Tafrica Shanta Barrett v. State

Opinion issued May 10, 2012. In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-10-00824-CR ——————————— Tafrica Shanta Barrett, Appellant V. The State of Texas, Appellee On Appeal from the 263rd Judicial District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1186903 MEMORANDUM OPINION Tafrica Shanta Barrett was charged by indictment with theft and pleaded not guilty. After a jury found her guilty of third-offender theft it assessed a punishment of one and a half years in prison. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(4)(D) (West Supp. 2011). On appeal, Barrett contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm. Background On October 9, 2008, Deputy R. Delrosario was working as a loss prevention officer for Wal-Mart.[1] While patrolling the store, Delrosario saw Barrett and Sursensa Turner take forty-three cans of baby formula off the shelves and place them into a shopping cart. Delrosario watched Barrett and Turner walk to a different department and move the formula from the first shopping cart into a large blue plastic container inside a second shopping cart. According to Delrosario, the women then put various items, including clothing that they had removed from hangers, into the same container, closed the lid, and placed two rugs and a box of diapers on top of the full container.[2] Delrosario explained that large items like the container, diapers, and rugs would not fit in a bag and would be marked with a sticker at checkout to show that the items had been purchased. Testimony at trial showed that before reaching the exit door, a customer would have to walk past the registers, through an electronic security system called an E.A.S., and through a vestibule containing shopping carts. Delrosario testified that the E.A.S. would set off alarms if the security tags on certain items had not been deactivated. Delrosario stated that he would stop people if they walked past the final point of sale with merchandise that they had not purchased. According to Delrosario, the store also had an employee, who was referred to as a greeter, stand near the exit. Although Delrosario offered inconsistent testimony about precisely where the greeter stood in relation to the vestibule and the E.A.S., Delrosario testified clearly that he stopped Barrett and Turner when Barrett had pushed the cart past all points of sale and the women were next to the store’s greeter. Delrosario admitted that he had not watched the surveillance video recording of the incident. The State offered additional evidence, including the testimony of Deputy B. Murray who arrived at Wal-Mart after the incident and arrested Barrett and Turner. According to Murray, although he did not witness the incident, it was his understanding, after speaking with Delrosario, that the women were past all points of sale at the time that Delrosario stopped them. The State entered into evidence a picture of a non-translucent container like the one in Barrett’s cart and a receipt prepared by a Wal-Mart employee showing that there were 88 items totaling $819.97 in the cart. At the close of its case, the State entered into evidence Barrett’s stipulation to two prior theft convictions. Barrett offered the testimony of Chrissandra Simpson, a third woman who accompanied Barrett and Turner to Wal-Mart. Simpson testified that although all three women arrived at the store together, Simpson parted ways with Barrett and Turner when they got inside the store and later met back with them to continue shopping. According to Simpson, she chose the large plastic container that Barrett and Turner used to hold the items because she needed a hamper for her aunt. Simpson testified that after seeing the length of the checkout lines, the women decided to put all of their merchandise into one basket and checkout together but pay separately. According to Simpson, none of the women intended to leave the store without purchasing the items in the cart. Rather, she testified that at the time the women were stopped by Delrosario, they had approached the greeter so Simpson could ask where to find an adapter for her aunt’s dryer. Simpson testified that Barrett and Turner stayed behind her with the cart and never passed the greeter. Simpson also testified that Barrett would have been able to pay for her items because Barrett had cash and received financial assistance from two government programs. A jury found Barrett guilty of third-offender theft and sentenced her to one and a half years in prison. Standard of Review This court reviews legal and factual sufficiency challenges using the same standard of review. Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). Under this standard, evidence is insufficient to support a conviction if considering all record evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a factfinder could not have rationally found that each essential element of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Gonzalez v. State, 337 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979)). Evidence is insufficient under this standard in four circumstances: (1) the record contains no evidence probative of an element of the offense; (2) the record contains a mere “modicum” of evidence probative of an element of the offense; (3) the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt; and (4) the acts alleged do not constitute the criminal offense charged. Id. at 479 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 318 n.11, 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2786, 2796). If an appellate court finds the evidence insufficient under this standard, it must reverse the judgment and enter an order of acquittal. Id. An appellate court “determine[s] whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). When the record supports conflicting inferences, an appellate court presumes that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defers to that resolution. Id. (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793). We treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally: circumstantial evidence can be as probative as direct evidence, and “circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). Applicable Law A person commits theft if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a) (West Supp. 2011). A person appropriates an item if he acquires or otherwise exercises control over property other than real property. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §31.01(4)(B) (West Supp. 2011). An appropriation of property is unlawful when “it is without the owner’s effective consent.” Id. § 31.03(b)(1). There are three main elements of theft: (1) an appropriation of property (2) that is unlawful (3) and is committed with the intent to deprive the owner of the property. Id. The offense of theft becomes a state jail felony if the value of the property stolen was less than $1,500.00 and the accused has been previously convicted two or more times of any grade of theft. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(4)(D). Analysis On appeal, Barrett argues that the State did not offer sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that she unlawfully appropriated the property or that she intended to deprive Wal-Mart of its property. Barrett first contends that the evidence is insufficient to show she unlawfully appropriated Wal-Mart’s property because the State’s primary witness, Delrosario, was biased and offered inconsistent testimony about whether the women had walked past the final point of sale, and Simpson testified clearly that Barrett had not done so. Although Delrosario made somewhat inconsistent statements about where the greeter usually stands, he testified clearly that he stopped the women after he saw Barrett push the shopping cart past all points of sale. To the extent that Barrett argues the jury could not have relied on Delrosario’s testimony because of his inconsistent statements about where the greeter was positioned, or because of his alleged bias, we reject her arguments because we must presume that the jury decided all conflicts in evidence in favor of the verdict and defer to the factfinder’s determination on the credibility of witnesses. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). With respect to Barrett’s claim that there was insufficient evidence that her exercise of control over the items was without the owner’s effective consent insofar as she did not exit the store with the merchandise, we note that the State was not required to make such proof to prove theft. “[I]t is not essential that the property be taken off the premises; it is instead only essential that the evidence show an ‘exercise of control over the property,’ coupled with an ‘intent to deprive the owner of the property.’” Hill v. State, 633 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Here, the evidence showed that Barrett controlled the property: Delrosario testified that Barrett was pushing the shopping cart and that most of the items were concealed in a plastic container, which was itself partially concealed under other merchandise. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Barrett exercised control over Wal-Mart’s property without Wal-Mart’s effective consent. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §31.03(a); Hill, 633 S.W.2d at 521 (evidence sufficient to show theft when appellant put guns under his shirt but removed them before fleeing store); see Hawkins v. State, 214 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) (evidence sufficient to prove theft when appellant climbed over hardware store fence, picked up roll of barbed wire, but dropped it when startled by employee). In her second argument, Barrett contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove intent. In support of this claim, she points out that the evidence showed her ability to pay for the items. She also contends that the jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the intent to deprive Wal-Mart of its property because she never left the store. “Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies on circumstantial evidence.” Gahagan v. State, 242 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (citing Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). Intent to deprive may be inferred from the circumstances, including “the words, acts and conduct of the accused.” Banks v. State, 471 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Winkley v. State, 123 S.W.3d 707, 713 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). Although the evidence demonstrated that Barrett had cash in her possession, that is not conclusive evidence that she lacked intent. The jury heard testimony that Barrett concealed forty-three cans of formula in a large plastic container. It also heard that Barrett and Turner put several additional items in the container, put the lid on the container, placed rugs and diapers on top of the lid, and that Barrett pushed the shopping cart past the final point of sale without paying for the items. Based on this evidence, we conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Barrett unlawfully appropriated property with the intent to deprive the owner of the property. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a); see Hill, 633 S.W.2d at 521; Hawkins, 214 S.W.3d at 670; Butler v. State, No. 01-10-00725-CR, 2012 WL 1379628, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 19, 2012, no. pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (evidence appellant hid cellular telephones in his pants and walked towards exit was sufficient to show appellant’s intent to deprive owner of items even though appellant did not leave store and attempted to reshelve items). Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Rebeca Huddle Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Huddle. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). [1] While Delrosario worked for Wal-Mart at the time of the incident, he is now a Deputy with the Harris County Sherriff’s Department. [2] Although Delrosario did not specify in his testimony which additional items the women had placed in the container, the inventory receipt showed the women had also placed feminine products, candles, and undergarments in the container.