Pridgen v. Shannon

Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

8-19-2004

Pridgen v. Shannon Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 02-3842 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004

Recommended Citation "Pridgen v. Shannon" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 367. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/367

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PRECEDENTIAL 1515 Locust Street Tenth Floor UNITED STATES COURT OF Philadelphia, PA 19102 APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Attorney for Appellant

Susan E. Moyer [Argued] Office of the District Attorney No. 02-3842 Lancaster County Courthouse 50 North Duke Street P.O. Box 83480 JAMES MARIO PRIDGEN, Lancaster, PA 17608-3480

Appellant Attorney for Appellees

v.

SHANNON; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OPINION OF THE COURT OF LANCASTER; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF _______________________ PENNSYLVANIA FUENTES, Circuit Judge: F o l l o w i n g a ___________ state court jury trial, James Mario Pridgen (“Pridgen”) was convicted of the shooting On Appeal from the United States death of Colin Koulesser and sentenced to District Court life in prison. After exhausting direct for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania appeals and filing an unsuccessful federal habeas petition, Pridgen filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion District Court Judge: The Honorable Jan seeking “Relief From Judgment or Order,” E. DuBois based on newly discovered evidence. The (D.C. No. 00-cv-04561) new evidence consisted of two affidavits ___________ of witnesses who, according to Pridgen, Argued on December 9, 2003 were present at the scene of the shooting and could refute the testimony of the Before: AMBRO, FUENTES & state’s key witness. The principal issue we CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges must determine is whether a Rule 60(b) motion by a state prisoner, who previously (Opinion Filed: August 19, 2004 ) filed an unsuccessful habeas petition, should be regarded as an unauthorized successive habeas petition. We conclude Elayne C. Bryn [Argued]

in this case that the District Court correctly While Pridgen’s appeal of the dismissed those claims in Pridgen’s Rule denial of his PCRA petition was still 60(b) motion which sought to invalidate pending in the Pennsylvania courts, his underlying state conviction because Pridgen filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas they constituted the equivalent of a second Corpus in the United States District Court habeas petition. We also affirm the for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. District Court’s denial of the remaining The District Court, adopting the Report portion of his motion, though on different and Recommendation of the Magistrate grounds. 1 Judge, dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice on the ground that I. F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL Pridgen had failed to exhaust his state B ACKGROUND court remedies. Thereafter, the Superior Pridgen was convicted in July 1993 Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial of first-degree murder in state court in of Pridgen’s PCRA petition, and on Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He was January 12, 1999, the Pennsylvania sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. Supreme Court denied his appeal. At this At trial, the government established that point, Pridgen’s state remedies had been Pridgen fired a handgun at Sheila Wright exhausted and he became eligible to file a with the intent to kill her, but, instead, he petition for federal habeas relief. 28 shot and killed Colin Koulesser, who was U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Holloway v. positioned behind Wright. After an Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 714 (3d Cir. 2004). unsuccessful direct appeal, Pridgen filed a Section 2244(d) of the Anti- petition under the Pennsylvania Post Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), claiming (AEDPA) of 1996 sets forth a one-year ineffective assistance of counsel, statute of limitations period following prosecutorial misconduct, and actual direct review in the state courts within innocence. The Court of Common Pleas which a state prisoner may file a petition of Lancaster County denied Pridgen’s for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § petition and he appealed. 2244. However, section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for State post- 1 The District Court concluded that it conviction or other collateral review with was bound, under the law of the case respect to the pertinent judgment or claim doctrine, by an earlier panel of this Court’s is pending shall not be counted toward any denial of a Certificate of Appealability to period of limitation under this subsection.” Pridgen on a separate claim raised in his 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). 60(b) motion. Because we conclude that Pridgen’s second PCRA petition was not Rather than filing a petition for “properly filed” under AEDPA, we do not habeas relief, Pridgen, in February 1999, reach the law of the case issue.

