Kevin F. Strong v. Rebecca M. Brakeley

GORMAN, J. [¶ 1] Kevin F. Strong appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superi- or Court (Androscoggin County, MG Kennedy, J.) in favor of Rébecca M. Brakeley and Jonathan M. Baúsman granting them immunity from Strong’s complaint for defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship. Strong contends that the court erred by concluding that 24 M.R.S. § 2511 (2015) provides Brakeley and Bausman with absolute immunity for statements they made regarding Strong’s professional credentials. We affirm the judgment. I. BACKGROUND [¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to Strong, the summary judgment record establishes the following facts. See Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 11, 974 A.2d 276. Brakeley, Bausman, and Strong are all physicians licensed to practice medicine in Maine. Synernet, Inc., is a “credentials verification organization, which collects, verifies, and dispenses physician credentialing information’! to its clients, including hospitals. St. Mary’s Regional Medical Center is a hospital that provides health pare services and follows competence review processes. St. Maty’s contracted with Synernet to collect credentialing information on its behalf. Synernet began collecting credentialing information regarding Strong after Strong applied for staff privileges at St. Mary’s in 2013. As part of that effort, Synernet sent “Professional Reference ■ Questionnaires” to Brakeley and Bausman “for the purpose of assisting St. Mary’s in collecting credentialing information .relating to [Strong].” Brakeley and Bausman completed their questionnaires and returned them to Syn-ernet, which then forwarded them to St. Mary’s. [¶ 3] On October 15, 2013, Strong filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Brakeley and Bausman, alleging that certain negative statements made by them on Synernet’s questionnaires caused St. Mary’s to deny him staff privileges. By apiended complaint, Strong asserted claims for defamation and tortious interference with his business relationship with St. Mary’s, and sought punitive damages. Brakeley and Bausman filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they enjoyed absolute immunity for their statements pursuant to 24 M.R.S. § 251Í. The court denied the motion and allowed the case to proceed, but limited the scope of discovery to the immunity issue. After that discovery was completed, Brakeley and Bausman filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts and, based on its conclusion that section 2511 afforded them absolute immunity, the court granted that motion. Strong appeals. II. DISCUSSION [¶ 4] When, as here, a defendant moves, for summary judgment, we first examine the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine, de novó, whether any genuine, dispute of. material fact exists for trial. 1 Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 11, 974 A.2d 276. “An issue is genuine if there is *1009 sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a choice between the differing versions; an issue is material if it could potentially affect the outcome of the matter.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 5] The court granted a summary judgment based solely on Brakeley and Bausman’s immunity pursuant to 24 M.R.S. § 2511, which is found within the Maine Health Security Act, 24 M.R.S. §§ 2501-2988 (2015). Section 2511 provides as follows: § 2511. Immunity Any person acting without malice, any physician, podiatrist, health care provider, health care entity 'or professional society, any member of a professional competence committee or professional review committee, any board or appropriate authority and any entity required to report under this chapter are immune from civil liability: L Reporting. For making any report or other information available to any board, appropriate authority, professional competence committee or professional review committee pursuant to law; 2. Assisting in preparation. For assisting in the origination, investigation or preparatioh of the report or information described in subsection 1; or 3. Assisting in duties. For assisting the board, authority or committee in carrying out any of its duties or functions provided by law. 24 M.R.S. § 2511. Because the parties dispute its scope and application, we must interpret this provision de novo by first evaluating its plain language. See Maine-Today Media, Inc. v. State, 2013 ME 100, ¶ 6, 82 A.3d 104; Searle v. Town of Bucksport, 2010 ME 89, ¶ 8, 3 A.3d 390. If that language is ambiguous, we then look ■ to legislative history and other indicia of legislative intent to determine the provision’s meaning. MaineToday Media, Inc., 2013 ME 100, ¶ 6, 82 A.3d 104. [¶ 6] In its first paragraph, section 2511 identifies those persons or entities who may claim immunity according to their occupation or role. The plain language of the first paragraph of section 2511 makes eligible for immunity, “any physician.” 2 24 M.R.S. § 2511. Because it is undisputed in the summary judgment record that Brakeley , and Bausman- are physicians, Brakeley and Bausman are eligible for immunity as a matter of law for any action described in subsection 1, 2, or 3. [¶7] Next, in subsections 1, 2, and 3, the statute delineates the actions for which the identified persons have immunity. In subsections. 