Shawn Frank Butler v. State

Opinion issued April 19, 2012 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-10-00725-CR ——————————— Shawn Frank Butler, Appellant V. The State of Texas, Appellee On Appeal from the 23rd District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 62013 MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted appellant Shawn Frank Butler of the state jail felony offense of theft of property worth less than $1,500 with two prior convictions for theft. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(D) (West Supp. 2011) (establishing offense). The jury sentenced him to two years in jail. Butler argues that there was a material variance between the indictment and the proof at trial regarding the identity of the owner of the allegedly stolen property. He also argues that there was legally insufficient evidence that he intended to deprive the owner of the property. We affirm the judgment. Background Pearland Best Buy employee Marlin Williams was carrying a television toward the front of the store when he saw two men putting cell phones into their pants. Williams laid down the television, alerted the door greeter to “put the camera on” the men, and stood in the exit doorway. One of the men set off the store’s security alarm as he walked through the exit doors, hitting Williams’s arm on the way out. He fled the scene in an SUV. The other man, Butler, walked past the sales registers to the entrance doors, which do not open automatically from the inside and did not open. Butler turned around and returned to the aisles to reshelf two phones in a section displaying a different class of merchandise. He then walked out of the exit doors without any merchandise. As Williams followed Butler out of the store, he spotted two Pearland Police Department officers. Williams told the officers what had happened and asked for their help. The officers detained Butler near Best Buy and escorted him back to the store to be identified by witnesses. A Brazoria County Sheriff’s deputy subsequently took Butler to jail. The indictment accused Butler of having intentionally or knowingly, unlawfully appropriate[d], by acquiring or exercising control over property, to-wit: cell phones, owned by Martin Williams, Best Buy, hereinafter referred to as Complainant, without the effective consent of Complainant and with intent to deprive Complainant of said property, said property having a value of less than Fifteen Hundred and No/100 ($1,500.00) Dollars . . . . A jury found Butler guilty of theft of property worth less than $1,500 with two or more previous convictions and sentenced him to two years in jail. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(D). Butler appeals from this conviction. Analysis I. Variance In his first issue, Butler argues that there is a fatal variance between the charging instrument and the proof at trial regarding the owner of the cell phones. The trial record shows that Best Buy employee Marlin Williams testified against Butler, while the indictment alleges that the owner of the cell phones is “Martin Williams, Best Buy.” Butler argues that it is impossible to determine whether these two men are the same person, and also that there was no testimony concerning who was the owner of the stolen property. The State argues that Butler failed to preserve the variance issue in the trial court, and he therefore cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. The State also argues that the rule of idem sonans applies, so that the variance in spelling between the two names is immaterial. Alternatively, the State argues that Butler understood before trial that Best Buy was the alleged owner of the cell phones, and so to the extent there was a variance, his substantial rights were not prejudiced. “A ‘variance’ occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the charging instrument and the proof at trial.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Texas courts routinely treat the issue of variance as one concerning the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 247. An appellate court must always address challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, which need not be preserved at the trial level for appellate review. Rankin v. State, 46 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Thus, we will review the record for a material variance between the charging instrument and the proof at trial, as Butler urges. See id.; Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 246. A court must conduct a materiality analysis in all cases that involve a sufficiency of the evidence claim based upon a variance between the indictment and the proof. Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 257). The variance must be material to render the evidence insufficient. Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 257. A material variance is one that is likely to prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights by either failing to give the defendant notice of the charges or by allowing a second prosecution for the same offense. See Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Fuller, 73 S.W.3d at 253. Only a material variance between the indictment and the proof presented at trial renders the evidence insufficient and requires reversal. Mueshler v. State, 178 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 257). Conversely, an immaterial variance is disregarded in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review. Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258. A person commits theft “if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a). An appropriation of property is unlawful when “it is without the owner’s effective consent.” Id. § 31.03(b)(1). For the purposes of the Penal Code, the legislature has expansively defined the term “owner” to include a person who “has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (West Supp. 2011); see also Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “Possession” is defined to mean “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39). Thus, an “owner,” for the purposes of the statutory offense of theft, may be either the “actual owner,” or he may be a “special owner” who has actual care, custody, control, or management of property that belongs to another person. Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 251–52. Although the State does not need to prove the name of the owner, the State is required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person alleged in the indictment as the owner has the same identity as the person proven at trial to be the owner. Id. at 252–53. Even though the name of the owner is not an element of theft, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the State to allege the owner’s name in the charging instrument. Id. at 251 & n.48 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 21.08). When an entity, such as a corporation, is the actual owner of the property, “it is perfectly permissible, and sometimes preferable, to now allege the corporation . . . as the owner of the property and then call any agent or employee who holds a relevant position in the company to testify that the corporation did not give effective consent for a person to steal or shoplift its property.” Id. at 252. Alternatively, it is permissible for the State to allege than an agent—the special owner—is the owner and then call that agent to testify on behalf of the entity, the actual owner. See Garza, 344 S.W.3d at 414. Butler relies heavily on Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), to argue that his case presents a material variance. Byrd was accused of leaving a Wal-Mart store with merchandise without paying. Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 244–45. The information identified the “owner” of the property as “Mike Morales.” Id. at 245. Despite no one referring to “Mike Morales” in any way during trial, Byrd was found guilty. Id. Observing that the State failed to prove that someone named “Mike Morales” had any ownership interest in the stolen property, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to prove the allegation in the information. Id. at 258. Butler argues that his case follows Byrd’s “flawed pattern,” as there was no evidence offered regarding anyone named “Martin Williams,” and the Marlin Williams who testified did not claim to be the owner of the stolen property. The variance between the indictment and the proof at trial, Butler contends, demands reversal of his conviction. Butler’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the difference between “Martin” and “Marlin,” which is a difference of one letter and one phoneme, is of the kind that the Court of Criminal Appeals has held to be idem sonans, meaning “the same sound.” See Flanagan v. State, 620 S.W.2d 591, 597–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (op. on rehearing) (holding “Cecil Chatman” and “Cecil Chapman” to be idem sonans); Black’s Law Dictionary 813 (9th ed.) (defining “idem sonans”). Such a slight variance between the name appearing in the indictment and the name of the complaining witness at trial is immaterial. See Flanagan, 620 S.W.2d at 598. The variance in this case is not like the variance in Byrd, wherein there was absolutely no evidence concerning the person who was the alleged owner in the information. See Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 245. Second, this indictment identifies the “owner” by reference to both the special owner, Williams, and the actual owner, Best Buy. The Code of Criminal procedure provides that when “property is owned in common, or jointly, by two or more persons, the ownership may be alleged to be in all or either of them.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.08 (West 2009). The Penal Code defines “owner” in such a way that it covers both actual owners and special owners. Compare Tex. Penal Code. Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A), (39), with Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 252. Thus, the indictment against Butler conforms to the statutory requisites pertaining to indictments, insofar it alleges two common or joint owners of the phones: Williams and Best Buy. See Billings v. State, 725 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (“[W]e hold it was appropriate to allege the ownership in the two entities and a representative member of the board of directors of each entity.”). Contrary to Butler’s argument, the proof at trial comported with the allegation of ownership by Williams and Best Buy. Williams testified that he was an employee of Best Buy, the establishment in which the theft allegedly took place. After seeing Butler putting phones into his pocket, Williams alerted other staff, stood at the exit, followed Butler out of the store, and called upon peace officers to intervene. Although Williams was not directly asked who owned the phones, his testimony supports an inference that he was the special owner of the cell phones that were actually owned by Best Buy. See Garza, 344 S.W.3d at 414 (affirming theft conviction when corporate security investigator was identified in indictment as special owner of property actually owned by corporation, and he testified on corporation’s behalf at trial); see also Robertson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“Proof of ownership may be made by circumstantial evidence, just as any other issue in a criminal case.”). Thus, there was no variance between the indictment and the proof at trial concerning the identity of the phones’ owners. Accordingly, we overrule Butler’s first issue. II. Legal sufficiency In his second issue, Butler argues that the State presented legally insufficient evidence on the theft element of “intention to deprive.” He asserts that in retail stores, customers are encouraged to pick up items as they shop and to return them to the shelves if they later change their minds. Thus, Butler argues, his conduct at Best Buy was consistent with that of an ordinary shopper, and the State did not prove otherwise. The State argues that the evidence was legally sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that Butler’s intention was to deprive Best Buy of its property when he put the phones in his pants. The State also argues that the act of theft became complete upon Butler’s possession of the phones, and therefore it was not necessary to prove that he carried the merchandise out of the store in order to prove the act of theft. When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). We do not resolve any conflict of fact, weigh any evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as this is the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The testimony of a single eyewitness may constitute legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction. See Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)). A person commits theft “if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a). Given that “intent to deprive the owner of property” is an element of theft, see Hawkins v. State, 214 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.), we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found this element beyond a reasonable doubt upon the evidence presented at trial. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. Williams testified that he saw Butler and a second man put phones into their pants before attempting to leave Best Buy through separate doors. By the time the men arrived at the doors, they had passed all points of sale. The second man left the store without paying for the merchandise, hitting Williams’s arm on the way out. Williams testified that he saw Butler turn around after the front doors failed to open, reshelf the phones in a different section, and then leave the store. This evidence was sufficient for the jury rationally to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Butler put the phones in his pants without Best Buy’s effective consent and with the intention of depriving Best Buy of them, which is an act that satisfies the elements of statutory theft. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (b)(1); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798. Contrary to the implication of Butler’s argument, it was not necessary for the State to prove that Butler left the store with the merchandise, as such proof does not relate to any essential element of statutory theft. See Hawkins, 214 S.W.3d at 670 (observing that “asportation—the act of carrying away or removing property—is not an element of statutory theft” and affirming theft conviction of man who entered store premises after hours and picked up roll of barbed wire but dropped it upon discovery by store employee). We overrule Butler’s second issue. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Michael Massengale Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Huddle. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).