filed a second PCRA petition in state filed, in the District Court, a Motion for court. The Court of Common Pleas denied Relief from Judgment under Federal Rule the petition because it was filed beyond the of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (2) and (6).2 one-year period permitted by state law. 42 Pridgen’s motion set forth three separate Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 (1982). The grounds for relief: he sought relief Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, and pursuant to Rule 60(b) on the grounds that on June 20, 2000, the state Supreme Court newly discovered evidence and evidence declined to hear the appeal. that he inadvertently failed to include in his habeas petition demonstrate that (1) the On July 24, 2000, a year and a half state court erred in denying his second after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court PCRA petition as untimely; (2) the state denied his first PCRA petition, Pridgen court lacked jurisdiction to rule that the again filed for habeas relief in federal claims raised in his second petition were court. The District Court dismissed the federal petition, reasoning that, because the Pennsylvania courts dismissed 2 Pridgen’s second PCRA petition as Rule 60(b) provides in part: untimely, the PCRA petition had not been “properly filed” and thus could not act to ( b ) M i s t a k e s ; toll the one-year statute of limitations Inadvertence; Excusable under AEDPA. The District Court Neglect; Newly Discovered reasoned that because the section 2244 Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On statute of limitations began to run on motion and upon such terms January 13, 1999 (the day after the as are just, the court may Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his relieve a party or a party’s appeal), the one-year period had expired legal representative from a by the time Pridgen filed his habeas final judgment, order, or petition in July 2000. 28 U.S.C. § proceeding for the following 2244(d)(1)(A). Therefore, the District r e a s o n s : ( 1 ) m i s ta k e , Court dismissed Pridgen’s habeas petition inadvertence, surprise, or in its entirety and declined to issue him a excusable neglect; (2) newly Certificate of Appealability (COA). discovered evidence which by due diligence could not Pridgen then petitioned this Court have been discovered in for a CO A under 28 U.S .C. § time to move for a new trial 2253(c)(1)(A). We denied the petition for under Rule 59(b) . . . or (6) the same reasons stated by the District any other reason justifying Court – Pridgen’s habeas petition was not relief from the operation of timely filed (Order, October 31, 2001, the judgment. Appendix A-41). While his petition for a COA was pending in our Court, Pridgen F ED. R. C IV. P. 60(b).

waived; and (3) his second PCRA petition Memorandum Op. at 6. Pridgen had was a “properly filed application for [s]tate received no such authorization. The Court post-conviction relief or other collateral noted that a majority of the courts of review” under § 2244(d)(2) that tolls the appeals that have ruled on the issue have AEDPA statute of limitations applicable to held that a Rule 60(b) motion, challenging his federal habeas petition. Pridgen also a prior judgment denying habeas relief posited that his “properly filed” claim should, in most cases, be treated as the presented “extraordinary circumstances” functional equivalent of a second or that warranted relief under the catchall successive habeas petition requiring, under provision of Rule 60(b)(6). AEDPA, authorization from a court of appeals. Id. at 8 (citations omitted). The The District Court first considered Court determined that it had to dismiss the whether Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion was first and second arguments in Pridgen’s in essence a second or successive habeas 60(b) motion because, in its view, Pridgen petition. In its written opinion, the Court was seeking relief that would be available pointed out that such an analysis was to him only in a second habeas petition. In necessary because “[a] state prisoner other words, those portions of Pridgen’s seeking to file a second or successive § 60(b) motion that should have been raised 2254 habeas petition must as a preliminary in a second habeas petition had to be step obtain an order from the appropriate dismissed because they amounted to an court of appeals authorizing the district unauthorized successive filing under court to con sider th e mo tion .” 3 AEDPA.

3 Secti on 2244(b) of the A E D PA provides in pertinent part: (3)(A) Before a second or judge panel of the court of s u c c e s s iv e applic atio n appeals. permitted by this section is (C) The court of appeals filed in the district court, the may authorize the filing of a applicant shall move in the s e c o n d o r s u c c e ss i v e appropriate court of appeals applic ation only if it for an order authorizing the d e t e r m in e s that th e district court to consider the application makes a prima application. facie showing that the (B) A motion in the court of application satisfies the appe als for an order r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h is authorizing the district court subsection. to consider a second or successive application shall 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). be determined by a three-

