United States v. Byron Hess, IV

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. *196 PER CURIAM: Byron Roswell Hess, IV, appeals his sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised release after pleading guilty to possession of child pornography. Hess challenges the term and several conditions of his supervised release. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. We ordinarily review a criminal sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). We likewise review for abuse of discretion the imposition of conditions on supervised release,' an area where district courts have broad latitude. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir.2009). However, because Hess did not object to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his sentence before the district court, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Wesley, 81 F.3d 482, 484 (4th Cir.1996). To establish plain error, Hess must show “‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights.’” United States v. Thomas, 669 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir.2012) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). We detect no plain error in the district court’s imposition of supervised release. Hess contends that the district court failed to explain adequately its reasons for ordering a lifetime term and several conditions of supervised release. Having reviewed the record, we find the district court’s explanation sufficient. Hess further argues that a number of his supervised-release conditions are unconstitutionally vague. However, because no binding precedent establishes that these conditions are unconstitutional, Hess cannot satisfy the second requirement of plain error review. Even if we were to conclude that Hess’ supervised-release conditions are vague, they are not plainly so. Thus, we decline to disturb them. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions aré adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED.