In re: Capital Options, LLC

FILED MAY 27 2016 1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK 2 U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP Nos. AZ-15-1165-JuKuJa ) AZ-15-1166-JuKuJa 6 CAPITAL OPTIONS, LLC, ) AZ-15-1167-JuKuJa ) (Related Appeals) 7 Debtor. ) ______________________________) Bk. No. 2:12-bk-12-13416-GBN 8 ) CAPITAL OPTIONS, LLC, ) Adv. Nos. 2:14-ap-00158-GBN 9 ) 2:14-ap-00166-GBN Appellant, ) 10 ) v. ) M E M O R A N D U M* 11 ) C. DENNIS LOOMIS; BAKER ) 12 HOSTETLER, LLP; GEORGE H. ) GOLDSMITH; G2,LLC, ) 13 ) Appellees. ) 14 ______________________________) 15 Argued and Submitted on May 20, 2016 at Phoenix, Arizona — 16 — Filed - May 27, 2016 — 17 — Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 18 for the District of Arizona 19 Honorable George B. Nielsen, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding _________________________ — 20 — Appearances: H. Lee Horner Jr. of Goldstein, Horner & Horner, 21 Attorneys PLLC argued for appellant Capital Options, LLC; Steven D. Jerome of Snell & Wilmer 22 LLP argued for appellees C. Dennis Loomis and Baker Hostetler, LLP; Warren John Stapleton of 23 Osborn Maledon, PA argued for appellees George H. Goldsmith and G2,LLC. 24 _______________________ — 25 — 26 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 28 See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. -11 Before: JURY, KURTZ, and JAIME,** Bankruptcy Judges. 2 In these related appeals chapter 111 debtor, Capital 3 Options, LLC (CO), appeals from (1) the order dismissing its 4 adversary complaint against George H. Goldsmith (Goldsmith) and 5 G2, LLC (G2) with prejudice, and the order denying 6 reconsideration of that order (BAP No. AZ-15-1167); (2) the 7 order dismissing its adversary complaint against C. Dennis 8 Loomis (Loomis) and Baker Hostetler, LLP (Baker) without 9 prejudice (BAP No. AZ-15-1165); and (3) the order denying 10 confirmation of CO’s plan of reorganization, granting G2's 11 motion to dismiss CO’s bankruptcy case without prejudice, and 12 denying CO’s motion to extend the statute of limitations to file 13 avoidance and turnover actions (Plan Denial Order) (BAP No. 14 AZ-15-1166).2 15 In BAP No. 15-1167, CO sought declaratory relief against 16 Goldsmith and G2 regarding its rights under G2's oral operating 17 agreement. CO alleged that it held a 50% membership interest in 18 G2 thereby entitling it to half of any distributions. 19 Goldsmith, G2’s purported sole member, disputed this contention. — 20 — 21 ** Hon. Christopher D. Jaime, United States Bankruptcy Judge 22 for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation. — 1 — 23 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 . 24 “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of 25 Civil Procedure. 26 2 On May 25, 2015, CO moved to consolidate the three 27 appeals. On June 30, 2015, the BAP issued an order denying consolidation because the orders on appeal were different and the 28 underlying parties and proceedings were not identical. -21 The membership issue was never adjudicated because the 2 bankruptcy court decided that CO’s request for declaratory 3 relief regarding its membership interest was essentially for 4 breach of the oral operating agreement and time barred under 5 California’s two-year statute of limitations pertaining to oral 6 contracts. The court rejected CO’s tolling arguments and 7 dismissed the adversary proceeding against Goldsmith and G2 with 8 prejudice. The bankruptcy court subsequently denied CO’s motion 9 for reconsideration in which CO raised new arguments for the 10 first time. 11 In BAP No. 15-1165, CO filed an adversary proceeding 12 against Loomis and Baker, seeking turnover of G2’s records and 13 estate property owed to it based on its asserted 50% membership 14 interest in G2. The complaint also alleged claims for avoidance 15 of fraudulent transfers and fiduciary misconduct. The 16 bankruptcy court found that all the claims asserted were 17 dependent on CO’s alleged membership interest in G2, 18 adjudication of which the court previously decided was time 19 barred. The court dismissed the adversary proceeding on this 20 ground because without a membership interest CO could not 21 possibly prevail. The dismissal was without prejudice in the 22 event CO reversed the Goldsmith/G2 dismissal through its appeal. 23 In BAP No. 15-1166, because CO proposed to fund its plan of 24 reorganization (Plan) with proceeds won from the Loomis/Baker 25 litigation, the bankruptcy court found that the Plan was not 26 feasible and administrative claims could not be paid in full on 27 the effective date once the Loomis/Baker complaint was 28 dismissed. The bankruptcy court denied confirmation of CO’s -31 Plan and also granted G2's motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case 2 without prejudice in the event CO prevailed in the Goldsmith/G2 3 matter on appeal. 4 For the reasons explained below: 5 (1) We conclude that the bankruptcy court properly 6 dismissed the complaint in the Goldsmith/G2 matter on statute of 7 limitations grounds. We also conclude that the court did not 8 abuse its discretion in denying CO’s motion for reconsideration 9 of its dismissal order. We thus AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s 10 ruling in BAP No. 15-1167; 11 (2) We further conclude that the bankruptcy court did not 12 err in dismissing the Loomis/Baker adversary proceeding in its 13 entirety. The court properly found that the claims for relief 14 were all dependent upon CO establishing its 50% membership 15 interest in G2. CO could not establish such an interest when 16 its claim was based on a breach of the oral operating agreement 17 and was time barred. