Mike Boulanger, Trustee, on Behalf of Westlum Trust v. Waste Management of Texas, Inc., Waste Management, Inc., and USA Waste Landfill Operations & Transfer, Inc.

Opinion issued December 15, 2011. In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-10-01002-CV ——————————— Mike Boulanger, Trustee, On behalf of Westlum Trust, Appellant V. Waste Management of Texas, Inc., Waste Management, Inc., and USA Waste Landfill Operations and Transfer, Inc., Appellees On Appeal from the 334th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2010-28400 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Mike Boulanger, as Trustee on behalf of the Westlum Trust, and appellees, Waste Management of Texas, Inc., Waste Management, Inc., and USA Waste Landfill Operations and Transfer, Inc. (collectively, Waste Management), each claim fee title to an abandoned railroad right-of-way through separate deeds. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Waste Management and against Boulanger. In five issues on appeal, Boulanger contends the summary judgment should be reversed because the trial court looked beyond the four corners of the deed to ascertain the parties’ intent, considered the rules for deed construction and extrinsic evidence in the absence of any pleading or finding of ambiguity, and failed to recognize the existence of a fact issue as to the ownership of the right-of-way. We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment. Background The Sam Houston Recycling Center sits at the southwest corner of Westview Drive and Lumpkin Road in Houston, Texas. The property consists of two tracts of land: (1) the “Main Tract” of approximately 3.6406 acres and (2) the “Panhandle Tract” of approximately 2.117 acres. Running in a north-south direction between the Main Tract and the Panhandle Tract is the forty-foot-wide railroad right-of-way that is the subject of this appeal. The Main Tract and the Panhandle Tract originally were part of a larger, 142 acre tract of land owned by C.P. Lumpkin. Lumpkin split the 142 acres into various parcels. The Main Tract and the Panhandle Tract were included in one parcel, which consisted of 14.177 acres. In 1955, Lumpkin conveyed 13.697 acres of the parcel, including the Main and Panhandle Tracts, by deed to Cramerus Realty Company (the Cramerus Deed). The Cramerus Deed identified the property conveyed by metes and bounds description and stated that it was “LESS the following tract of land reserved for railroad right-of-way:” BEGINNING at a point in the North line of Tract “F” above from which the Northwest corner of tract “F” bears N. 88 deg. 38’ 23” W. 681.93 feet; THENCE S. 88 deg. 38’ 23” E., along the North line of Tract “F”, 40.01 feet to a point; THENCE S. 88 deg. 38’ 33: W. along the South line of Tract “F” 40.01 ft. to a point; THENCE North 522.70 feet to the place of beginning, and containing 0.480 acres of land. The parties dispute whether this language conveyed fee title to the right-of-way along with the Main and Panhandle Tracts. Waste Management alleges that it did and that, through a series of subsequent conveyances, Waste Management acquired the right-of-way. Specifically, in 1991, separate grantors conveyed both the Main and Panhandle Tracts by deed to Waste Management’s corporate predecessor (the Waste Management Deeds), who then established the recycling center. According to Waste Management’s regional Director of Planning and Project Development, Charles Rivette, Waste Management has used the right-of-way to operate the recycling center and to cross back and forth between the Main and Panhandle Tracts for more than fifteen years. There is no alternate route between the Main and Panhandle Tracts. Because the right-of-way was abandoned by the railroad in 1999, Waste Management contends that, “if [the right of way is not] utilized as part of the Sam Houston Recycling Center, [it] would be a useless, land-locked piece of real estate.” In contrast, Boulanger denies that Lumpkin conveyed fee title to the right-of-way in the Cramerus Deed; instead, Boulanger alleges that Lumpkin retained the right-of-way in the Cramerus Deed and that Boulanger later purchased the right-of-way as part of the 0.7175 acres he acquired from Lumpkin’s heirs in 2005. Boulanger filed suit against Waste Management for trespass and unjust enrichment. Waste Management filed counterclaims for trespass to try title and suit to quiet title. Waste Management also filed a combined no-evidence and traditional motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that Boulanger had no evidence of the ownership element of his trespass claim or, alternatively, that Waste Management had conclusively negated that element.[1] Without stating its reasons, the trial court granted Waste Management’s motion. Thereafter, the parties dismissed the remainder of their claims, rendering the trial court’s partial summary judgment order a final and appealable judgment. This appeal followed. Summary Judgment Standard of Review We review a summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); City of Galveston v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 196 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). A defendant is entitled to a no-evidence summary judgment if, after adequate time for discovery, there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the plaintiff’s claim. