Dara Parvin v. Cna Financial Corp

MEMORANDUM ** Dr. Dara Parvin appeals the district court’s dismissal of his negligence, fraud, and tortious breach of the convenant of good faith and fair dealing causes of action and summary adjudication of his breach of contract cause of action against his malpractice liability insurer, CNA Financial Corporation and Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, “CNA”). As the facts and procedural history are familiar to the parties, we do not recite them here except as necessary to explain our disposition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. The district court did not err in summarily adjudicating and dismissing Dr. Parvin’s causes of action. • CNA introduced evidence — which the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting, see Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th. Cir.2008)— demonstrating that the Oregon Medical Association Professional Consultation Committee (“PCC”) consented to the Mason settlement. Dr. Parvin failed to identify any evidence showing that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the PCC’s consent, to settle. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Given the PCC’s declarations of consent, Dr. Parvin’s breach of contract, fraud, negligence, and bad faith causes' of action necessarily, fail. The district court, therefore, did not err in dismissing and summarily adjudicating these claims. See Kling v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We ... may affirm a judgment on any ground supported by the record, regardless of whether the district court relied upon, rejected, or even considered that ground.”). Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing .CNA to file a second motion for summary judgment on Dr. Parvin’s breach of contract cause of action or in construing CNA’s motions in limine concerning Dr. Parvin’s other causes of action as successive motions for summary judgment. Successive motions for summary judgment are generally permissible. See Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 910-12 (9th Cir.2010). Lastly, Dr. Parvin waived any challenge to the district court’s partial award of costs. See United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168-69 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that an appellant “waived [an] issue on appeal” where it “present[ed] th[e] argument in a lone footnote and fail[ed] to cite any authority in support”). AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.