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy 18 court’s dismissal of the Loomis/Baker adversary complaint in BAP 19 No. 15-1165; and 20 (3) We also conclude that the bankruptcy court properly 21 denied confirmation of CO’s Plan on feasibility and other 22 grounds. In addition, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its 23 discretion in dismissing the underlying bankruptcy case without 24 prejudice. Therefore, we AFFIRM the Plan Denial Order in BAP 25 No. 15-1166. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// -41 I. FACTS 2 A. Prepetition Events 3 1. Dispute over CO’s membership interest in G2 4 G2 was formed in 2003 in California, but it is unclear who 5 was involved in its formation. It was either Goldsmith alone, 6 Goldsmith and Donna Stephenson (Stephenson), or Goldsmith and 7 Rich Gurnett (Gurnett). G2 was an asset recovery firm that 8 helped victims of financial fraud determine the perpetrators of 9 the fraud and recapture the misappropriated funds.3 10 The record suggests that Stephenson and Goldsmith were the 11 initial members of G2, each owning 50%. CO was not an initial 12 member since it was formed several years after the formation of 13 G2. The parties do not dispute that G2's operating agreement 14 was oral. 15 When G2 was formed, Goldsmith’s ex-girlfriend, Ida Fung 16 (Fung) filed the original Articles of Organization (AO) with the 17 California Secretary of State. Fung checked the box on the AO 18 form that showed management of G2 was vested in one manager. 19 Fung signed and filed a subsequent amendment to the AO with no 20 box checked regarding how G2 was managed. 21 Stephenson later filed a “Statement of Information” with 22 the California Secretary of State from 2003 to 2007 that listed 23 Goldsmith as the manager of G2 and the only member. However, 24 for the tax years 2003 through 2006, G2 filed partnership tax 25 returns with the Internal Revenue Service and California — 26 — — 3 — 27 Due to the nature of the business, Goldsmith used the alias “Henry George” and Gurnett went by the alias of “Rich 28 Douglas.” -51 Franchise Tax Board which reflected that the right to share in 2 50% of the profits was held by each member and identified 3 Goldsmith and Stephenson as members. For these years, 4 Stephenson served as the tax matters partner of G2 and allegedly 5 managed G2 together with Goldsmith and Gurnett. 6 Some years after G2 was formed, Stephenson and Gurnett 7 established CO, an Arizona limited liability company, allegedly 8 for estate planning purposes as to Stephenson’s 50% membership 9 interest in G2. Gurnett and Stephenson maintained that CO 10 succeeded to Stephenson’s membership interest in G2, but there 11 is no documentation in the record that shows how that occurred. 12 Nonetheless, tax returns for 2007, 2008 and 2009 showed that CO 13 held a 50% interest in G2 for all purposes with Goldsmith as the 14 other 50% member. 15 In an email dated December 10, 2007, Goldsmith acknowledged 16 that Stephenson was a member in G2 and owned 50% of G2 that was 17 “owned” by CO. He also acknowledged at various times in 2008 18 and 2009 that “Rich Douglas” was a co-owner and co-founder of 19 G2, or that CO was entitled to 50% of the G2 revenues. 20 By the end of 2007, relations between the parties soured. 21 According to Gurnett, Goldsmith asked Stephenson to “cook G2's 22 books” so that Goldsmith could pay off some of his personal 23 debts out of G2's account to reduce his income tax liability. 24 Gurnett also alleged that Goldsmith engaged in other “illegal 25 schemes.” Goldsmith allegedly informed Gurnett that he would no 26 longer work with Gurnett, effectively ending G2. From Gurnett’s 27 perspective, the parties agreed to wind up G2's affairs. 28 However, Gurnett maintains that while he was hospitalized, -61 Goldsmith took over G2, removed Gurnett and Stephenson as 2 administrators, changed all their passwords, and told service 3 providers that they were no longer with the company. 4 On September 10, 2008, Stephenson filed a “Limited 5 Liability Company Certificate of Amendment” with the California 6 Secretary of State showing that G2 was managed by all its 7 members. She signed the form as a member. Goldsmith contends 8 that this filing was fraudulent. 9 On July 22, 2009, Goldsmith filed a corrected document with 10 the California Secretary of State showing himself as the only 11 member and manager. Gurnett contends that this filing was 12 fraudulent. 13 Two weeks later, on August 5, 2009, Stephenson filed 14 another document with the California Secretary of State’s office 15 on behalf of G2, again listing CO as a member. Finally on 16 April 7, 2010, Goldsmith filed another document on behalf of G2 17 showing only Goldsmith as a member in G2. 18 At some point in 2010, Goldsmith retained a different CPA 19 to prepare G2's tax returns and made himself the tax matters 20 partner on this return, without a vote from CO. At that time, 21 he reported that he was the sole member in G2 and signed the 22 return. Around the same time, G2 evidently began receiving 23 payments on account receivables. 