the Bennett-Nguyen Joint Venture and Robert S. Bennett v. Kelly Coghlan and Coghlan & Associates

Opinion issued July 14, 2011. In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-10-00575-CV ——————————— The Bennett/Nguyen Joint Venture and Bob Bennett, a/k/a Robert S. Bennett, Appellants V. Kelly Coghlan and Coghlan & Associates, Appellees On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 759593-401 MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal of a turnover order. On April 28, 2011, this Court notified appellants, The Bennett/Nguyen Joint Venture and Bob Bennett, a/k/a Robert S. Bennett (collectively, “Bennett”), that they had failed to timely file a brief and that their appeal may be dismissed for want of prosecution if they failed to file a brief by May 18, 2011. We also informed appellees, Kelly Coghlan and Coghlan & Associates (collectively, “Coghlan”), that they may respond to the notice. On May 18, 2011, Bennett filed a motion to extend time to file an appellant’s brief. In this motion, Bennett stated that the trial court entered an order on November 30, 2010, distributing the money collected pursuant to the challenged turnover order to pay the outstanding judgment. Also on May 18, 2011, Coghlan responded to this Court’s notice. Coghlan likewise stated that the judgment supporting the turnover order was satisfied following the trial court’s November 30, 2010 order to disburse money collected pursuant to the turnover order. Coghlan argued that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the cause is now moot. We agree.[1] Standing is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). To have standing, a controversy must exist between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2000). “If a controversy ceases to exist—‘the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome’—the case becomes moot.” Id. A post-judgment turnover order is a procedural device allowing judgment creditors to reach assets of a debtor that are otherwise difficult to attach or levy on. Bahar v. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 330 S.W.3d 379, 386 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (quoting Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tex. 1991)). Thus, a turnover order is “a vehicle for the collection of the judgment.” Pandozy v. Beaty, 254 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.). When the judgment underlying the turnover order is paid, the turnover order is of no further force and effect. See id. (holding that turnover order “became immediately moot when the judgment which it was issued to enforce was satisfied”). Because both parties agree that the judgment for which the turnover order was issued to enforce has been satisfied, any issues relating to the validity or enforceability of the turnover order are moot, and this Court lacks standing to consider this case on the merits. See id.; see also Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 (“If a controversy ceases to exist—‘the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome’—the case becomes moot.”). Accordingly, we dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction and dismiss all pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Massengale. [1] On June 2, 2011, this Court notified Bennett that we intended to dismiss this appeal as moot and stated that any response to the notice was due by June 13, 2011. We received no response.