With regard to the third and final Only one question was certified for argument in Pridgen’s 60(b) motion, that appeal by the District Court: whether the his second PCRA petition was properly law of the case doctrine prevented the filed for purposes of AEDPA, the District District Court from reconsidering its Court determined that it was bound, under earlier ruling that Pridgen’s second PCRA the law of the case doctrine, by this was untimely and, therefore, not properly Court’s prior ruling that the second PCRA filed for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244. was not timely filed. Based on that ruling, However, we must first satisfy ourselves the District Court denied this claim, but, that the District Court properly exercised nevertheless, granted Pridgen a COA on jurisdiction over Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) this issue. motion, which requires us to consider whether it should have been treated as a For the reasons that follow, we second or successive habeas petition or a agree with the District Co urt’ s proper Rule 60(b) motion.4 A classification of certain portions of determination that the Rule 60(b) motion Pridgen’s 60(b) motion as attacks on his was in essence a successive habeas underlying conviction and we concur in petition means that under AEDPA the the Court’s ultimate dismissal of those District Court did not have jurisdiction to claims. Additionally, we affirm the entertain the motion because this Court District Court’s denial of Pridgen’s had not authorized Pridgen to file a “properly filed” argument because, in our successive habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § view, Pridgen’s untimely second PCRA 2244(b). petition failed to toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. III. D ISCUSSION II. J URISDICTION AND S TANDARD OF A.Whether Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion R EVIEW constitutes a second habeas petition A district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is typically reviewed for an Several circuit courts have abuse of discretion. Brown v. Phila. Hous. addressed the issue of whether a Rule Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003). 60(b) motion made by a habeas corpus How ever, the preliminary question petitioner can be considered following the regarding the legal status of the 60(b) dismissal of a federal habeas petition. The motion is an issue of law that we review de Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have novo. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Attorney General of State of N.J., 4 297 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he As noted earlier, because we conclude legal interpretation of a procedural rule is that Pridgen’s “properly filed” argument in reviewed de novo.” (citation omitted)). his 60(b) motion should have been denied on the merits, we will not reach the law of the case issue.

adopted the position that a Rule 60(b) customary scope of Rule 60(b) does not motion filed after the dismissal of a federal offend AEDPA. Id. petition for habeas corpus should per se be A plurality view emerges between treated as a second or successive habeas these two ends of the spectrum. The First, petition under AEDPA. Thus, such Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits motions can never be entertained by a maintain that a Rule 60(b) motion may be district court without permission from the considered, but not if it conflicts with the appropriate court of appeals. See Lopez v. provisions of AEDPA or if its purpose is Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975 (10th Cir. to attack the underlying conviction. The 1998); Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 657 Ninth Circuit held in Thompson v. (11th Cir. 1996); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. F.3d 1302, 1335 (6th Cir. 1996). The 1998) that “[i]n most cases when the Eleventh Circuit reasoned in Felker that factual predicate for a Rule 60(b) motion allowing courts to consider Rule 60(b) also states a claim for a successive petition motions in habeas cases would invite under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) . . . the Rule prisoners to file second or successive 60(b) motion should be treated as a collateral attacks on their convictions, successive habeas petition . . . . We do not thereby evading the limitations that foreclose the possibility, however, that Congress set forth in AEDPA. 101 F.3d at under a different factual situation a 60(b) 661. motion filed after the denial of an initial The Second Circuit alone has taken petition for habeas corpus would not have the position that “a motion under Rule to comply with the AEDPA’s successive 60(b) to vacate a judgment denying habeas petition requirements.”). In Dunlap v. is not a second or successive habeas Litscher, the Seventh Circuit stated that petition and should therefore be treated as AEDPA’s provisions “are clear and bar a any other motion under Rule 60(b).” district court from using Rule 60(b) to give Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 198 a prisoner broader relief from a judgment (2d Cir. 2001). The court explained in rendered by the court in the prisoner’s Rodriguez that a Rule 60(b) motion does federal habeas corpus (including section not seek the same relief requested in a 2255) proceeding. Otherwise AEDPA’s habeas petition (which is, generally, to limitations on collateral attack would be h a v e t h e u nd e r l yi n g c o n vi c t i o n set at naught.” 301 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. invalidated). Rather, such a motion “seeks 2002). The court clarified, however, that only to vacate the federal court judgment “[i]t is only when Rule 60(b) conflicts with dismissing the habeas petition.” Id. In AEDPA that it is unavailable to a other words, a Rule 60(b) motion is prisoner.” Id. The Seventh Circuit “merely a step along the way” to habeas envisioned circumstances in which a relief. Id. at 199. Consequently, the prisoner’s motion to vacate a judgment Second Circuit determined that the under Rule 60(b) would not offend