24 2. The joint defense and cooperation agreement 25 To temporarily avoid litigation regarding the validity and 26 extent of CO’s membership interest in G2, the parties entered 27 into a joint defense and cooperation agreement (JDCA) on 28 April 20, 2010. The agreement was for an indefinite period and -71 stated that Goldsmith denied that CO or Stephenson had any 2 ownership interest in G2. It further provided: 3 E. Capital Options, LLC, Richard Douglas Gurnett, and Donna Stephenson each acknowledges that George Henry 4 Goldsmith asserts and contends (i) that neither Capital Options LLC nor Donna Stephenson (collectively 5 “the Capital Parties”) has any ownership interest in or to G2 LLC, (ii) that neither of the Capital Parties 6 has any right to share in any fees paid or owing to G2 LLC by any clients of G2 LLC, and (iii) that 7 neither of the Capital Parties has any separate or independent right to direct, manage, or control the 8 enforcement or disposition of any G2 LLC claims against any G2 LLC clients or any other third party. 9 Capital Options, LLC, Richard Douglas Gurnett, and Donna Stephenson each deny that such assertions and 10 contentions as set forth in this Recital E are correct or valid. Nonetheless, Capital Options LLC, Richard 11 Douglas Gurnett, and Donna Stephenson each acknowledges and affirms that the execution and 12 performance of participation in this Agreement by George Henry Goldsmith is without prejudice to and 13 shall not be asserted or relied upon as evidence in opposition to his assertions and contentions as set 14 forth in this Recital E. 15 The agreement also designated Loomis, an attorney who 16 represented Goldsmith, along with his law firm Baker, as 17 attorney members in G2. Similarly, Gurnett and Stephenson’s 18 attorney, Marc Epstein (Epstein), and his law firm, Gaims, Weil, 19 West & Epstein, LLP, were designated as attorney members in G2. 20 Under the agreement, the attorney members were given authority 21 to communicate and negotiate with third parties, including past 22 and present clients of G2. The attorney members were required 23 to act jointly, unanimously, and in writing to place all funds 24 which were paid to G2 into one or more bank accounts requiring 25 the signatures of all attorney members for withdrawals, subject 26 to any court order to the contrary. This “escrow” provision 27 survived termination of the agreement. 28 Paragraph K of the agreement provided: -81 Nothing in this Agreement is intended to create any attorney-client relationship, fiduciary duty, or any 2 other duty of any kind between Baker Hostetler and/or C. Dennis Loomis, on the one hand, and any of Capital 3 Options LLC, Richard Douglas Gurnett, and Donna Stephenson, on the other hand. All parties hereto 4 agree that no such attorney-client relationship or duties exist. — 5 — 6 A similar paragraph applied to Epstein and his firm. 7 In July 2010, the JDCA was amended to reflect that the 8 attorney members and their clients agreed to settlement of G2's 9 claims against Dominic Cusumano (Cusumano) and Atlas Free, Inc. 10 (Atlas Free). The amendment further provided that the “client 11 members” would cause G2 to distribute all settlement funds 12 received from Cusumano and Atlas Free, directly or indirectly, 13 within two days of receipt of such funds, 50% to Goldsmith and 14 50% to CO, with no deduction for attorneys’ fees, costs, or 15 otherwise. The amendment did not specify how proceeds from any 16 of G2's remaining potential recoveries would be distributed. It 17 further provided that the parties intended to resolve their 18 disputes at some time in the future through negotiation, 19 mediation, arbitration or court action. 20 3. The Cusumano and Atlas Free settlement funds 21 On August 6, 2010, Loomis sent an email to Epstein which 22 stated that rather than distributing the Cusumano and Atlas Free 23 settlement funds, estimated to be around $375,000, in the manner 24 set forth in the amended JDCA, Goldsmith believed that the funds 25 should be applied to G2's and its individual member/defendants’ — 26 — — 27 — — 28 — -91 legal costs in the “Silver and Morningstar” cases.4 The email 2 then detailed how representation of G2 and its individual 3 members should be achieved and how legal costs would be divided 4 if Gurnett agreed. If Gurnett did not agree, settlement funds 5 would be used to pay the retainers for the attorneys in the 6 Silver and Morningstar matters and then the remaining balance 7 would be distributed 50/50 to CO and Goldsmith. The email 8 further provided that going forward, unless Gurnett agreed in 9 writing to pay 50% of all charges incurred by the attorneys in 10 the Silver and Morningstar matters, such amounts would be 11 deducted from the Cusumano and Atlas Free settlement funds. 12 In response, Epstein sent an email to Loomis urging him to 13 reconsider his “threat” of “misappropriating” 50% of the 14 settlement funds which had been entrusted to Baker, and to which 15 CO was entitled pursuant to the amended JDCA. Epstein further 16 maintained that Loomis’ conduct “implicates a serious breach of 17 fiduciary duty and breach of trust, a serious breach of the 18 canons of ethics, conversion, and frankly, one or more crimes.” 