Todd W. Altschul v. State

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 15, 2010. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-09-00325-CV Todd W. Altschul, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On Appeal from the 278th District Court Walker County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 24,379 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Todd W. Altschul, an indigent inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”), Correctional Institutions Division, appeals from an order dismissing his suit against the State of Texas under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. On appeal, appellant contends (1) an order granting habeas relief and vacating an order of commitment to Texas Youth Commission supports his claim for damages under the wrongful imprisonment statutes; (2) Chapter 14 does not apply to his wrongful imprisonment claim; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his claim; (4) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on his motion for production of records; and (5) the wrongful imprisonment statute is constitutionally infirm. We affirm. Factual and Procedural Background Appellant, an inmate in the TDCJ,[1] filed a claim for wrongful imprisonment under Chapter 103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Appellant’s claim was filed pro se, in forma pauperis. According to his petition, a trial court granted habeas corpus relief and dismissed a 1989 order committing appellant to the Texas Youth Commission (“TYC”). The court granted the relief because the jury in the juvenile proceedings found appellant not responsible for his delinquent conduct under section 55.51 of the Texas Family Code, yet the trial court disregarded the jury’s verdict and committed him to TYC. Appellant filed suit against the State, asserting that the habeas corpus relief granted by the trial court entitled him to compensation for wrongful imprisonment for the term he served in TYC. The trial court dismissed with prejudice appellant’s wrongful imprisonment suit as frivolous. In its order, the trial court stated: “After reviewing [the State’s motion to dismiss], Plaintiff’s Petition, and Chapter 14 of the Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code, the Court finds that said dismissal is mandatory, and should be in all things granted.” Appellant filed this pro se appeal shortly after the trial court dismissed his suit. Discussion Although appellant has raised six issues on appeal, we only address those necessary for disposition of this case. I. Does Chapter 14 apply to an inmate’s suit for wrongful imprisonment? In both the trial court and on appeal, appellant contends that Chapter 14, the Inmate Litigation Act, does not govern his suit for compensation for wrongful imprisonment under Chapter 103 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.[2] We disagree. This allegation simply is not supported by the plain language of the chapter. Section 14.002 provides: This chapter applies only to a suit brought by an inmate in a district, county, justice of the peace, or small claims court in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs is filed by the inmate. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 14.002(a) (Vernon 2002). Because appellant is an inmate who has filed suit in a district court with an affidavit of inability to pay costs, Chapter 14 applies to his claim. See id. Indeed, the legislature enacted Chapter 14 to control the flood of frivolous lawsuits filed in Texas courts by prison inmates. McCollum v. Mt. Ararat Baptist Church, Inc., 980 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). Had the legislature wished to exclude Chapter 103 wrongful-imprisonment claims from the requirements of Chapter 14, it would have done so. In fact, the legislature has indicated its willingness to exempt certain types of suits from the requirements of Chapter 14 by explicitly stating that the chapter does not apply to actions brought under the Family Code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 14.002(b). Accordingly, we conclude that appellant was required to comply with Chapter 14, and overrule this issue. We next turn to appellant’s issues regarding the trial court’s dismissal of his suit under Chapter 14. II. Did the trial court abuse is discretion in dismissing appellant’s suit under Chapter 14? We review a trial court’s decision to dismiss a lawsuit brought by an inmate under Chapter Fourteen for an abuse of discretion. Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004). When an inmate fails to comply with the affidavit requirements of section 14.004, the trial court may assume that the current suit is substantially similar to one previously filed by an inmate and thus is frivolous. See Samuels v. Strain, 11 S.W.3d 404, 407 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Bell v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 962 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Section 14.004 requires an inmate to file an affidavit of previous filings that: (1) identif[ies] each suit, other than a suit under the Family Code, previously brought by the person and in which the person was not represented by an attorney, without regard to whether the person was an inmate at the time the suit was brought; and (2) describ[es] each suit that was previously brought by: (A) stating the operative facts for which relief was sought; (B) listing the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought; (C) identifying each party named in the suit; and (D) stating the result of the suit, including whether the suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious under Section 13.001 or Section 14.003 or otherwise. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 14.004(a). Here, appellant filed an affidavit purportedly complying with this section that lists only two previous filings. However, appellant did not (a) describe the operative facts of one of the cases included in the affidavit or (b) list the case name and cause number or identify the parties in the other. Cf. Samuels, 11 S.W.3d at 405, 407 (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing inmate’s claim because, inter alia, inmate failed to list the operative facts or identify the parties in one of the cases included in his affidavit). Furthermore, in his claim, appellant stated that he has initiated numerous “rounds” of habeas corpus petitions and identifies a published opinion that he alleges held he could attack his Texas Youth Commission adjudication through a habeas proceeding. He also describes at least two petitions for writs of mandamus in his pleading. None of these previous filings are included in his affidavit. Under these circumstances, the trial court was entitled to presume the instant suit was substantially similar to one of his previous filings and dismiss it as frivolous. See id. at 407; Bell, 962 S.W.2d at 158. We thus overrule his issue regarding dismissal of his suit under Chapter 14, and do not reach his issues relating to the merits of his Chapter 103 claims.[3] Conclusion Having considered and overruled those issues necessary to the disposition of this appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. /s/ John S. Anderson Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and Christopher. [1] According to the State, appellant was originally incarcerated in the TDCJ for burglary, but committed additional offenses while incarcerated. He is currently serving two concurrent sentences for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution. [2] Chapter 103 provides for compensation for persons wrongfully imprisoned. As is relevant here, a person is entitled to compensation if he has been granted relief on the basis of actual innocence of the crime for which he was sentenced. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 103.001(a) (Vernon 2005). As noted above, appellant stated that the habeas relief was granted because the jury found him not responsible for his delinquent conduct due to mental illness or mental retardation. See Tex. Fam. Code § 55.51(a) (Vernon 2008). He thus was not granted relief on the basis of actual innocence. [3] See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4 (stating that when issues are settled, court should write a brief memorandum opinion no longer than necessary to advise the parties of the court’s decision and the basic reasons for it).