Eudalia Bonilla v. State

Affirmed and Substitute Memorandum Opinion filed June 3, 2010. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals ___________________ NO. 14-08-00289-CR ___________________ EUDALIA BONILLA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 239th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 51,110 SUBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted appellant, Eudalia Bonilla, of felony theft amounting to at least $1,500.00 but less than $20,000.00 (aggregated). In seven issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict, her due process rights were violated, and the trial court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction on mistake of law and overruling her objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument. We affirm. I. Background Appellant is the mother of four children, including C.B., a female who was fourteen-years-old at the time of trial. Linda Nesmith is C.B.’s paternal grandmother and has had legal custody of C.B. since 1997. In July 2004, Nesmith was interviewed by Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“HHSC”) eligibility specialist Debbie Brock regarding Nesmith’s eligibility for benefits, including food-assistance benefits for C.B. Brock discovered C.B. was already the subject of a benefits claim by appellant. Nesmith told Brock that C.B. had lived with her for several years and presented court documents establishing her legal custody of C.B. Brock notified appellant that she would no longer be allowed to claim C.B. as part of her household for benefits purposes. Appellant did not respond to the notice. Appellant’s alleged food-stamp fraud was referred to Kameshia McCoy, a senior fraud investigator with HHSC. McCoy concluded from her investigation that appellant’s fraudulent activities began in April 2002. She also concluded appellant was overissued $4,093.43 from HHSC as a result of wrongfully claiming benefits for C.B. Appellant was indicted for felony theft-aggregated. Following a jury trial and conviction, appellant entered into a plea agreement relative to punishment. II. Analysis A. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence We begin by addressing appellant’s issues challenging legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. In her first issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that she deceived HHSC by claiming C.B. as part of her household because an incorrect legal standard was used by the State and trial court for determining that C.B. did not “live with” appellant. In her third issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that she was deceptive during the entire period of time the State examined to determine the aggregate amount of alleged theft. In her fourth issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that she had the requisite criminal intent to commit theft. In determining legal sufficiency, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and decide whether a trier of fact could have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony; it is the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Thus, when performing a legal-sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A factfinder may disbelieve some or all of a witness’s testimony, even when that testimony is uncontradicted. Hernandez v. State, 161 S.W.3d 491, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We must resolve any inconsistencies in the testimony in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 1. Food-Stamp Eligibility Standards We first consider whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the contention that the correct legal standard was used for determining whether appellant and C.B. lived together. Interpretation of federal food-stamp law and regulations is a question of law we consider de novo. See Anderson v. State, 193 S.W.3d 34, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Statutory interpretation is a question of law.”); see also In re R.C.T., No. 14-07-00642-CV, 2009 WL 2517054, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 18, 2009, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (interpreting state and federal statutory language de novo). The parties agree that a “household” eligible to receive food stamps is defined in the federal regulations, in pertinent part, as, [A] group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption. [P]arents and their children 21 years of age or younger who live together, and children . . . under 18 years of age who live with and are under the parental control of a person other than their parent together with the person exercising parental control shall be treated as a group of individuals who customarily purchase and prepare meals together for home consumption even if they do not do so. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(i) (West 1999) (emphasis added), amended by Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 4112(b)(1), 116 Stat. 134, 312–13 (2002) (current version at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(n) (West Supp. 2009))[1]; see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(a), (b)(1)(ii) (2009) (containing language defining “household” in accord with language contained in 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012).