19 4. The Morningstar recovery 20 One of G2's clients was Morningstar Holding Corporation 21 (Morningstar). G2 successfully recovered embezzled funds for 22 Morningstar, but Morningstar sued G2, along with Goldsmith and 23 Gurnett individually, in 2010 in Idaho to avoid paying fees owed 24 to G2. G2 counterclaimed. G2 and Goldsmith retained Thomas 25 Angstman (Angstman) to represent them in the case. Goldsmith — 26 — — 27 — — 4 — Silver and Morningstar were clients of G2. The 28 Morningstar matter is further described below. -101 alleges that Gurnett evaded service and was removed from the 2 case. Gurnett maintains he was never afforded the opportunity 3 to participate. A court-ordered mediation produced a settlement 4 which resulted in Morningstar paying a reduced fee to G2. In 5 June 2012, settlement proceeds were paid to Angstman for fees 6 with the remainder disbursed to Goldsmith. 7 5. The California state court lawsuit 8 On June 11, 2011, CO sued Goldsmith and G2 in the 9 California state court seeking the appointment of a receiver for 10 G2 due to the alleged disbursement of settlement funds in 11 violation of fiduciary obligations purportedly owed to CO. 12 The allegations included facts regarding the deterioration of 13 the parties’ relationship, Goldsmith’s hostile takeover of G2, 14 and Goldsmith’s misappropriation of money owed to CO. Despite 15 extensive discovery, the state court declined to appoint a 16 receiver, citing lack of evidence. The case was ultimately 17 dismissed by CO’s chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee. 18 6. Goldsmith designates himself as the sole member in G2 in 2011, 2012, and 2013 tax returns — 19 — 20 In a 2011 tax return, Goldsmith designated himself the tax 21 matters partner and the sole member in G2. He also reported on 22 the G2 form K-1 that he was a 100% member and reported on CO’s 23 K-1 that CO had no interest in G2 at any time in 2011. On the 24 2012 tax return, Goldsmith represented that he was the tax 25 matters partner and that CO was now a 0% member and Goldsmith 26 was the sole member. The 2013 tax return also showed Goldsmith 27 as the sole member in G2 and made no mention of CO anywhere. It 28 is not clear from the record when CO or its members became aware -111 of these returns. 2 7. Failed attempts to put G2 into an involuntary bankruptcy — 3 — 4 On February 29, 2012, CO filed an involuntary chapter 7 5 petition against G2 in the Central District of California, but 6 did not serve G2. The California bankruptcy court dismissed 7 CO’s involuntary petition by order entered on May 11, 2012. 8 Before the court dismissed the February 29 involuntary 9 petition, Brent Johnson (Johnson), another alleged G2 creditor, 10 filed a second involuntary petition against G2 on April 2, 2012. 11 The lawyer for Johnson in the second involuntary case was the 12 same as that for CO in the first involuntary case. Johnson 13 moved for the appointment of an interim chapter 7 trustee to 14 take custody of G2 and intercept any settlement proceeds. 15 Gurnett supported this motion with a declaration, again 16 asserting that CO was a 50% owner in G2. On May 31, 2012, the 17 California bankruptcy court granted G2's motion to dismiss the 18 involuntary proceeding, finding that the petition had not been 19 filed by a creditor with an undisputed claim.5 20 B. Bankruptcy Events 21 On June 14, 2012, CO filed a chapter 7 petition. On 22 August 25, 2012, the chapter 7 trustee filed a notice to sell 23 CO’s interest in G2. G2 made the highest offer for this asset. — 24 — 25 5 G2 then moved for attorneys’ fees. On September 25, 2012, 26 the California bankruptcy court sanctioned Johnson over $117,000 finding it “suspicious, at a minimum, that Johnson’s counsel was 27 also C[apital] O[ptions]’ counsel when it filed an involuntary against G2” and that Johnson’s “actions and motives for filing 28 [the bankruptcy] [were] questionable.” -121 CO objected and moved to dismiss or convert the case. On 2 September 26, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered an order 3 converting CO’s chapter 7 case to one under chapter 11. 4 On December 18, 2013, the United States Trustee (UST) moved 5 to convert or dismiss the case. The UST asserted that CO had 6 been in a chapter 11 proceeding for over a year and was unable 7 to reorganize. According to the UST, CO owned no real property, 8 had no secured or unsecured priority creditors, had 9 approximately $207,000 in unsecured debt, and generated no 10 income. The UST further noted that the case involved 11 liquidation of CO’s personal property such as its interest in 12 G2. 13 Thereafter, CO filed a disclosure statement (DS) and Plan 14 on February 11, 2014. The Plan was a litigation plan, dependent 15 upon recovery of approximately $1,500,000 in assets in the hands 16 of third parties based on CO’s alleged 50% membership interest 17 in G2. Around the same time, to collect these funds, CO filed 18 numerous adversary complaints against third parties, including 19 the Goldsmith/G2 and Loomis/Baker matters at issue in these 20 appeals. 21 1. The Goldsmith/G2 adversary proceeding 22 On February 18, 2014, CO filed an adversary complaint 23 against Angstman. Angstman filed a motion to dismiss the 24 complaint, which the bankruptcy court granted, giving CO leave 25 to amend to correct defects in the complaint.6 — 26 — — 27 — — 6 — The claims against Angstman were dismissed in November 28 2014. -131 On July 29, 2014, CO filed the amended complaint which 2 added Goldsmith and G2 as defendants and asserted three claims 3 for relief against them: (1) declaratory relief seeking to 4 establish that CO held a 50% membership interest in G2; 5 (2) derivative recovery of certain settlement funds owing to G2 6 allegedly negligently disbursed by Angstman and diverted to 7 Goldsmith; and (3) turnover of G2's records. 