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); LMB, Ltd. v. Moreno, 201 S.W.3d 686, 688 (Tex. 2006). A defendant moving for a traditional summary judgment, however, must conclusively negate at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s claim or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508-509 (Tex. 2010); City of Galveston, 196 S.W.3d at 221. Under both standards, we view all evidence in a light favorable to the non-movant and indulge every reasonable inference in the non-movant’s favor. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 661; City of Galveston, 196 S.W.3d at 221. Deed Construction The parties’ disagreement is not limited to their difference of opinion on the legal effect of Lumpkin’s conveyance; they also dispute the proper role of construction aids and extrinsic evidence in construing the Cramerus Deed. Boulanger argues in his second and fourth issues that neither the trial court nor this Court may apply the rules of construction or consider extrinsic evidence in the absence of a pleading or finding that the Cramerus Deed is ambiguous. Because there was no pleading or finding of ambiguity, Boulanger contends we are bound by the language used in the “four corners” of the Cramerus Deed in determining whether Lumpkin conveyed fee title to the right-of-way. Waste Management, however, argues that when the construction of a deed is at issue, the courts must consult the rules of construction to give legal effect to the language used in the conveyance. According to Waste Management, the existence of an ambiguity is a prerequisite only to the admission of extrinsic evidence. Waste Management states the correct rule. The construction of a deed is ordinarily a question of law. See Terrill v. Tuckness, 985 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (noting that rules of contract construction ordinarily apply to construction of deeds). Our primary concern in construing a deed is to ascertain the parties’ true intent as expressed in the instrument. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991); CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec., L.L.P. v. Old TJC Co., 177 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). “Because ‘once a dispute arises over meaning, it can hardly be expected that the parties will agree on what meaning was intended,’ courts use canons of construction to help ascertain the parties’ intent.” French v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 59 (Tex. 1964) (Calvert, C.J., concurring)). The “four corners” rule requires us to ascertain intent from the entire instrument. See French, 896 S.W.2d at 797. We must strive to harmonize all of the deed’s parts, construing the deed to give effect to all of its provisions. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462; CenterPoint Energy, 177 S.W.3d at 430. Extrinsic evidence of intent is admissible only if the deed is ambiguous on its face. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Tex. 1996); CenterPoint Energy, 177 S.W.3d at 431 (“A court may consider the parties’ interpretations of the contract through extrinsic or parol evidence only after a contract is first determined to be ambiguous.”). The decision whether the deed is ambiguous is also a question of law. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003); see also CenterPoint Energy, 177 S.W.3d at 430. To make this determination, we look at the deed as a whole in light of the circumstances existing when the parties entered into their agreement. See CenterPoint Energy, 177 S.W.3d at 430. If the deed is worded in such a way that it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning, then it is not ambiguous and the court will be confined to the writing. See id. at 30-31. A mere disagreement about the proper interpretation of a deed, however, does not make the deed ambiguous; the instrument is ambiguous only if, after application of the rules of construction, the deed is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. 1980); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1951). Thus, in summary, a court may (1) hear and consider evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Cramerus Deed and (2) apply the rules of construction to resolve the parties’ disagreement as to the proper construction of the deed. Contrary to Boulanger’s assertion, neither a pleading nor a finding of ambiguity is required. The absence of an ambiguity on the face of the deed only precludes the admission and consideration of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ subjective intent. See CenterPoint Energy, 177 S.W.3d at 430. We overrule Boulanger’s second and fourth issues. The Cramerus Deed The remainder of Boulanger’s issues address the merits of the trial court’s summary judgment. Boulanger contends that summary judgment was improper because of ambiguity in the Cramerus Deed and the existence of fact issues as to the ownership of the railroad right-of-way. Because ownership is the dispositive issue in this case, we must determine whether Lumpkin granted Cramerus fee title to the right of way. A single word gives rise to the parties’ differing opinion as to the legal effect of Lumpkin’s conveyance: “LESS.” The Cramerus Deed conveys certain property “LESS the [described] tract of land reserved for railroad right-of-way.” Using dictionaries to define “less” as commonly meaning “devoid of,” Boulanger contends the Cramerus Deed excluded the right of way from the conveyance of the Main and Panhandle Tracts. Waste Management disagrees that “LESS” excludes the right-of-way and suggests a different construction of the term—namely, one