1401. Mental the Michigan Supreme Court ordered that the discharge of illness is defined as “a substantial disorder or thought or persons in custody pursuant to the Act would continue to be mood that significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity governed by the Act’s discharge provisions until further to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary legislative clarification. Admin. Order 1969-4, 382 Mich. demands of life.” Id. § 330.1400(g). xxix (1969). As no such clarification ever occurred, the Act’s discharge provisions have continued to apply to such persons. B. Facts Under those provisions (section 7 of the Act as enacted), a person in custody “shall be discharged only after there are In October 1967, Theodore Williams, the petitioner, entered reasonable grounds to believe that such person has recovered a plea of guilty in Michigan state court to a charge of first from such psychopathy to a degree that he will not be a degree murder. Prior to sentencing, Williams was designated menace to others.” Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 780.507 (West a “criminal sexual psychopath,” under the then-applicable 1968). Sexual Psychopath Act, and committed to the custody of a state mental hospital. He was initially discharged in 2. Michigan’s Mental Health Code September 1973, but he was returned to custody in 1979, following a determination by the Michigan Supreme Court With the exception of persons committed pursuant to the that he had been improperly released.2 See People v. Sexual Psychopath Act, Michigan’s Mental Health Code governs the commitment and discharge of persons in the custody of the Michigan Department of Mental Health. Mich. 2 A convoluted series of events transpired between W illiams’ release Comp. Laws Ann. § 330.2050(5) (West 2003). Under the in 1973 and his return to custody in 1979. W hen W illiams pleaded guilty Mental Health Code, a person must be discharged when “the in 1967, he had been charged with the rape and murder of a seven-year- patient’s mental condition is such that he or she no longer old girl in Allegan County, Michigan. After his release, Allegan County, meets the criteria of a person requiring treatment.” Id. for reasons not apparent from the record, filed new charges based on that § 330.1476(2). A “person requiring treatment” is defined as same rape and murder. W illiams again pleaded guilty, this time to second degree murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Williams appealed, an individual “who has mental illness” and (1) who as a result citing section 8 o f the Sexual Psychopath A ct. Section 8 provided that a of that illness can reasonably be expected within the near defendant was immune from prosecution for the “the offense with which future to intentionally or unintentionally seriously injure he originally stood charged, or convicted” prior to commitment. Mich. himself or herself or another individual; (2) who as a result of Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.508 (West 1968). The Michigan Court of that illness is unable to attend to his or her basic physical Appeals held that section 8 applied and reversed W illiams’ conviction. The Michigan Supreme C ourt affirmed, but ordered Williams returned to needs necessary to avoid serious harm in the near future; or the custody of the Department of Mental Health on the ground that he had (3) whose judgment is so impaired that he or she is unable to been “imprope rly released” in 1973. People v. Williams, 406 Mich. 990 (1979). The case was rem anded to the state circuit court to permit W illiams to file a new petition for discharge. People v. Williams, 407 1 Mich. 91 2 (1979 ). Under the Sexual Psychopath Act, either the state or the defendant could seek this designation. Shortly after his release in 1973 , W illiams was also arrested and

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 5 6 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