8 On September 5, 2014, Goldsmith and G2 moved to dismiss the 9 complaint asserting that (1) the statute of frauds made the oral 10 operating agreement unenforceable; (2) the complaint was time 11 barred under California’s two-year statute of limitations for 12 breach of an oral agreement; and (3) the bankruptcy court lacked 13 jurisdiction over the action. 14 Instead of responding to the motion, CO moved to disqualify 15 Osborn Maledon, counsel for Goldsmith and G2, alleging that 16 under California law the firm had an “irreconcilable conflict of 17 interest” in representing both Goldsmith and G2 in the adversary 18 proceeding. Goldsmith and G2 responded, arguing that 19 (1) Arizona law applied given that Goldsmith and G2's counsel 20 practice in Arizona; (2) CO lacked standing to allege any 21 conflict since it was not a member of G2 nor was it a client or 22 former client of Osborn Maledon; and (3) under Arizona’s ethical 23 rules, there was no conflict in jointly representing Goldsmith 24 and G2 under the circumstances. 25 On November 12, 2014, the bankruptcy court heard the motion 26 for disqualification. The court noted that CO was not a client 27 or former client of the Osborn Maledon firm and that under 28 Arizona law, only in extreme circumstances should a party to a -141 lawsuit be allowed to interfere with the attorney-client 2 relationship of his opponent. In the end, the court denied the 3 motion for disqualification, finding that CO had not met its 4 burden that it had initial standing to file a disqualification 5 motion or that extreme circumstances existed such that it should 6 be allowed to file such a motion. The bankruptcy court’s ruling 7 denying the motion was set forth in a minute entry dated 8 November 12, 2014. No further order was submitted to the 9 bankruptcy court. 10 Two weeks later, CO opposed the motion to dismiss by 11 responding to Goldsmith’s and G2's argument regarding the two12 year statute of limitations under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 339. 13 CO argued that the two-year statute was tolled due to 14 Goldsmith’s absence from California under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 15 § 3517 and his active concealment of material facts that he was 16 required to disclose to CO as a 50% managing member of G2. CO 17 did not argue that a four-year statute of limitations pertaining 18 to written contracts applied or that the limitations period was 19 tolled due to the filing of the state court receivership action 20 or § 108. 21 On January 20, 2015, the bankruptcy court granted — 22 — — 23 — — 7 — This statute states, — 24 — If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, 25 he is out of the State, the action may be commenced 26 within the term herein limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause of action accrues, he 27 departs from the State, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the 28 action. -151 Goldsmith’s and G2's motion to dismiss, finding that CO knew at 2 least by April 2010 when it entered into the JDCA that Goldsmith 3 disputed that it held a membership interest in G2. Therefore, 4 the complaint against Goldsmith and G2 was time barred since it 5 was filed more than two years later. 6 The court rejected CO’s tolling arguments based on 7 Goldsmith’s absence from the state and fraudulent concealment. 8 With respect to Goldsmith’s absence from California, the 9 bankruptcy court noted inconsistencies in California case law 10 regarding the constitutionality of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 351. 11 In Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng, 71 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1282 (1999), 12 the court held Cal. Code Civil Proc. § 351 constitutional and 13 not an infringement on the commerce clause absent evidence that 14 the defendant was engaged in interstate commerce. In Heritage 15 Marketing & Insurance Services, Inc. v. Chrustawka, — 16 — 160 Cal.App.4th 754 (2008) (followed by Dan Clark Family Ltd. 17 Partnership v. Miramontes, 193 Cal.App.4th 219 (2011)), the 18 California courts in the Fourth District invalidated the statute 19 as applied to defendants who have permanently moved out of 20 state. The Heritage court reasoned that the statute penalized 21 people who moved out of state by imposing a longer statute of 22 limitations on them in contrast to those who remained in the 23 state. The court concluded that the commerce clause protected 24 persons from such restraints on their movement across state 25 lines. 160 Cal.App.4th at 763-64 ; see also Abramson v. 26 Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1990). 27 In the end, the bankruptcy court found that the tolling of 28 the statute would apply only to Goldsmith who moved from -161 California in 2010. Relying on the previously cited cases, the 2 court decided that Goldsmith’s move would not toll the statute 3 of limitations because Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 351 would impair 4 Goldsmith from engaging in interstate commerce. 5 Finally, the bankruptcy court found that CO had fallen 6 short of the requirement to provide specific facts about the 7 alleged fraudulent concealment with the same particularity as 8 would be required for a cause of action for fraud. 