having the effect of conveying fee title to all the land described while notifying Cramerus that the grant is burdened by the railroad right-of-way and reserving the railroad’s right to continue using that land. Recognizing that “separate ownership of long narrow strips of land, distinct from the land adjoining on each side, is a fruitful source of litigation and disputes,” the Texas Supreme Court developed a rule with respect to the legal construction of conveyances like Lumpkin’s to Cramerus: “[I]t is presumed that a grantor has no intention of reserving a fee in a narrow strip of land adjoining the land conveyed when it ceases to be of use to him, unless such fee is clearly reserved.” Cantley v. Gulf Prod. Co., 143 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex. 1940) (presuming that language “keeping” thirty-foot-wide road easement did not reserve title to strip of land underlying easement in absence of evidence of clear intention to do so). Stated differently, “[w]hen an instrument conveys land definitely described in the instrument and then excepts from the conveyance a road, railroad right-of-way or canal right-of-way occupying an easement on, over or across the land conveyed, the instrument conveys the fee to the entire tract, subject to such right-of-way, unless the deed clearly indicates that the grantor intended to reserve the strip.” Moore v. Rotello, 719 S.W.2d 372, 375-76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (concluding that “save and except” language in deed was not express reservation of interest in property, it had no other effect than to say that grant was burdened with railroad right-of-way, and deed conveyed fee title to entire tract of land). There is no disagreement that the railroad right-of-way at issue here is a forty-foot-wide strip of land that adjoins and separates the Main and Panhandle Tracts conveyed in the Cramerus Deed. And, we see no reason why “LESS” should have a different legal effect than “keeping” or “save and effect,” as those terms have given rise to the presumption stated above in Cantley and Moore. See Cantley, 143 S.W.2d at 915; Moore, 719 S.W.2d at 375-76. Applying that presumption, the Cramerus Deed would be reasonably susceptible to only one construction—i.e., the construction urged by Waste Management—unless Boulanger presented summary judgment evidence that clearly indicated Lumpkin intended to retain an interest in the right-of-way. He did not. Although he asserts that the “evidence shows the [right-of-way] is not a narrow strip of land” and that it has some individual value because “[m]ost lots located in any metropolitan area such as Houston are 50 or so feet wide” and “many lots where townhomes are constructed are only 20 feet in width,” Boulanger has not cited to any place in the record where the evidence of such facts appears. Nor can we find any evidence that the right-of-way was useful to Lumpkin after he conveyed the Main and Panhandle Tracts to Cramerus.[2] Moreover, as we have already determined that the word “LESS” has special meaning beyond its common dictionary definition, we find no other language in the Cramerus Deed indicating that Lumpkin intended to reserve the right-of-way for his own use. In the absence of evidence that Lumpkin “clearly reserved” title to the right-of-way, we conclude that the Cramerus Deed unambiguously conveyed fee title to all of the land described therein, including the Main Tract, the Panhandle Tract, and the right-of-way. The property description that follows the word “LESS” merely served to notify Cramerus that the grant was burdened by the railroad right-of-way. Boulanger concedes that, if the Cramerus Deed conveyed fee title to the right-of-way, then Waste Management acquired that title under the Waste Management Deeds in 1991, so we need not consider whether the Waste Management Deeds are valid or whether Waste Management’s chain of title is complete. Further, because the Cramerus Deed is unambiguous, we will not decide whether the extrinsic evidence attached to the summary judgment motion and response raises an issue of fact as to ownership of the right-of-way. See CenterPoint Energy, 177 S.W.3d at 430. Instead, we conclude only that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for Waste Management. We overrule Boulanger’s first, third, and fifth issues. Conclusion Having found no error, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment. Harvey Brown Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp, and Brown. [1] To recover damages for trespass to real property, a plaintiff must show that (1) he owns or has a lawful right to possess the real property, (2) the defendant entered the plaintiff’s land and the entry was physical, intentional, and voluntary, and (3) the defendant’s trespass caused injury to the plaintiff. Tex. Woman’s Univ. v. The Methodist Hosp., 221 S.W.3d 267, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). [2] In that part of his brief addressing the extrinsic evidence presented as a part of the summary judgment, Boulanger contends that a fact issue exists as to whether Lumpkin intended to reserve the right-of-way because, at the time he executed the Cramerus Deed, he had not yet granted the right-of-way to the railroad. We do not consider this contention because it was not raised as a ground for defeating Waste Management’s summary judgment motion in the trial court. See Priddy v. Rawson, 282 S.W.3d 588, 597 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).