[2] The meaning of the phrase “live together,” which the parties concede is not defined, is at the heart of appellant’s first issue. Appellant explains that the State, in attempting to establish she was ineligible to receive food stamps for C.B., presented evidence that (1) she did not have legal custody of C.B., and (2) a person can claim a child if the child lived with her more than fifty percent of the time. Appellant argues this evidence is “legally insufficient to show that [C.B.] did not live with [appellant] as required by the food stamp law . . . .” Appellant misunderstands the State’s burden in this case. Unlawful appropriation of food stamps is chargeable under the general theft statute. See Gomez v. State, 663 S.W.2d 662, 663–64 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.). Hence, the State had the burden of proving the elements of theft beyond a reasonable doubt. The standards employed by HHSC for determining whether C.B. was part of appellant’s household were relevant only for purposes of determining whether appellant committed theft—did appellant understand these standards and know that she failed to meet them when she requested and received benefits from HHSC? Nevertheless, after reviewing the whole record, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support HHSC’s determination that appellant and C.B. did not “live together” in compliance with the applicable federal rules and regulations. “The Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture conducts the food stamp program . . . , and the Secretary of Agriculture issues regulations necessary for its administration.” Shaffer v. Block, 705 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir. 1983).[3] For purposes of determining what constitutes a “household,” the Department has decided not to define “living with,” commenting that a “regulatory definition would be no more effective then the application of a reasonable judgment based on the circumstances of a particular living arrangement.” 47 Fed. Reg. 52,328, 52,329 (1982). “Although the food stamp program is administered at the national level by the [Department], it is administered by state agencies at the local level. The state agencies are responsible for determining, in accordance with uniform national standards, which applicant households are eligible for the issuance of food stamps . . . .” Shaffer, 705 F.2d at 809 (citations omitted). “No plan of operation submitted by a State agency shall be approved unless the standards of eligibility meet those established by the Secretary, and no State agency shall impose any other standards of eligibility as a condition for participating in the program.” 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014(b) (West 1999) (current version at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014(b) (West Supp. 2009)). Additionally, no one may be a member of more than one household in a given month. 7 C.F.R. § 273.3(a) (2009).[4] We rely on the foregoing in reviewing HHSC’s methodology for determining appellant and C.B. did not “live together.” McCoy conducted the investigation of appellant’s alleged welfare fraud. During her investigation, McCoy relied on court documents establishing that Nesmith had custody of C.B., documentation from HHSC personnel’s benefits-interviews with appellant, school records for C.B., and interviews with Nesmith and other individuals. McCoy also interviewed appellant, who told her C.B. was only with Nesmith to go to school, and that she “picked [C.B.] up” on Fridays and had possession of her on weekends. McCoy agreed that appellant was entitled to benefits for C.B. when she was living with appellant more than fifty percent of the time. As explained below, McCoy ultimately determined appellant was overissued over four-thousand dollars by claiming benefits for C.B. when they did not live together. Additionally, even from appellant’s perspective, HHSC considered her situation before advising her on eligibility. Appellant testified that she spoke with HHSC representatives several times and always explained her situation to the representatives. She testified that HHSC informed her she could claim a child as part of her household as long as the child resided with her at least fifteen days per month. Appellant also testified that she frequently called HHSC to remove C.B. from her file because the number of days C.B. lived with her fluctuated month-to-month. According to appellant, because she called HHSC so often, she was eventually told her she could claim a child when they lived together fourteen days per month. Appellant claims HHSC finally told her to stop claiming C.B. because the constant claiming and removing was creating a large amount of paperwork. Hence, the evidence supports that HHSC personnel considered appellant’s situation and then advised her on the number of days she needed to have possession of C.B. in order to claim her. In sum, McCoy determined appellant and C.B. did not “live together,” and other HHSC personnel instructed appellant regarding eligibility, after application of a reasonable judgment based on the circumstances of appellant’s and C.B.’s particular living arrangement. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 52,329.[5] Accordingly, the evidence is legally sufficient to support that HHSC’s standards for determining appellant’s eligibility comported with the federal rules and regulations. 2. Legal-Sufficiency of Elements of Theft We next consider whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s findings that appellant (1) deceived HHSC by claiming C.B. during a period when appellant and C.B. did not live together, (2) was deceptive during the entire period used to determine the aggregate value of the theft, and (3) had the requisite criminal intent to commit theft. A person commits the offense of theft if she “unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.03(a) (Vernon 2003). A person acts with intent when it is her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003). Appropriation is unlawful if it is accomplished without the owner’s effective consent. Id. § 31.03(b)(1). Consent is not effective if it is induced by deception. Id. § 31.01(3)(A) (Vernon 2003). “Deception” means: [C]reating or confirming by words or conduct a false impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, and that the actor does not believe to be true[.] Id. § 31.01(1)(A). Deception and intent may be inferred from the circumstances. See Lewis v. State, 715 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Christensen v. State, 240 S.W.3d 25, 34–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (“A jury may infer intent from any facts that tend to prove its existence, such as the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant.”). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them. Id. at 16. Speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented. Id. A conclusion reached by speculation may not be completely unreasonable, but it is not sufficiently based on facts or evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Appellant posits several reasons the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s findings that she acted deceptively or with criminal intent. She asserts the State relied solely on three governmental-assistance applications as proof of her deception: (1) application of January 15, 2004, in which appellant claimed C.B.; (2) application of May 4, 2004, in which appellant did not claim C.B.; and (3) application of June 15, 2004, in which appellant claimed C.B., but noted “Gone for summer.”[6] Appellant argues the January 15 application is the only possible evidence she deceptively sought benefits for C.B., and any deception ended when she did not claim C.B. in her May 4 application. According to appellant, because the only evidence possibly inferring that she received benefits by deception was for a four-month period for which an amount of overissuance was not specified, it was impossible for the jury to determine how much she wrongfully misappropriated. Appellant also argues the applications actually support her contention that she complied with HHSC’s eligibility standards because they reflect she consciously attempted to determine when she could and could not claim C.B., even noting when C.B. was absent during the summer. Finally, appellant emphasizes her testimony that she called HHSC frequently to add and remove C.B., creating so much paperwork that HHSC instructed her to cease claiming C.B. However, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury could have found each challenged element beyond a reasonable doubt. Senior fraud investigator McCoy reviewed HHSC caseworker notes from appellant’s application interviews for the duration of the alleged fraud, which, according to McCoy, began in April 2002. McCoy testified, “I was able to obtain court records . . . saying [C.B.] was in Mrs. Nesmith’s custody. And basically, I went through the caseworker’s documentation and for each interview it suggested that [appellant] said [C.B.] was, in fact, in her household, and I got more information suggesting that she was not.” McCoy testified appellant told her that C.B. was staying with Nesmith in order to attend school, but that appellant had possession of C.B. during weekends.[7] Although McCoy did not investigate whether C.B. lived with appellant on any single day, she was able to determine if C.B was part of appellant’s household “on a certain month or any certain month,” and explained that there was an overissuance for the months C.B. was not part of appellant’s household (McCoy did not disclose these specifics at trial). McCoy testified appellant was overissued $4,093.43 in benefits after claiming C.B. as a member of her household. She calculated this amount using a computerized budget system that reflected the amount of benefits appellant received each month. McCoy input that C.B. was not part of appellant’s household, and the system output the amount for which appellant was eligible absent C.B. She also calculated the amount appellant was overissued by claiming C.B. McCoy did not provide a monthly computation reflecting the incremental overpayments, and no document was admitted reflecting her method of computation. The parties agree McCoy did not specify when the overissuance ended. Nevertheless, eligibility specialist Brock testified that she interviewed Nesmith in July 2004 and determined appellant was claiming C.B. Brock notified appellant she would no longer be allowed to claim benefits for C.B. According to Brock, C.B. was removed from appellant’s benefits calculation when appellant failed to respond to the notification. Brock explained it was too late to recalculate appellant’s benefits for August, but that C.B. could be included in Nesmith’s benefits in September.[8] This testimony supported an inference that appellant stopped receiving funds for C.B. by September 2004, and also that McCoy’s investigation ended in September 2004. Accordingly, there was evidence appellant was overissued $4,093.43 by claiming C.B. from on or around April 1, 2002 until on or around August 1, 2004.[9] Our next inquiry is whether the evidence supported the jury’s finding that appellant misappropriated these funds by deception and with the requisite criminal intent. The HHSC witnesses testified that whomever a child resides with most of the time may, or is likely eligible to, claim benefits for the child. However, there is no evidence HHSC personnel relayed to appellant, or that appellant was aware of, this standard. The only evidence relevant to appellant’s understanding of whether she could claim benefits for C.B. was provided by appellant. Appellant admitted she understood HHSC eligibility requirements when she claimed benefits for her children. She testified HHSC personnel told her she could claim benefits for C.B. during months when the child stayed with her at least fifteen days.