9 In connection with Goldsmith’s and G2's other arguments, 10 the bankruptcy court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the 11 adversary proceeding because the litigation was an estate asset 12 and the only means available to fund CO’s Plan.8 The court 13 further decided that it was not clear that the statute of frauds 14 was implicated because there was at least one writing — the 2010 15 tax return signed by Goldsmith — which indicated that CO had an 16 interest in G2. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court denied the 17 motion to dismiss without prejudice as to the statute of frauds. 18 On January 29, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered its order 19 granting the motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds 20 and dismissing the adversary proceeding with prejudice. 21 On February 10, 2015, CO moved for reconsideration of the 22 court’s ruling under Civil Rule 59(e), made applicable by 23 Rule 9023. There, CO argued for the first time that the 24 four-year statute of limitations under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 25 § 337 applied to its litigation against Goldsmith and G2. CO — 26 — — 8 — 27 Later in the hearing, counsel for Goldsmith and G2 indicated that they would consent to jurisdiction for purposes of 28 the dismissal order. -171 maintained that after formation of G2 based on an oral operating 2 agreement, Goldsmith made numerous affirmative, unambiguous, 3 written acknowledgments of the actual agreement of the parties, 4 including the emails and representations to the taxing 5 authorities as described above. Due to these writings, CO 6 argued that the four-year statute of limitations for suits on 7 written contracts should apply. CO further asserted for the 8 first time that the limitations period was tolled due to the 9 state court receivership action. As discussed below, the court 10 heard and decided the motion for reconsideration on April 21, 11 2015, in conjunction with other matters. 12 2. The Loomis/Baker adversary proceeding 13 On February 23, 2014, CO filed an adversary proceeding 14 against Loomis and Baker. The amended complaint alleged that 15 Loomis and Baker, as attorney members of G2 under the JDCA, owed 16 a non-waivable fiduciary duty to CO as to all matters involving 17 G2 and CO as a 50% G2 managing member. CO further alleged that 18 Loomis and Baker had received G2 funds which were disbursed to 19 Goldsmith without written authorization in violation of the 20 JDCA. According to CO, Loomis and Baker breached their 21 fiduciary duties (1) by refusing to account to CO for G2 funds 22 received; (2) by not distributing 50% of the funds received 23 pursuant to the JDCA; and (3) by misdirecting and distributing 24 all G2 funds they received, including settlement funds from 25 Cusumano and Atlas Free, to Goldsmith without CO’s consent or 26 court order. Based on these facts and others, CO alleged three 27 claims for relief against Loomis and Baker: (1) turnover of 28 G2's records; (2) turnover of estate funds in the amount of -181 $3,515,675; and (3) unspecified damages for breach of fiduciary 2 duties. 3 On April 25, 2014, Loomis and Baker filed a motion to 4 dismiss the complaint. They argued that the request for 5 turnover of G2's records was “moot” since Baker had produced 6 these documents during the state court receivership action. 7 Loomis and Baker further asserted that the second claim for 8 relief seeking turnover of “estate funds” should be dismissed 9 under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) because CO failed to allege sufficient 10 facts to establish that it was a member in G2 and entitled to 11 50% of G2's funds. According to Loomis and Baker, since there 12 was a bona fide dispute pertaining to CO’s entitlement to funds 13 from G2, the claim for turnover should be dismissed. In 14 connection with the breach of fiduciary duty claim, Loomis and 15 Baker pointed to the provision in the JDCA which expressly 16 provided that no fiduciary duty arose between Loomis and Baker 17 on the one hand and CO, Gurnett and Stephenson on the other 18 hand. 19 Finally, Loomis and Baker argued that they were the wrong 20 defendants to litigate issues which were part of a long running 21 dispute between CO and G2 and Goldsmith over whether CO was a 22 legitimate member in G2 and, if so, whether it was owed any 23 distributions from G2. Loomis and Baker contended that these 24 issues were part of the Goldsmith/G2 adversary. They maintained 25 that even if CO’s claims against them were viable, the issues 26 asserted in the complaint were not ripe until CO’s membership 27 interest in G2 and its right to distributions were established. 28 At a hearing on July 9, 2014, the bankruptcy court denied -191 Loomis’ and Baker’s motion to dismiss, without prejudice, and 2 allowed the adversary proceeding against them to proceed. 3 Loomis and Baker subsequently moved for a stay of the 4 adversary proceeding pending resolution of the Goldsmith/G2 5 adversary complaint. They maintained that at least two issues 6 in that adversary were conditions precedent to the adjudication 7 of issues in the adversary against them. According to Loomis 8 and Baker, without a prior determination whether CO is a member 9 and, if so, a managing member, of G2, a corporate dispute that 10 must be litigated between CO and G2, CO could not pursue it 11 claims against them: “If CO is determined not to be a member of 12 G2, the adversary against them would be moot.” 13 CO opposed the motion for a stay arguing that under the 14 JDCA, Loomis and Baker agreed in writing, along with Epstein, to 15 be joint “cashiers” of funds owed to G2. CO disputed 16 Goldsmith’s contention that it had breached the JDCA or that the 17 JDCA was terminated.9 CO further pointed out that even if the 18 JDCA was terminated, the cashiering duties survived. According 19 to CO, these duties were independent from Goldsmith’s dispute 20 over CO’s membership interest in G2. 