Wilton Larron Mahaffey v. State

NO. 12-08-00430-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS WILTON LARRON MAHAFFEY,                   '                 APPEAL FROM THE APPELLANT V. ' COUNTY COURT AT LAW #2 THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE ' HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS OPINION OVERRULING REHEARING AFTER REMAND Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing, which is overruled. This court’s opinion of November 3, 2010 is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted in its place. Wilton Larron Mahaffey appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated, for which he was sentenced to confinement for three days and fined five hundred dollars. On original submission, in one issue, Appellant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because the traffic stop preceding his arrest was unlawful. See Mahaffey v. State, No. 12-08-00430-CR, 2009 WL 2517121, at *1 (Tex. App.–Tyler June 30, 2010) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We determined that, by his failure to signal his intent to turn when steering his car leftward as the right-hand lane in which he was driving merged into the left-hand lane, Appellant committed a traffic violation. See id., at *4. Consequently, we held that Appellant’s motion to suppress was properly overruled because the traffic stop was lawful and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review, which was granted. Concluding that Appellant’s leftward “merge” was not a turn under the transportation code, and thus, did not require Appellant to use a turn signal, the court of criminal appeals reversed our judgment and remanded the cause for our further consideration of Appellant=s sole issue. See Mahaffey v. State, 316 S.W.3d, 633, 639-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We affirm. Background Appellant was charged by information with driving while intoxicated. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to suppress any evidence seized as a result of what he alleged was an illegal detention. The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing on Appellant=s motion. At the hearing, Gun Barrel City Police Sergeant Billy Sparks testified concerning his stop of Appellant=s vehicle. Sparks testified that he stopped Appellant=s vehicle for violating Texas Transportation Code, section 545.104. Sparks elaborated that Appellant was traveling southbound on Texas Highway 198. Sparks stated that the southbound side of the highway had two lanes. Sparks further stated that Appellant passed a traffic sign that stated, ALane ends, merge left.@ Sparks testified that when Appellant reached the point in the roadway where the broken dividing lines between the two lanes ceased and the line dividing the right-hand lane with the shoulder angled inward, he merged his vehicle leftward without using a turn signal.[1] Sparks further testified that Appellant=s actions amounted to a traffic violation. Following the hearing, the trial court entered a written order denying Appellant=s motion to suppress. Thereafter, the trial court made the following written findings of fact and conclusions of law: On September 27, 2006, the Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation under Section 545.104 of the Texas Transportation Code (' 545.104. SIGNALING TURNS; USE OF TURN SIGNALS. (a) An operator shall use the signal authorized by Section 545.106 to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position.[).] The Court finds that the defendant did not cross over lane markings[,] but rather failed to use a turn signal after the lane markings ended as the two lanes merged into one. The Court finds that this conduct is a traffic violation as contemplated by Section 545.104(a) and as such the traffic stop was justified. The Court finds that the sole valid basis for the traffic stop and detention of the Defendant was the violation of Section 545.104(a). Subsequently, Appellant pleaded “guilty” as charged. The court sentenced Appellant to confinement for three days and fined Appellant five hundred dollars. This appeal followed. Motion to Suppress In his sole issue on remand, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, Appellant argues that Sparks=s traffic stop was baseless because Appellant=s failure to signal was not a violation of section 545.104(a). Standard of Review A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Maysonet v. State, 91 S.W.3d 365, 369 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2002, pet. ref=d). We will review de novo the legal question involving interpretation of the Texas Transportation Code. Wehring v. State, 276 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing Hernandez v. State, 957 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) and Maysonet, 91 S.W.3d at 369). Since all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court=s ruling, we are obligated to uphold it on a motion to suppress if that ruling was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Maysonet, 91 S.W.3d at 369. Governing Law A routine traffic stop closely resembles an investigative detention. Powell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, pet. ref=d). Because an investigative detention is a seizure that implicates the United States and Texas constitutions, the traffic stop must be reasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, ' 9; Francis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we conduct the inquiry set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio: (1) whether the officer=s action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the interference. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Under the first guideline, an officer=s reasonable suspicion justifies an investigative detention. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 242-43. Specifically, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred. Id. at 244 (citing Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). To determine whether an officer was reasonable in his initial action, we ask whether, in light of the officer=s experience and knowledge, there existed specific, articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted an intrusion. Id. at 242. Thus, if an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting that a person has committed a traffic offense, the officer may legally initiate a traffic stop. See Powell v. State, 5 S.W.3d at 376 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d) (citing Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375, 377-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). It is not necessary to show that the person detained actually violated a traffic regulation. See Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 376-77. Merging Lanes and Required Use of a Turn Signal Under Section 545.104(a) In the case at hand, Sparks believed Appellant=s failure to signal an intent to turn prior to initiating his leftward merge was a violation of section 545.104(a). The question we must resolve is whether it was reasonable for Sparks to conclude that a traffic violation had been committed even though Appellant=s vehicle did not cross any lane dividing lines. When interpreting statutes, we seek to effectuate the intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted them. Omaha Healthcare Ctr., L.L.C. v. Johnson, 246 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2008, pet. filed) (citing Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1999)). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the words should be applied. Hines v. State, 75 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Johnson, 246 S.W.3d at 282. However, if application of the plain language would lead to absurd consequences the legislature could not have intended, we may look to extracontextual factors to arrive at a sensible interpretation of the statute. Hines, 75 S.W.3d at 447; Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785–86. Section 545.104(a) of the Texas Transportation Code provides in pertinent part as follows: An operator shall use the signal authorized by Section 545.106 to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(a) (Vernon 1999). In response to Appellant’s sole issue on remand, the State argues that Appellant’s “merging” constituted a lane change. The plain language of the statute requires a driver to signal to “change lanes.” See id. The transportation code defines a “laned roadway” as a roadway that is divided into at least two clearly marked lanes for vehicular travel, see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 541.302(7) (Vernon 1999), while “change” means, among other things, to “switch” or “leave for another.” See The American Heritage Dictionary 258 (2d College ed. 1982); see also Mahaffey, 316 S.W.3d at 641 (citing Texas Driver’s Handbook, § A-5) (“Lane change” is defined as a “lateral maneuver moving the vehicle from one lane to another using proper space management procedures.”).[2] Sparks testified that both he and Appellant passed a traffic sign that stated, “Lane ends, merge left.” Sparks further acknowledged that Appellant did not cross any lane dividing lines at the point when he steered his vehicle to the left. Had Appellant steered his vehicle laterally across lane dividing lines, it would be clear that Appellant would have been required to signal prior to doing so. But there is no requirement that a driver cross a dividing line to effectuate a lane change. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 261 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. App–San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (holding that record supported trial court’s findings that the appellant did not signal intent to change lanes even though the appellant’s vehicle did not cross lane dividing lines). Yet, regardless of whether Appellant’s vehicle crossed a marked lane dividing line, the right-hand lane in which Appellant was traveling did end.[3] When the right-hand lane ended, Appellant continued driving in the other southbound lane, previously the lane to his left, that had not ended. To reach that remaining lane, Appellant had to make a leftward lateral maneuver as he departed that lane for another. Thus, it was reasonable for Sparks to conclude, based upon the plain language of section 545.104(a), that Appellant committed a traffic violation because he changed lanes[4] and did not signal his intent to do so. As such, the evidence related to the DWI gathered in conjunction with this lawful traffic stop was not required to be suppressed. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant=s motion to suppress. Appellant=s sole issue is overruled. Disposition Having overruled Appellant=s sole issue, we affirm the trial court=s judgment. Sam Griffith Justice Opinion delivered March 2, 2011. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J. (DO NOT PUBLISH) Appendix Figure A.1 Figure A-2 [1] Sparks acknowledged that Appellant did not cross any lane dividing lines at the point where he steered his vehicle to the left. However, Sparks stated that he still considered there to be two lanes in spite of the absence of a dividing line. [2]The Texas Driver’s Handbook (the Handbook) is online at the following url: http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/DriverLicense/documents/DL-7.pdf. In its opinion, the court of criminal appeals discussed several sections of the Handbook apart from the definition of “lane change” based upon the stated possibility that the statute might be considered ambiguous. See Mahaffey, 316 S.W.3d at 641. We do not conclude that the term “change lanes” is ambiguous given its commonly understood meaning. Therefore, we do not rely on the Handbook in our analysis. Even had we concluded that the term “change lanes” is ambiguous, the outcome would not differ because the Handbook’s definition of “lane change,” is consistent with that phrase’s commonly understood meaning. Under that scenario, we are mindful of the court’s statement in its opinion that “[n]owhere does the manual say that a driver must signal when a lane merges into another lane––save for the situation when a driver enters a freeway.” Id. The court’s statement is accurate. We note, however, that section 9-2, which concerns “entering the freeway,” is the only portion of the Handbook in which there is any reference to a driver’s responsibilities when one lane merges into another. Cf. Texas Driver’s Handbook, § 9-4 (no reference made to lanes merging when leaving the freeway). As the court notes, section 9-2 requires that a driver use a signal prior to merging from the “merging area” at the end of the “speed change” or “acceleration” lane into the ongoing right-hand freeway lane. See Texas Driver’s Handbook, §§ 9-2, A-5 (“merging area”). However, the turn signal requirement when merging onto a freeway is absent from both the Handbook’s and the Texas Transportation Code’s list of instances where a turn signal is required. See id. at § 9-2; Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(a). Moreover, we note that our conclusion is analogous to section 9-2’s requirement that a driver signal before making a leftward lateral movement from a “speed change” or “acceleration” lane into the ongoing right-hand freeway lane, where, similar to the scenario at hand, one lane ends by merging into a continuing lane of traffic. As in the case at hand, a reasonable conclusion is that a vehicle entering the freeway and merging as instructed by the Handbook has performed a maneuver that amounts to a lane change. Hence, the operator is required to use the vehicle’s turn signal. See Texas Driver’s Handbook, § 9-2. The diagram in section 9-2 illustrates the close similarities between the Handbook’s requirements under that section as referenced by the court of criminal appeals in its opinion and the scenario at issue in the instant case, which Appellant sought to illustrate in his brief by way of a diagram. Compare Appendix, Figure A-1 (diagram from section 9-2) with Appendix, Figure A-2 (diagram of description of movement of Appellant’s vehicle from statement of facts in Appellant’s brief). In sum, were we to conclude that the phrase “change lanes” is ambiguous, neither the Handbook’s failure to specifically outline a driver’s responsibilities in the situation before nor its solitary reference in section 9-2 to a driver’s responsibilities when one lane merges into another would result in a different outcome. [3] Because the question of the precise location where the right-hand lane ended is of no consequence to our analysis, we do not address it. [4] See The American Heritage Dictionary 258 (2d College ed. 1982); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 541.302(7) (Vernon 1999).