United States v. David Hill

MEMORANDUM ** David Charles Hill appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see United States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir.2009), we affirm. As Hill does not dispute, he is ineligible for a sentence reduction under Amendments 706 and 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines because he was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. See United States v. Charles, 749 F.3d 767, 770-71 (9th Cir.2014). Hill argues, however, that the statutory amendments under the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), which would have the effect of lowering his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, should be applied to him. This argument fails. The FSA does not apply retroactively to defendants, like Hill, who were sentenced before the Act’s effective date. See United States v. Baptist, 646 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir.2011). Contrary to Hill’s claim, the disparate treatment between pre- and post-Act offenders, which occurs any time an ameliorative statute is deemed not to be retroactive, does not violate his constitutional rights. See id. at 1228-30; see also United States v. Augustine, 712 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (9th Cir.2013). We *397 disagree with Hill that Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012), compels a different result. See id. at 2335 (recognizing that, even though disparities may result, “in federal sentencing the ordinary practice is to apply new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants already sentenced”). AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.