[10] Thus, to establish appellant received benefits by creating or confirming a false impression that she did not believe to be true, there must be legally-sufficient evidence to support the contention that she claimed and received benefits for C.B. during months she did not have C.B. at least fifteen days. Several witnesses testified that C.B. lived with appellant, but no one expressly stated how many days per month C.B. was with appellant. It was undisputed that C.B. spent time with both Nesmith and appellant. Nesmith testified that she has fed, clothed, and provided spending money to C.B. since she was one-year old. Nesmith testified that in 2002, when C.B. was nine-years-old, she took C.B. to school, and C.B. lived with her and slept at her house. She further testified that C.B. stayed with her in 2004. Nesmith also testified that C.B. may have spent four days in a row at appellant’s house. Nesmith’s daughter-in-law, Sondra Inglehart, testified that, in 2002 when C.B. was nine-years old, she spent her time mostly at Nesmith’s house. Inglehart explained, “I am not saying [C.B.] doesn’t go to her mom’s two or three days at a time but she lives with [Nesmith] as far as I am concerned. . . . [H]er clothes, her computer, her everything is at her house; and [Nesmith] takes care of her.” When asked if C.B. lived between homes when she was ten-years-old, Inglehart responded “In my opinion she visited her mom. That’s how I am looking. I see her at [Nesmith’s] house all the time.” Robin Nieman lived and worked at the apartment complex where Nesmith resided and has known C.B. since 2001. She saw C.B. at Nesmith’s apartment “all the time,” testified C.B. spent the night with Nesmith “most of the time,” and elaborated, “[E]very time that I would go pick [C.B.] up or go see her, she would be at [Nesmith’s], which would be, I would say, once a day, you know, because I would always hang out with her.” Nieman also testified that she saw appellant come and retrieve C.B. periodically, for instance, some months twice a week and some months not at all. Finally, as noted above, McCoy testified appellant explained she retrieved C.B. on Fridays for the weekend because C.B. was only with Nesmith to go to school. This evidence supports an inference that appellant did not have C.B. at least fifteen days per month during the school year.[11] We conclude the foregoing, although certainly not a model of clarity on the issue, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports a logical inference that C.B. did not spend at least fifteen days per month with appellant during the relevant time period. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16; see also Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts are sufficient to support the conviction.”).[12] Appellant’s claiming and receiving benefits for C.B., despite not possessing her for the requisite amount of time, supported the jury’s finding that appellant unlawfully appropriated the benefits by deceiving HHSC. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 31.01(1)(A), (3)(A); 31.03(b)(1). This evidence also supported the State’s contention that appellant intended to deprive HHSC of the benefits. Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant unlawfully appropriated $4,093.43 from HHSC from on or about April 1, 2002 to on or about August 1, 2004, with intent to deprive HHSC of said amount.[13] We overrule appellant’s first, third, and fourth issues.[14] B. Due Process We next consider issues two and five, in which appellant contends her due process rights were violated. In her second issue, appellant contends her conviction constitutes a deprivation of due process that amounts to an ex post facto violation. She argues that she was convicted on less or different evidence than required by law at the time of the offense because witnesses expressed standards of “living together” not in conformity with federal food-stamp law and regulations and the prosecutor emphasized these erroneous standards. Specifically, appellant asserts that the HHSC employees testified that a person is entitled to benefits for a child when the person has legal custody of the child and they live together “more than half the time.”[15] According to appellant, “living together” should have been defined in the charge as a determination made by “application of a reasonable judgment based on the circumstances of a particular living arrangement.” 47 Fed. Reg. 52,328, 52,329. “The prohibition against ex post facto laws is a prohibition against legislative and not judicial action.” Ex parte Bonham, 707 S.W.2d 107, 108 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). However, “a judicial decision having an unjust retroactive application is barred by the due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution rather than Article I, Section 10’s ex post facto provision.” Id. An unforeseeable judicial construction of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, can function like an ex post facto law and violate the Due Process Clause. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353, 84 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (1964). “If a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, it must not be given retroactive effect.” Id. 378 U.S. at 354, 84 S. Ct. at 1703 (quotation omitted). A state judicial decision may not operate retroactively if it has the effect of depriving persons of fair notice of what conduct will give rise to which criminal penalties. Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). It has long been held that unlawfully obtaining welfare assistance “is properly chargeable under the [general theft statute.]” See Ex parte Mangrum, 564 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). More specifically, unlawfully obtaining food stamps is chargeable under the general theft statute. See Gomez, 663 S.W.2d at 663–64. Nothing that occurred in this case altered the requirement that each element of theft be found beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained above, HHSC’s standards for determining food-stamp eligibility were relevant only as evidence of whether appellant used deception to unlawfully appropriate food stamps without HHSC’s effective consent. Appellant contends an ex post facto­-type due process violation occurred because the standards testified to at trial did not comport with the federal rule. We have found no caselaw supporting appellant’s contention that the trial court’s failure to include sua sponte the definition of a federal standard promulgated to instruct state agencies in making welfare-eligibility determinations resulted in an ex post facto-type due process violation depriving appellant of fair warning of what conduct could subject her to criminal penalty. Appellant does not complain of any judicial construction of law that subjected her to conviction for conduct without fair warning. We agree with the State that “[a]ppellant may dispute whether the [HHSC] interpretation of the law was accurate, but that is not an ex post facto issue.”[16] Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second issue. In her fifth issue, appellant contends her conviction violated due process because she was never apprised that she may not be eligible to claim C.B. Due process requires the government to enact and administer laws and regulations in a manner giving citizens fair warning of what is illegal. See Cox. v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574, 85 S. Ct. 476, 486 (1965). Appellant argues the laws and regulations that control who “lives together” for purposes of food-stamp eligibility is so vague even HHSC could not apply it, and she was left unaware of possible violations. Appellant appears to argue that federal law and HHSC’s standards for determining what constitutes a “household” eligible to receive food stamps is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to her. Appellant has waived this issue by failing to challenge the constitutionality of food stamp law and regulations in the trial court.[17] Nevertheless, appellant’s contention is without merit. It is a basic principle of due process that a statute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A statute is invalid if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited. Id. A plaintiff who engages in conduct clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (1982)). When challenging the constitutionality of a statute, it is incumbent upon a defendant to show that, in its operation, the statute is unconstitutional to her in her situation. Id. As mentioned supra, the Department of Agriculture has deferred to state agencies to determine whether two or more persons live together as a “household.” Appellant admitted she was aware of HHSC’s eligibility standards when she claimed benefits for her children. She testified that she informed HHSC about her living arrangement with C.B., and they instructed her she could claim a child who resides with her at least fifteen days per month. We have already held that this evidence supported the contention that HHSC complied with the federal rule that a state agency determine whether individuals live together based on the particulars of their living arrangement. It also supported the State’s contention that appellant understood the requisites for claiming benefits. Accordingly, the pertinent food stamp regulations are not unconstitutionally vague as applied to appellant’s situation or on their face. See Santikos v. State, 836 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s fifth issue. C. Instruction on Mistake of Law In her sixth issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying her request for a mistake-of-law instruction in the jury charge. Appellant contends the evidence presented at trial raised an issue on mistake of law under subsection 8.03(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code, entitling her to an instruction on the affirmative defense. In reviewing a claim of jury-charge error, we first determine whether there was charge error. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). A defendant is entitled to an affirmative-defensive instruction on every issue raised by the evidence, regardless of the strength of the evidence. Brown v. State, 955 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The defendant’s testimony alone may be sufficient to raise a defensive theory requiring a charge. Id. Subsection 8.03(b)(1) states: (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor reasonably believed the conduct charged did not constitute a crime and that he acted in reasonable reliance upon: (1) an official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question[.] Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.03(b)(1) (Vernon 2003). At the charge conference, appellant requested an instruction on mistake of law based on a grant of permission by HHSC. Appellant testified that she received oral instruction from HHSC personnel on when and whether to claim C.B. Thus, the operative question is whether subsection 8.03(b)(1) requires a written grant of permission. We have found no cases specifically interpreting “grant of permission.” However, the Court of Criminal Appeals and several intermediate appellate courts, including this court, have emphasized that an official statement must be in writing to constitute the basis of a mistake-of-law defense. See Austin v. State, 541 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Kuhns v. State, No. 03-01-00063-CR, 2002 WL 463223, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin March 28, 2002, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); Boyd v. State, No. 14-94-00796-CR, 1996 WL 153979, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] April 4, 1996, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Linder v. State, 734 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. App.