Williams, 406 Mich. 909 (1979). From then until the present, JA 105-111 (People v. Williams, 580 N.W.2d 438, 441-44 he has remained in the custody of the Michigan Department (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)). On November 24, 1998, the of Mental Health. He has filed a number of petitions for Michigan Supreme Court denied Williams’ application for discharge pursuant to section 7 of the repealed Sexual leave to appeal. See People v. Williams, 589 N.W.2d 287 Psychopath Act, all of which have been denied. Today, he is (Mich. 1998). the only person remaining in the custody of the Michigan Department of Mental Health who was committed under, and 2. Federal Collateral Proceedings whose discharge is governed by, the Sexual Psychopath Act. After the state circuit court rejected his constitutional C. Procedural History claims in 1993, Williams filed a petition in federal district court seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On 1. State Proceedings January 5, 1995, the district court dismissed the petition, pending final resolution of the state court proceedings. The The present action began with the petition for discharge case was reopened on January 14, 1999, after the Michigan Williams filed on September 19, 1991. In addition to seeking Supreme Court denied Williams’ application for leave to discharge under section 7 of the Sexual Psychopath Act, appeal. The district court appointed counsel to review, and Williams contended that the application of section 7 violated amend as necessary, Williams’ petition. Williams filed an his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. amended petition on October 13, 2000, claiming that On July 29, 1993, the state circuit court rejected Williams’ requiring him to seek discharge under section 7 deprived him constitutional challenges. JA 77-100 (People v. Williams, No. of his constitutional rights to due process and equal 67-4411 FY (Allegan County, Mich. Cir. Ct. July 29, 1993)). protection. His due process claim had two components. On June 13, 1994, at the conclusion of a series of evidentiary First, he claimed that section 7 failed to satisfy the hearings, it orally denied Williams’ petition. A subsequent requirements of constitutional due process because it only written order stated that “it was established by clear and required the state to prove a predisposition toward, not a convincing evidence that the defendant has not recovered “likelihood” of, future dangerousness, in conflict with the due from his criminal sexual psychopathy to a degree that he will process principles established by the Supreme Court in not be a menace to others.” JA 103. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), a decision upholding the standard for commitment in Kansas’ Sexually The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. It ruled that the Violent Predator Act. Next, he claimed that even if section 7 constitutional challenges were without merit and that the did not on its face violate due process, his continued detention circuit court had not clearly erred in denying discharge. See did because even under section 7 there was insufficient evidence to support the state circuit court’s conclusion that he was not entitled to release. His equal protection claim rested charged with the rap e and murd er of a thirteen-yea r-old girl in Newaygo on a comparison between the standard for discharge under County, Michigan, a crime he had committed in 1966 and confessed to section 7 and the standard for discharge under the Mental when he was arrested in 1967. Williams was unsuccessful in his attempt Health Code. The latter, he claimed, was easier to satisfy, to get those charges dismissed under se ction 8 , as they were not the basis resulting in his being treated differently than other similarly for his conviction. Nonetheless, for reasons not apparent from the record, situated persons held under the Mental Health Code. The those charges were dism issed after Williams entered his second plea of guilty in Allegan County.

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 7 8 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

district court referred the case to a magistrate judge on Kansas v. Crane . . . is unlikely to affect the merits of this January 16, 2001. case.” JA 194. That same day, the district court accepted the magistrate’s report and recommendation and denied On March 7, 2001, the magistrate judge issued his report Williams’ petition for habeas relief. JA 195-96. and recommendation, concluding that the habeas petition should be denied. JA 145-173. Williams had ten days to file On May 11, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil objections to that report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On Procedure 60(b), Williams filed a motion for relief from March 16, 2001, Williams filed a consent motion for an judgment, for reconsideration of the order denying his second enlargement of time, asking the district court for an additional motion for an enlargement of time, and for leave to file thirty days to file objections because “the issues are novel and objections, which he attached. JA 197-211. As grounds for complex, the record voluminous, and other matters already relief, Williams argued that his failure to timely file scheduled [for counsel] when the Report and objections was “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b). Recommendation was received will occupy a significant Williams’ motion described in greater detail the reasons why amount of [counsel’s] time in the next couple of weeks.” JA counsel had failed to file objections within the time allotted: 189-90. The district court granted the motion, giving Williams until April 25, 2001, to file objections. JA 191. undersigned counsel informs the Court that he fell ill on two separate occasions in the time between his first and On April 24, 2001, Williams filed a second motion for second motions for enlargement. As a result, he lost enlargement of time, asking for an additional twenty-one several days of work. Moreover, also during this time a days, until May 17, 2001, to file objections. JA 192-93. The close friend came into the final stage of a terminal motion stated that counsel needed the extra time “[o]n illness, which required the undersigned’s attention in account of recent illnesses and his trial schedule” and to both a personal and representative capacity, resulting in review the implications of the Supreme Court’s April 2, 2001 a additional time being diverted from the office. Those grant of certiorari in Kansas v. Crane, 532 U.S. 937 (2001), unexpected events, combined with an already heavy a case counsel thought had the potential to alter the guiding hearings schedule (including a trial) during this time, and constitutional principles of involuntary hospitalization.3 JA combined further with the unexpected Crane 193. Williams’ counsel was unable to speak with Williams development, made it impossible for the undersigned to prior to making this request, but he informed the district court file [William’s] objections within the enlargement of that he was “confident” Williams would not object. JA 193. time initially given. On April 27, 2001, the district court denied the motion, stating: “Petitioner’s counsel has already had one extension JA 198. With respect to the potential relevance of Crane, of time, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Williams argued that if the Supreme Court were to decide in Crane that the Constitution requires a showing of volitional impairment to prove future dangerousness, that would support 3 The issue presented in Crane was what, if any, showing of volitional Williams’ claim that the quantum of proof of dangerousness impairment a state must make before civilly committing a sexual required under the Sexual Psychopath Act did not satisfy offender. Ultimately, the Court held that a state does not need to prove constitutional due process. JA 199. Finally, Williams the offender’s total or complete lack of control over his dangerous pointed out that if the district court denied the motion for behavior, but does need to make some determination of a lack of contro l. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 9 10 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