21 By agreement between the parties, a stay of the litigation 22 applied until November 12, 2014. At the November 12, 2014 23 hearing, the bankruptcy court heard, among other matters, 24 Loomis’ and Baker’s motion for a stay. CO argued that the stay 25 should not be imposed since the issues with Loomis and Baker — 26 — — 9 — 27 Goldsmith evidently asserted that the JDCA was terminated in writing. The parties did not cite to any portion of the 28 record that contained this writing. -201 arose under the JDCA and required Baker to keep any G2 funds in 2 trust. Instead, CO found out that Baker received $171,000, and 3 that Baker and Loomis sent that check to Goldsmith who cashed 4 it. CO contended that while its membership interest would 5 determine where the funds were ultimately disbursed, the funds 6 should still have been in trust. 7 Loomis and Baker again argued that the turnover claims in 8 count one and count two of the complaint were dependent upon 9 whether or not CO was a member, or potentially a managing 10 member, before it could get either money or records. Regarding 11 the breach of the JDCA, Loomis and Baker argued that even 12 assuming CO was correct that the requirement of putting G2's 13 funds in trust survived in perpetuity, if CO was determined not 14 to be a member in G2, it was not entitled to any money in a 15 lockbox. They further asserted that CO’s membership interest in 16 G2 had to be determined before it could establish damages for 17 breach of fiduciary duties. Finally, Loomis and Baker noted 18 that CO’s only argument regarding specific sums due to CO was 19 related to the amended JDCA. There, the non-attorney “members” 20 in G2 agreed to have funds distributed in a certain way. 21 Accordingly, Loomis and Baker asserted: “That would be a claim 22 against Mr. Goldsmith, not a claim against Baker Hostetler.” 23 After hearing argument, the bankruptcy court decided to keep the 24 stay in place pending further status conferences. 25 On January 21, 2015, the bankruptcy court issued an order 26 requiring CO to pay the filing fee of $293 for filing the 27 complaint within fourteen days of the order. CO responded by 28 filing a motion to extend the time for paying the filing fee and -211 requested a status conference. Loomis and Baker objected to the 2 extension of time, but did not object to a status hearing. In 3 the objection, Loomis and Baker stated that at the status 4 hearing they intended to reargue that the adversary proceeding 5 should be dismissed since the court found that CO was barred by 6 the statute of limitations from litigating its membership 7 interest in G2. Since the membership interest was a condition 8 precedent to CO’s claims against Loomis and Baker, they again 9 argued that the adversary proceeding should be dismissed. At a 10 subsequent hearing, the bankruptcy court set oral argument for 11 the motion to extend the time to pay the filing fee on April 21, 12 2015, but did not set the reargument of the motion to dismiss on 13 calendar. 14 As discussed below, the bankruptcy court dismissed the 15 adversary complaint against Loomis and Baker after denying CO’s 16 motion for reconsideration in the Goldsmith/G2 matter at the 17 April 21, 2015 hearing. 18 3. The plan of reorganization 19 CO filed its DS and Plan in February 2014. Loomis and 20 Baker, as well as other defendants in other adversary 21 proceedings, asked CO to include in its DS and Plan a statement 22 that approval of the DS or confirmation of the Plan would not 23 adjudicate any facts or legal issues or constitute their consent 24 to jurisdiction or venue. On April 29, 2014, the bankruptcy 25 court ordered CO to resolve the issue with the defendants in the 26 adversary proceedings and if no resolution could be reached, to 27 include an insert in its DS and Plan describing the adversary 28 defendants’ position. -221 On October 6, 2014, CO filed an amended DS and Plan.10 The 2 amended DS and Plan did not mention the adversary defendants’ 3 position as required by the bankruptcy court’s order. The 4 bankruptcy court entered an order approving the amended DS on 5 October 7, 2014. 6 Loomis, Baker, Goldsmith and G2 objected to the 7 confirmation of CO’s amended Plan arguing, among other things, 8 that CO could not use its amended Plan to create jurisdiction 9 and/or venue in the adversary proceedings against them, or 10 determine facts and/or legal issues that could have a preclusive 11 effect in the adversary proceedings. They also argued that the 12 amended Plan was not feasible given that it was relying on 13 future and speculative recoveries from the various adversary 14 proceedings. As discussed below, the bankruptcy court held a 15 final hearing on plan confirmation on April 21, 2015. 