1 and 2, immunity is dependent upon the identity of the recipient of a report and the purpose of the report. For subsection 3, immunity is dependent upon the provision of assistance to a board, authority, or committee. Strong contends that Brakeley’s and Bausman’s statements were not actions described in subsection 1, 2?i or 3, and, therefore they are not immune from liability ' We begin by analyzing subsection 3 because it is the provision pursuant to which the Superior Court .determined that Brakeley and Bausman are immune from liability. Because Brakeley and Bausman are physicians, we discuss subsection 3’s application to physicians in particular. [¶ 8] Subsection 3 states that immunity is afforded when a physician is *1010 “assisting” a “board, authority or committee in carrying out any of its duties or functions provided by law.” 24 M.R.S. § 2511(3). There is no dispute that Brakeley and Bausman provided information to Synernet. Strong argues, however, that Synernet does not qualify as one of the intended recipients of assistance identified by subsection 3 — namely, a “board, authority or committee” — and therefore Brakeley and Bausman are not immune on that basis. [¶ 9] Although “board, authority or committee” is not defined in the statute, wé conclude that the phrase at least includes a “professional competence committee” based on express references to such committees in the first paragraph and in subsection 1 of section 2511. The Maine Health Security Act defines a “[professional competence committee” as, inter alia, “[ejntities and persons, including contractors, consultants, attorneys and staff, who assist in performing professional competence review activities.” 24 M.R.S. § 2502(4)(C). Section 2502 further defines “[professional competence review activity” as the “study, evaluation, investigation, recommendation or action, by or on behalf of a health care entity and carried out by a professional competence committee” that is necessary to “[mjaintain or improve the quality of care rendered in, through or by the health care entity or by physicians”; “[r]eduee morbidity and mortality”; or “[establish and enforce appropriate standards of professional qualification, competence, . conduct or performance.” , 24 M.R.S. § 2502(4-B). [¶ 10] The undisputed facts in this case establish that St. Mary’s is a health care entity that has contracted to have Syner-net collect, verify, and dispense credentialing .information for the purpose of the hospital’s competence review process, and that Synernet did so as to Strong’s application for staff privileges at St. Mary’s. Pursuant to section 2502(4)(C), Synernet is a professional competence committee because it is a “contractor ] ... [that] assists] in performing professional competence review activities,” 3 and therefore Synernet qualifies as a “board, authority or . committee” pursuant to 24 M.R.S. §.2511(3). [¶ 11] In challenging the application of subsection 3, Strong also offers an unnecessarily limited view of the word “assisting,” arguing that -it refers pnly to instances in which a physician is a member of the board, authority, or committee, rather than to instances in which a physician provides information to or otherwise aids the board, authority, or committee. This is an illogical and unsupported interpretation. See Ferald v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2008 ME 81, ¶ 7, 946 A.2d 395 (stating that we must avoid “absurd, illogical or inconsistent results” in .interpreting a statute (quotation marks omitted)). By its .plain terms, section 2511(3) contains no such requirement. The statute is intended to protect the acts of the person providing assistance; Strong, by focusing on the acts of board, authority, or committee members themselves,, twists subsection 3 to instead protect the acts of the committee to whom the assistance is given. No language in the statute suggests a basis for limiting the application of subsection 3 to the small subset of persons who staff such boards, authorities, and committees. [If 12] In the alternative, Strong contends that a physician’s action does not “assist[ ]” a board, authority, or committee within the meaning of section 2511(3) when that action involves making a false *1011 report or making a report with ill will. By this argument, Strong attempts to impute into the statute a malice requirement that simply is not there. See DiPietro v. Boynton, 628 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Me.1993) (defining “malice” as “motivated by ill will toward the plaintiff’). The only mention of malice anywhere in section 2511 is in the first paragraph — in supplying an exhaustive list of eligible reporters, section 2511 names “[a]ny person acting without malice” independently from the other identified persons and entities on the list, including physicians. 24 M.R.S. § 2511. Thus, the absence of malice is a requirement for anyone seeking immunity pursuant to section 2511 who otherwise does not fall within any of the listed catégoriés of eligible reporters. As physicians, Brake-ley and Bausman are not subject to the “acting without malice” requirement, and Strong concedes as much in his brief. The plain language of section 2511 otherwise contains no “acting without malice” requirement, and we decline to read one into it. Cf. Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 18, 90 A.3d 1169 (noting that policy decisions are reserved for the Legislature). [¶ 13] Finally, Strong suggests that section 2511 must be interpreted to limit immunity to instances in which a reporter is mandated by law to make a report. See, e.g., 24 M.R,S. §§ 2505, 2506, 2602 (involving mandatory reporting requirements). Again, section 2511(3) contains no such language. Rather, the “provided by law” language in subsection :3 is an adjectival phrase that directly modifies the nouns “duties or functions.” See Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago Manual of Style §§ 5.91, 5.156 (16th ed.2010) (distinguishing phrasal adjectives fi’om adverbs depending on the parts of speech they modify). Simply put, subsection 3 affords immunity to a person assisting a board, authority, or committee when that board, authority, or committee is performing. its statutory role, without regard to whether providing that assistance was a voluntary or mandatory act. 4 As we have already determined, the summary judgment record establishes as a matter of law that Synernet was acting according to its statutory duties as a professional competence committee in seeking, on behalf , of St. Mary’s, the credentialing information that was provided by Brakeley and Bausman. See 24 M.R.S. § 2502(4)(C), (4-B). [¶ 14] We conclude that Brakele/s and Bausman’s answers to Synernet’s questionnaires constituted reports by eligible reporters made for the purpose of assisting a board, authority, or committee in carrying out its statutory duties as- a matter of law within the plain meaning of section.2511(3). .Strong’s reading of section 2511, in contrast, would limit its application to only a select few, and would discourage the type of reporting that section 2511 was instead meant to encourage. 5 *1012 We therefore affirm' the summary judgment affording immunity to Brakeley and Bausman for their reports about Strong. 6 The entry is: Judgment affirmed., Footnotes [1] Strong cites to precedent from the 1970s to argue that "[s]ummary judgment is an ex- ■ treme remedy,” Haskell v. Planning Bd., 388 A.2d 100, 102 (Me.1978) (quotation marks omitted). Since 2001, however, we have stated on multiple occasions that "[sjummary judgment is no longer an extreme remedy,” and is instead "simply a procedural device for obtaining judicial resolution of those matters that may be decided without fact-finding.” Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶7, 784 A.2d 18; see also Guardianship of Jo Ann L., 2004 ME 68, ¶ 11, 847 A.2d 415 ("Summary judg *1009 ment procedure is an appropriate practice encouraged in most litigated cases in order to •effectuate policies of judicial economy’’). [2] "Physician" is defined as "any -natural person authorized by law to practice medicine, osteopathic medicine or veterinary medicine within this State,” 24 M.R.S. § 2502(3) (2015). [3] Contrary to Strong’s suggestion, there is nothing in the language of section 24 M.R.S. § 2502(4), (4-B) (2015) or in 24 M.R.S. § 2511 (2015) that requires Synernet to make the ultimate credentialing decision in order to fall within the statute's reach. [4] In McCullough v. Visiting Nurse Service of Southern Maine, Inc., we considered a nurse's claim that a nursing service defamed her by reporting to the State Board of Nursing the details regarding the termination of her employment. 1997 ME 55, ¶¶2, 12, 691 A.2d 1201. We agreed with the trial court that the nursing service was immune for its reports pursuant to the predecessor version of the statute, 24 M.R.S.A. § 2511 (1990 and Supp. 1996). McCullough, 1997 ME 55, ¶¶ 13-14, 691 A.2d 1201. The facts of McCullough happened to involve a mandatory report by -the nursing service, but we: did not state that mandatory reporting was always a condition for immunity pursuant to section 2511, and in fact, we noted that it was "unnecessary for us to express an opinion whether-the immunity provided by section 2511 is absolute or conditioned on the reporter acting without malice.” McCullough, 1997 ME 55, 13-14, 691 A.2d 1201. [5] We are not persuaded by Strong’s other argument — that the court erred in limiting discovery to certain topics that precluded him from inquiring into whether Brakeley and Bausman were acting "honestly, in good faith *1012 and for a legitimate purpose.” The court limited discovery to those materials that were relevant to-24 M.R.S, § 251,1(3) as we .have interpreted it today. See Fernald v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2008 ME 81, ¶ 7, 946 A.2d 395 (stating that tire fact-finder’s limits on discovery are reviewed for an abuse of discretion). The matters on which Strong sought additional- discovery were irrelevant to the question of Brakeley and Bausman's immunity pursuant to section 2511(3), See M.R.'Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (limiting discovery to those materials that are not privileged, relevant, and "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”), , [6] , Because our conclusion — that Brakeley and Bausman are entitled to immunity pursuant to section 2511(3) as a, matter of law — is dis-positive, we need not consider whether they also would be entitled to immunity pursuant to section 24 M.R.S. § 2511(1) or (2).