relief from judgment, he would be barred from any appeal on seeking relief has a meritorious claim or defense. Id. at 845. the merits. JA 204. Culpability is “framed” by the specific language of the rule; i.e., a party demonstrates a lack of culpability by On June 6, 2001, the district court denied Williams’ motion demonstrating “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable for relief from judgment, for reconsideration of the order neglect.” Waifersong, Ltd. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 denying the second motion for enlargement of time, and for F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992). And because Rule 60(b)(1) leave to file his objections instanter. JA 174-75. The court “mandates” such a demonstration, “[i]t is only when the ruled that Williams’ counsel’s “recent illnesses, his trial [party seeking relief] can carry this burden that he will be schedule and the potential need to review a case before the permitted to demonstrate that he also can satisfy the other two Supreme Court” did not amount to “excusable neglect to factors: the existence of a meritorious defense and the absence justify granting relief under Rule 60(b).” JA 175. of substantial prejudice to the [other party].” Id.; see also Weiss v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 790, 794 Williams filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 3, 2001. (6th Cir. 2002) (a party seeking relief “must demonstrate first On January 11, 2002, the Sixth Circuit issued a Certificate of and foremost that the default did not result from his culpable Appealability, limited to “the sole issue of whether the district conduct”). A district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion court properly denied Williams’ motion for relief from is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United Coin, 705 F.2d at judgment and for leave to file objections to the magistrate’s 843. report and recommendation.” B. Application II. DISCUSSION 1. Culpability of Party Seeking Relief A. Legal Principles We start, as we must, by considering Williams’ culpability. In relevant part, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) Williams contends that the failure to timely file objections provides that “on motion and upon such terms as are just, the was not the result of culpable conduct but of “excusable court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . for . . . neglect.” A party’s conduct is culpable if it “display[s] either mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Where a party seeks relief from a default for the effect of its conduct on those proceedings.” judgment,4 Rule 60(b)(1) should be applied “equitably and Amerinational Indus. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, liberally . . . to achieve substantial justice.” United Coin 978 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting INVST Financial Group, Inc. v. Meter v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 844-45 (6th Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., 815 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1992). Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether Moreover, although clients are held liable for the acts and relief is warranted, three factors are relevant: (1) whether the omissions of their counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Reyes, party seeking relief is culpable; (2) whether the party 307 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2002), “this court, like many others, opposing relief will be prejudiced; and (3) whether the party has been extremely reluctant to uphold the dismissal of a case or the entering of a default judgment merely to discipline an 4 errant attorney because such a sanction deprives the client of Although these principles com e from cases involving defa ult his day in court,” see Buck v. United States Dep’t of judgments, the parties assume, and we agree, that the same approach Agriculture, 960 F.2d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 1992). should govern the prese nt case.

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 11 12 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

The record establishes that in failing to timely file neither demonstrate with respect to a sexual offender’s lack of Williams nor his counsel engaged in any culpable conduct. control, clearly had the potential to be relevant to Williams’ First, Williams’ failure to timely file objections does not claims. appear to have been “willful” or the result of “carelessness” or “negligence.” See Weiss, 283 F.3d at 795. He timely Finally, Williams did not delay seeking relief or filing his asked for enlargements of time, and the time requested was objections. He filed his motion for relief, with objections not extraordinary. His first motion for an enlargement of attached, almost immediately after the district court denied time, which was granted, was timely filed and sought merely the second motion for enlargement of time and entered an additional thirty days. The second motion was also timely judgment. And the objections Williams seeks to file are not filed and asked for only an additional twenty-one days. mere repetitions of his original petition. Given these Moreover, the length of time that lapsed between the circumstances, Williams’ failure to timely file objections was appointment of Williams’ counsel and the filing of the the result of “excusable neglect,” not culpable conduct. amended petition, while not irrelevant, does not obviate the need for sufficient time after receiving the magistrate’s report 2. Prejudice to Prevailing Party and recommendation to review the actual report and prepare responsive objections. The respondent concedes that granting the requested relief will cause it no prejudice. Nor did Williams fail to give reasons for needing additional time. See, e.g., Wilson v. Cassidy (In re Cassidy), 273 B.R. 3. Meritoriousness of Claim or Defense 531 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002). In both the second motion for an enlargement of time and the motion for relief from The final factor to consider is the meritoriousness of the judgment, Williams cited a number of reasons for needing claim of the party seeking relief – in this case, the additional time, including illness, preexisting professional meritoriousness of Williams’ objections to the magistrate’s obligations, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in report and recommendation. A claim or defense is Kansas v. Crane, the complexity of the issues, the magnitude “meritorious,” if “there is some possibility that the outcome of the record, and the magistrate’s reliance on caselaw from of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result other jurisdictions. All of these events were mostly or achieved by the default.” INVST Financial v. Chem-Nuclear entirely beyond counsel’s control, and there is no evidence Systems, 815 F.2d 391, 398-99 (6th Cir. 1987) (internal that the any of the claimed reasons were false or frivolous. quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Amerinational The respondent asks us to penalize Williams for failing to Indus. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 977 (6th Cir. provide the district court with the specific details of his 1991). The test of meritoriousness is not “likelihood of counsel’s illness or trial schedule, but we do not believe that success,” but merely whether the claim or defense is “good at fact supports a finding of culpability where, as here, he was law.” United Coin, 705 F.2d at 845. Ambiguous or disputed never asked for such information and the veracity of the facts must be construed “in the light most favorable to the information has not been challenged. The respondent also [defaulted party].” Amerinational, 925 F.2d at 977. contends, as the district court ruled, that Crane had no Accordingly, we must decide whether permitting the filing of relevance to Williams’ case. We disagree. The grant of Williams’ objections, which opens up the possibility of an certiorari in Crane, presenting (and ultimately resolving) the appeal on the merits, creates “some possibility” of a different issue of what the federal Constitution requires a state to

