Raymond Ramirez v. Cal Terhune

MEMORANDUM * Raymond Ramirez appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Wé affirm. The California Supreme Court’s decision denying Ramirez’s habeas petition was not an unreasonable application of the “narrow proportionality principle that applies to noncapital sentences.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Possession of any quantity of illegal drugs is no less serious than the theft offenses that the Supreme Court has found not to raise an inference of gross disproportionality. See Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir.2006). Nor does Ramirez’s criminal history raise such an inference, because an attempt to restrain a victim in her home is “marked by ... the threat of violence.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292-93, 296, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). If the gravity of a petitioner’s triggering offense and criminal history does not create an inference of gross disproportionality, we need not proceed to intrajurisdictional and in-terjurisdictional comparisons. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2004). AFFIRMED. Footnotes [*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.