AEDPA (for example, if it were raise claims in an earlier petition.” Id. at discovered that the state had fraudulently 1339. Because petitioner’s counsel had procured the dismissal of the habeas omitted claims that would have been petition). Id. at 875-76. cognizable on federal habeas review, the Rule 60(b) motion was deemed to Under the pre-AEDPA habeas constitute a successive habeas petition. Id. statute, the Eighth Circuit took a position similar to that of the Seventh. See Guinan We find the reasoning of the First, v. Delo, 5 F.3d 313, 316 (8th Cir. 1993) Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth (“We do not rule out the possibility that a Circuits convincing. We are particularly habeas case may present circumstances in persuaded by the F irst Circu it’s which a Rule 60(b) motion might properly explanation in Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F.3d be examined as such rather than as a 66, 67 (1st Cir. 2003), that “AEDPA’s subsequent habeas petition. This, restrictions on the filing of second or however, is not such a case”). In Guinan, successive habeas petitions make it the court stated that, had the Rule 60(b) implausible to believe that Congress motion been timely filed, the district court wanted Rule 60(b) to operate under full should have treated it as a second habeas throttle in the habeas context.” We petition “because it [sought] to raise concur, and hold that, in those instances in claims that either could have been raised in which the factual predicate of a Guinan’s original habeas petition or were petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion attacks the raised therein and adjudicated.” Id. at 317. manner in which the earlier habeas judgment was procured and not the underlying conviction, the Rule 60(b) In Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327, motion may be adjudicated on the merits. 1338 (4th Cir. 1995), another pre-AEDPA However, when the Rule 60(b) motion case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial seeks to collaterally attack the petitioner’s of a Rule 60(b) motion by a prisoner who underlying conviction, the motion should attempted to correct his habeas counsel’s be treated as a successive habeas petition. failure to include several claims in his We believe that this rule is consonant with initial habeas petition. The district court Congress’s goal of restricting the had applied the “cause and prejudice” availability of relief to habeas petitioners. standard for determining ineffective 142 Cong. Rec. S3446-02 (daily ed. Apr. assistance of counsel under habeas law, 17, 1996) (Statements of Senator Hatch); rejecting petitioner’s plea to apply the Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 standard set forth under Rule 60(b). The (1996). Prior to AEDPA, it was generally court of appeals affirmed, holding that a understood that there were no limitations district court “may properly treat a Rule on a prisoner’s filing successive habeas 60(b) motion as a successive habeas petitions. Indeed, as far back as 1924, the petition and require that the defendant Supreme Court had noted in Salinger v. show cause and prejudice for the failure to

Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924), that the Regarding Pridgen’s contention that doctrine of res judicata did not apply to a his second PCRA was “properly filed” for petition for habeas corpus. Thus, res the purposes of tolling the AEDPA statute judicata did not prevent a prisoner from of limitations, we believe that the District filing an endless stream of habeas Court properly regarded this argument as petitions. AEDPA changed the landscape an attack on the habeas proceeding, rather in 1996 by severely limiting the number of than on Pridgen’s underlying state successive habeas petitions a prisoner is conviction. This is because Pridgen does entitled to file, as well as the time period not argue that he is entitled to a new trial. in which to seek relief. Fahy v. Horn, 240 Rather, he contends that the District Court F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2001). misinterpreted Pennsylvania law and AEDPA. Unlike the other claims in his Against this background, we turn to 60(b) motion, this ground, if proven, the District Court’s disposition of would necessarily result in the reopening Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion. Pridgen of Pridgen’s federal habeas proceeding. raised three principal issues in the motion: This portion of Pridgen’s motion would first, that the state court erred in its not necessarily affect the state court determination that his second PCRA judgments in Pridgen’s case. Thus, as to petition was untimely; second, that the the “properly filed” issue, we conclude state court lacked jurisdiction to rule that that the District Court properly exercised the claims raised in his second PCRA jurisdiction without Pridgen having first petition had been waived; and third, that obtained Court of Appeals approval under notwithstanding the state court’s section 2244(b) of AEDPA.5 timeliness ruling, his second PCRA petition was a properly filed application B.Whether the District Court properly for state post-conviction relief or other denied Pridgen’s “properly filed” claim collateral review under AEDPA, and it therefore tolled the applicable section 2244 limitations period. With respect to his first As we previously stated, Pridgen two arguments, we agree with the District claims that regardless of the state court’s Court that Pridgen simply sought to ruling his second PCRA petition untimely, relitigate issues that the District Court had already considered and rejected when 5 ruling on Pridgen’s habeas petition. If Alth oug h the D istrict Court ’s Pridgen were to succeed on these claims, disposition of the other arguments in the result would be the reversal of the state Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion has not been court judgment rejecting his second PCRA raised on appeal, we note that because petition. The proper forum to raise these those arguments directed their attacks at claims is in a habeas proceeding. actions of the state court, they would not be cognizable under a Rule 60(b) motion pursuant to the rule we set forth today.