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 13 14 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

outcome. Applying this standard, as explained below, we The magistrate judge agreed that Hendricks established that believe that several of his objections are meritorious. due process requires proof of a likelihood of future dangerousness, but rejected Williams’ claim that section 7 a. Meritorious Objection to Analysis of First Due does not require such proof. He acknowledged that the Process Claim language of section 7 differs from the language of Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, but found those differences Williams’ first due process claim is that section 7 is immaterial as the Michigan courts, in his view, had applied unconstitutional because it does not require sufficient proof section 7 in a manner that “mirrors the Kansas statute.” JA of future dangerousness. Specifically, he claims that under 162. He justified his conclusion by pointing out that the section 7, as interpreted and applied by Michigan courts, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that State can prevent discharge by proving merely a Williams’ claim failed “because the state proved, as required predisposition toward future dangerousness, whereas the by the [Sexual Psychopath Act], that [Williams] would pose Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, upholding an actual threat of danger to others if he were release[d] from Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act, established that his detention.” JA 162-63 (quoting Williams, 228 Mich. App. continued confinement requires proof of a likelihood of future at 555 (JA 109)). Relying on this language, he concluded that dangerousness. the “menace to others” language of section 7 serves the same purpose as the “likelihood of such conduct” language in the In Hendricks, in the course of resolving the specific issues Kansas statute, namely, to insure that continued commitment before it, the Supreme Court observed that civil commitment is based on a finding of a likelihood of future dangerousness. statutes generally satisfy due process when “they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some Williams objects to the magistrate’s reliance on the additional factor, such as a mental illness or mental Michigan Court of Appeals’ opinion as the basis for his abnormality.” It then concluded that Kansas’ Sexually conclusion that section 7 requires finding a likelihood of Violent Predator Act satisfied this standard because it future dangerousness. JA 207. He contends that the opinion required “evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a does not clearly impose such a requirement, as it also present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such describes the required finding in terms of a predisposition or conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated.”5 521 propensity toward future dangerousness. Id. (citing Williams, U.S. at 357-58 (emphasis added). 228 Mich. App. at 554-555 (JA 109)). We agree. In its opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals states that Williams poses an “actual threat of danger,” but it 5 also describes section 7 as requiring the state to prove Kansa s’ Sexually Vio lent Predator Act is an act similar, but not “criminal propensities to commit future sex offenses,” or a identical, to M ichgan ’s Sexual Psychopath Ac t. The Kansas Act provides for the civil co mmitment o f a “sexually violent predator,” defined as a “mental disorder that predisposes him to commit future sex person (1) convicted of, or charged with, a sexually violent offense, offenses.” JA 109 (Williams, 228 Mich. App. at 554-555). (2) who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and This conflicting language calls into question the magistrate’s (3) which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual conclusion that it has been clearly established by the violence. A person held under this statute must be discharged if, at any Michigan courts that section 7 requires proof of a likelihood time, the state can no longer sa tisfy its burden of p roving these facts beyo nd a reasonable doubt.