—Waco 1987 pet. ref’d). We conclude that an official statement of the law in a grant of permission must be in writing for a defendant to assert mistake of law based on that statement.[18] Here, there was no evidence appellant received any official written statement pertaining to eligibility for benefits. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s request for an instruction on mistake of law. We overrule appellant’s sixth issue. D. Jury Argument In her seventh and final issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling her objection during jury argument when the prosecutor opined on the credibility of C.B.: [PROSECUTOR:] My argument is this: I am not going to put a witness on the stand that I don’t personally believe. Okay. You watched her testify and he calls her the most credible witness. I guess opinion is different because I find her the most incredible -- well, next to the defendant -- second most incredible witness on the stand. What is she going to do, ladies and gentlemen? I feel sorry for the poor girl. She has got a grandmother, and she has got her mother sitting in the courtroom. She is being asked basically to prosecute her mom. She catches what’s going on. She may not understand the potential range of punishment and the whole aspect of the division of what’s a misdemeanor and what’s a felony and what’s what, but she knows something serious that 12 of you are sitting in this box okay. She knows something is very serious. I am not going to put a witness that I don’t personally believe. I will not cross. [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Judge, I think he’s going beyond the record on this. [PROSECUTOR:] He called. [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] But he’s saying what he didn’t believe. THE COURT: Overruled. We conclude no error occurred because appellant’s counsel invited the prosecutor’s argument on C.B.’s credibility. See Longoria v. State, 154 S.W.3d 747, 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (“Under the invited argument rule, a prosecutor is entitled to respond to defensive argument that goes outside the record, so long as the prosecutor’s argument does not stray beyond the scope of the invitation.”). Specifically, during closing argument, appellant’s counsel expressed that the State did not call C.B. as a witness or even talk to her until the morning of her testimony (argument supported by the record), but then later commented on C.B.’s veracity by arguing, “We can’t get any better than [C.B.] She is the one. She told it like it is. We could have brought witnesses to say the same thing but why? You don’t believe her, you are not going to believe anybody else.” Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s seventh issue. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Charles W. Seymore Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Seymore and Sullivan. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). [1] The 1999 version of, and 2002 amendment to, subsection 2012(i) are substantially the same as the current version section 2012(n). See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(n) (West Supp. 2009). [2] The language used to define “household” in 7 C.F.R. 273.1, subsections (a) and (b)(1)(ii), is the same now as it was during the period appellant allegedly committed theft. See 65 Fed. Reg. 64586 (Oct. 30, 2000) (amending subsections (a) and (b) of section 273.1). At the time appellant’s fraud allegedly began, the income assistance services program was in Texas Department of Human Services (“DHS”); “DHS include[d] or exclude[d] people from the food stamp household as specified in the Food Stamp Act of 1977 . . . .” See 24 Tex. Reg. 6515 (1999), adopting amendment proposed at 24 Tex. Reg. 4973 (2004) (former 40 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.501(c)). In 2004, subsection 3.501(c) was repealed and section 3.151 was substituted. See 29 Tex. Reg. 2664 (2004) & 29 Tex. Reg. 2673 (2004), adopting proposed section and repeal at 28 Tex. Reg. 9748 (2003) & 29 Tex. Reg. 9772 (2003) (former 40 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.151). The language in section 3.151 expressed that benefits were provided by household “as defined in 7 C.F.R. § 273.1.” See 28 Tex. Reg. 9748 (adopting language still used at 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 372.151). That same year, section 3.151 was transposed to Title 1 of the Texas Administrative Code, section 372.151. See 29 Tex. Reg. 6361 (2004) (current version at 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 372.151 (2009) (Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, Receiving SNAP Benefits). This transposition made HHSC responsible for income assistance services. [3] The “food stamp program” is now referred to as the “supplemental nutrition assistance program.” See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(l) (West Supp. 2009). [4] Subsection (a) of 7 C.F.R. 273.3 is the same now as it was during the period appellant allegedly committed theft. See 61 Fed. Reg. 54317 (Oct. 17, 1996) (amending subsection (a) of section 273.3). [5] Appellant cites Robinson v. Block as support that HHSC’s standards violated federal law. 869 F.2d. 202 (3d Cir. 1989). The court in Robinson held a state department determination that siblings lived together whenever they had the same address was inconsistent with the federal mandate to consider all circumstances. Id. at 212–14. Appellant’s reliance on Robinson is unpersuasive because HHSC personnel considered the particular circumstances of her situation. [6] McCoy testified that these were the only applications she could locate. [7] Appellant testified that she told McCoy she had possession of C.B. full time, not just on weekends. However, we resolve inconsistencies in favor of the verdict. See Curry, 30 S.W.3d at 406. [8] Nesmith never received HHSC benefits for C.B. because Nesmith found employment, vitiating her need for assistance. [9] Because it is alleged in the indictment the theft occurred from on or around April 1, 2002 to on or around August 1, 2004, it is irrelevant that McCoy’s investigation may have included money overissued after August 1, 2004. It is well established the “on or about” language “allows the State to prove a date other than the one alleged in the indictment as long as the date is anterior to the presentment of the indictment and within the statutory limitation period.” Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). [10] Although appellant also testified HHSC personnel later told her she could claim benefits for C.B. when she lived with her at least fourteen days, the jury was free to disregard such testimony, and we review all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Hernandez, 161 S.W.3d at 491; Young, 14 S.W.3d at 753. [11] The prosecutor emphasized this testimony during jury argument: “[Appellant] said, I have the child on the weekends. At the most there [are] five weekends a month. So, that’s ten days a month. That doesn’t follow the defense theory if you have it at least half of the time then you have possession of that child.” [12] We acknowledge that, according to appellant’s testimony, she need only have the child half the time on thirty-day months (fifteen days out of thirty days) and less than half the time on thirty-one day months (fifteen days out of thirty-one days) to be entitled to receive benefits for the child. Based on the evidence, we conclude a rational jury could have logically inferred C.B. was with Nesmith most of the time each month during the relevant time frame. From this inference, it was reasonable and logical to infer that C.B. was with Nesmith more than sixteen days per month, which, in turn, means appellant did not have the child the necessary fifteen days per month, e.g., if X lives with Y most of the time, it is logical to infer X lives with Y more than sixteen days during a thirty-one day month. [13] Despite determining that the evidence is legally sufficient, we wish to exemplify the difficulty of such a determination under the particulars of this case. First, without appellant’s testimony that HHSC informed her she could claim benefits for a child who lived with her at least fifteen days, there is no evidence relative to appellant’s understanding as to what HHSC required. Nowhere in the governmental-assistance applications is there any explanation concerning who qualifies as a member of an applicant’s household. Further, none of the HHSC witnesses testified that HHSC personnel explained to appellant who she can and cannot claim as part of her household for eligibility purposes. In this case, appellant’s admission that HHSC told her she could claim benefits for those living with her at least fifteen days per month is the sole evidence that she understood her eligibility to claim benefits on behalf of C.B. Because of appellant’s testimony, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s findings on deception and intent. [14] Appellant further argues her situation is analogous to contract disputes prosecuted under criminal law because there is a dispute regarding whether she believed she was entitled to the benefits. Appellant cites cases holding a conviction for theft is unsupported by mere evidence that a defendant accepted money pursuant to a civil contract but failed to perform fully under the contract, i.e., a bona fide dispute exists regarding ownership of the money. See Jacobs v. State, 230 S.W.3d 225, 231–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Bokor v. State, 114 S.W.3d 558, 560–61 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); Stockman v. State, 826 S.W.2d 627, 636 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d). These cases are not analogous because there is evidence appellant understood the eligibility requirements but nonetheless claimed benefits for an ineligible child. [15] No HHSC witness testified that a person must have legal custody of a child to be eligible to claim benefits for that child. [16] Furthermore, the requirement that a welfare beneficiary must actually reside in a claimant’s home more than half the time under scrutiny does not necessarily contravene the federal rule that “lives with” be determined by application of a reasonable judgment based on the circumstances of a particular living arrangement. Certainly, the most important circumstance to consider when determining if two people “live with” each other is the amount of time they actually cohabit. [17] See Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding defendant may not assert “a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute” for the first time on appeal); Dockstader v. State, 233 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (explaining defendant must preserve an as-applied challenge to constitutionality of a statute). [18] Relying on rules of grammar and common usage, we conclude “written order or grant of permission” means “written order” and “written grant of permission.” See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005); see also Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 37­­–39 (Tex. 2000); State v. Huggins, 802 So.2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2001) (phrases where an adjective is followed by a list of nouns “are commonly construed to mean that the adjective modifies subsequent nouns, for example, ‘qualified man or woman’ and ‘governmental fine or penalty’ mean ‘qualified man or qualified woman’ and ‘governmental fine or governmental penalty,’ respectively.”).