the petition was a “properly filed” revisiting its prior decision that the habeas application for state post-conviction relief petition was untimely filed. Moreover, our under AEDPA. The District Court did not decision in Merritt v. Blaine. 326 F.3d 157 address the merits of this claim, but (3d Cir. 2003), reinforces the District instead denied it because a prior panel of Court’s decision. In Merritt, we addressed this Court had earlier denied Pridgen a the same argument that Pridgen makes Certificate of Appealability (COA). The here: namely, whether an untimely District Court reasoned that it was bound, application for state post-conviction relief under the law of the case doctrine, by the by a petitioner was “properly filed” for panel’s denial of a COA to Pridgen on the purposes of the federal statute’s tolling grounds that his habeas corpus petition provisions. was untimely. The District Court certified In Merritt, the petitioner appealed, this issue for appeal. We agree with the on timeliness grounds, from the dismissal District Court’s decision to deny relief but of his habeas corpus petition challenging a for reasons other than those expressed by Pennsylvania conviction. 326 F.3d at 158- the Court. We conclude that because the 59. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, state court ruled that Pridgen’s second Merritt filed a PCRA petition, which was PCRA petition was not timely filed, it did ultimately denied by the Pennsylvania not toll the one-year AEDPA statute of Supreme Court on January 17, 1995. Id. at limitations. We therefore do not reach the 159. On December 20, 1996, Merritt filed law of the case issue in concluding that the a second PCRA petition in state court, District Court was correct in dismissing seeking to introduce new ballistics the petition. evidence. The Pennsylvania court denied The standards for deciding a Rule the second PCRA petition both on the 60(b)(6) motion are well settled and merits and because it was untimely. Id. at familiar. “[L]egal error does not by itself 160. Merritt, like Pridgen, had failed to warrant the application of Rule 60(b). .... file his second PCRA petition in Since legal error can usually be corrected a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e tim e l i n e ss on appeal, that factor without more does requirements of 41 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § not justify the granting of relief under Rule 9545(b)(1). 60( b)(6 ).” Ma rtinez-McB ean v. On May 5, 2000, Merritt filed a Government of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d, petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 908, 912 (3d Cir.1977). In Page v. federal district court. On appeal from the Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 158 (3rd district court’s denial of the habeas Cir.1986), the court held that only petition, we concluded that when a “extraordinary, and special circumstances” Pennsylvania court holds that a petition for justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). No collateral relief is untimely, it is not extraordinary circumstances are presented “properly filed” under AEDPA. 326 F.3d here that would warrant the District Court at 166 (citing Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239

(3d Cir. 2001)). Furthermore, we rejected not “properly filed” and therefore did not Merritt’s argument, which is identical to toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. the argument Pridgen makes here, that IV. C ONCLUSION even if his PCRA petition had been dismissed as untimely, it was still In sum, we conclude that when a “properly filed” if the applicant asserted a Rule 60(b) motion is in conflict with statutory exception to the Pennsylvania provisions of AEDPA or is a direct attack statute of limitations. Id. on a state conviction, it constitutes the equivalent of a successive habeas corpus Our decision in Merritt drew petition and should be dismissed. We support from Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. accordingly affirm the District Court’s 214 (2002), an opinion involving decision dismissing those portions of California’s timeliness standard for post- Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion that conviction petitions. In California, a represented challenges to his state petitioner who sought to appeal the conviction, and were not authorized under dismissal of a state petition was required to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). We also affirm file a second, original petition in a higher the District Court’s denial of Pridgen’s state court within a “reasonable” period of “properly filed” claim because Pridgen time. Id. at 221. The Supreme Court held failed to satisfy AEDPA’s limitations that if the California petition was period. ultimately found untimely, AEDPA’s statute of limitations would not be tolled while the question of unreasonable delay was pending before the state court. Id. at 225-26. As is the case in Pennsylvania, the California statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions was not an absolute bar. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated that even when the state court considered the merits of the underlying state claim as well as its timeliness, if the petitioner’s delay was ultimately found to have been unreasonable it would not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. Id. at 226. As in Merritt, Pridgen was unable to convince the Pennsylvania courts that his second PCRA petition met one of the state’s statutory exceptions for timeliness. For these reasons, Pridgen’s petition was