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 15 16 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

of future dangerousness and persuades us that Williams’ preclude the possibility that a federal court might nonetheless objection is meritorious. conclude that there are differences between the two schemes and that those differences are constitutionally significant. The b. Meritorious Objections to Equal Protection magistrate’s analysis does not address this possibility. Analysis Moreover, Williams’ claim that the burdens are not identical, and that it is more difficult to obtain release under section 7, Williams’ equal protection claim is that section 7 is is supported by the testimony of at least one expert. See JA unconstitutional because it subjects him to a different, and 41 (describing testimony of Dr. Mark Fettman). Accordingly, more difficult to satisfy, standard for release than that applied we are persuaded that this objection is meritorious. to other involuntary detainees, including sexual offenders committed after being found guilty but mentally ill or not Williams also objects to the magistrate’s conclusion that guilty by reason of insanity, who are covered by the Mental any difference between his treatment under section 7 and the Health Code. treatment of other sexual offenders under the Mental Health Code is constitutionally insignificant because it results from The magistrate rejected Williams’ equal protection claim the state’s “substantial” interest in improving its criminal on several grounds. First, again relying on the Michigan justice, sentencing and mental health schemes. He contends Court of Appeals’ opinion, he concluded that standards for that the magistrate erred because he failed to apply strict discharge in the Mental Health Code and in section 7 “largely scrutiny, which requires that the government’s interests be mirror” each other and, therefore, that Williams could not compelling. We agree. Any difference in treatment of show any constitutionally significant difference between his involuntary detainees is subject to strict scrutiny. See Foucha treatment and the treatment of other involuntary detainees v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1992). As the magistrate’s under the Mental Health Code. JA 166. Moreover, he ruled, analysis fails to apply this standard, Williams’ second even if the standards are different, the equal protection claim objection to the magistrate’s equal protection analysis is also fails because “[i]mprovement in the criminal justice, meritorious. sentencing, and mental health schemes of a state are substantial governmental interests, and a state does not violate III. CONCLUSION equal protection by applying different schemes to persons who committed their crimes at different times.” JA 169. As all three Coin factors weigh in Williams’ favor, the district court should have granted Williams’ motion for relief Williams first objects to the magistrate’s conclusion that from judgment and permitted him to file his objections. section 7 imposes the same burden as the Mental Health Accordingly, and for the above stated reasons, the district Code. He argues that the definition of future dangerousness court’s order denying Williams’ motion for relief from in the Mental Health Code is “specific and narrow,” while the judgment, for reconsideration of the order denying a second definition in section 7 is “broad and general,” making it easier enlargement of time to file objections and for leave to file to obtain release under the Mental Health Code. JA 210. As objections is REVERSED. The district court’s April 27, the magistrate recognized, the Michigan Court of Appeals’ 2001 order denying the second motion for enlargement of finding that the Mental Health Code and section 7 “largely time is REVERSED; its April 27, 2001 order accepting the mirror” each other is a construction of state law that is magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denying binding on a federal court. However, that finding does not Williams’ application for the writ of habeas corpus is

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 17 18 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

VACATED; and its April 27, 2001 judgment in favor of the ______________ respondent and against the petitioner is VACATED. The case is REMANDED with instructions for the district court DISSENT to accept Williams’ objections for filing, and to issue a ______________ decision on Williams’ petition after consideration of all of his objections.6 BOGGS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ holding that counsel committed “excusable neglect” in failing to file objections to the magistrate judge’s report in this case. Counsel had asked for an extension of time for thirty days beyond the ten-day period prescribed for such objections. The court actually granted an additional thirty-nine days, to April 25. Counsel, now having had forty-nine days since the filing of the magistrate judge’s report, waited until the forty-eighth day to ask for an additional twenty-one day extension. Under these circumstances, waiting until the next to the last day to file the extension was virtually defying the judge’s right to rule on the motion. The circumstances at issue here, while certainly trying, are in no way out of the ordinary for legal practice. Other professional and personal commitments, which did not arise at the last moment, are part and parcel of doing business as a lawyer. The reasons relied on by my colleagues for finding this neglect excusable would be present in very many cases before our court. By waiting until the end of the extended period to file a request for yet another extension, counsel insured that the judge would have no choice between dismissing the case, with the harsh consequences that are noted in the opinion, and acceeding to counsel’s request, whatever its merits. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the test of United Coin Meter and of Weiss has been met and that counsel’s actions show carelessness and/or negligence in dealing with the time given him by the court’s initial extension of time. 6 A de termination o n remand that W illiams has been dep rived of his I therefore respectfully dissent. constitutional right to due pro cess or equa l protection d oes not entitle him to release, but to have a state court recon sider his petition for discharge guided by the federal court’s final ruling o n the merits.