16 4. The April 21, 2015 hearing 17 On April 21, 2015, the bankruptcy court heard CO’s motion 18 for reconsideration in the Goldsmith/G2 matter and held a final 19 hearing on confirmation on CO’s amended Plan. The stay of the 20 Loomis/Baker matter was also continued to that date. 21 In connection with CO’s motion for reconsideration, the 22 court opined that it was inclined to deny the motion since CO’s 23 argument regarding the four-year statute of limitations was 24 available at the time of the original briefing. CO’s counsel — 25 — — 10 — 26 On September 12, 2014, CO filed an amended DS which included an insert, drafted and provided by Baker’s counsel, that 27 described Baker’s and the other adversary defendants’ position. However, this insert was later omitted from the amended DS that 28 was approved by the bankruptcy court. -231 acknowledged that his argument regarding the four-year statute 2 of limitations “should have been made out of the gate.” The 3 bankruptcy court commented that if the argument should have been 4 raised earlier, it was too late to raise it in a reconsideration 5 motion. Although counsel responded by alluding to 6 misinterpretation of the law or miscarriage of justice, the 7 court declined to accept those theories. The bankruptcy court 8 observed that any movant could advance a set of arguments, and, 9 if they lost the argument at the first hearing, they could 10 advance a second set of arguments later on and say: “If you 11 don’t consider these new arguments, it’ll be a miscarriage of 12 justice.” 13 For these reasons, the bankruptcy court denied the motion 14 for reconsideration. The court noted that the complaint stated 15 that G2's operating agreement has at all times been oral. Next, 16 the court pointed out that at no time did CO argue the four-year 17 statute of limitations applied, instead asserting that the two18 year statute had not run due to Goldsmith’s absence from the 19 state and his active concealment of material facts. The court 20 concluded by stating that a motion for reconsideration may not 21 be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first 22 time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the 23 litigation, citing Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma 24 GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). 25 Following resolution of CO’s motion for reconsideration in 26 the Goldsmith/G2 matter, the bankruptcy court denied CO’s oral 27 motion for a stay of the various adversary proceedings while CO 28 appealed the bankruptcy court’s ruling in the Goldsmith/G2 -241 matter. The court then concluded that since CO’s litigation 2 against Loomis/Baker was contingent on the establishment of its 3 membership interest in G2 it could not state a claim which 4 entitled it to relief. The court dismissed the adversary 5 proceeding without prejudice. 6 Next, addressing plan confirmation, the bankruptcy court 7 stated that it was not feasible because the only viable 8 litigation regarding CO’s membership and right to distributions 9 from G2 had been dismissed. The court also found the Plan was 10 not filed in good faith and could not meet the requirement under 11 § 1129(a)(9)(A) to pay administrative claimants in full on the 12 effective date. The court therefore denied confirmation. 13 In addressing dismissal of the case, the bankruptcy court 14 opined that it was not a useful exercise to keep the bankruptcy 15 case open when the only possibility for a plan was to be 16 successful in appellate litigation. The court decided that 17 conversion was not an option since there was already one unpaid 18 chapter 7 trustee and there was no reason to run up any 19 additional costs. The bankruptcy court dismissed the case 20 without prejudice. 21 On April 28, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered the 22 dismissal order in the Loomis/Baker matter. On April 29, 2015, 23 the bankruptcy court entered the Plan Denial Order. On the same 24 date, the bankruptcy court entered the order denying CO’s motion 25 for reconsideration in the Goldsmith/G2 matter. CO timely filed 26 an appeal from each of these orders on May 12, 2015. 27 II. JURISDICTION 28 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. -251 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(L) and (O). We have jurisdiction under — 2 — 28 U.S.C. § 158 . 3 III. ISSUES 4 A. Whether the bankruptcy court erred by finding that 5 CO’s claims against Goldsmith and G2 were time barred under 6 California’s two-year statute of limitations relating to oral 7 contracts; 8 B. Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in 9 denying CO’s motion for reconsideration of its ruling that CO’s 10 claims against Goldsmith/G2 were time barred; 11 C. Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in 12 denying CO’s motion to disqualify the attorneys for Goldsmith 13 and G2 in the Goldsmith/G2 adversary proceeding; 14 D. Whether the bankruptcy court erred by dismissing the 15 Loomis/Baker adversary proceeding; 16 E. Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion 17 denying confirmation of CO’s Plan; and 18 F. Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in 19 dismissing CO’s bankruptcy case. 20 IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 21 A bankruptcy court’s decision as to whether a claim is 22 barred by the statute of limitations is reviewed de novo. Santa 23 Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000). The 24 bankruptcy court’s decision whether a statute of limitations has 25 been equitably tolled is generally reviewed for an abuse of 26 discretion, unless the facts are undisputed, in which event the 27 legal question is reviewed de novo. Id. 28 A bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration -261 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. First Ave. W. Bldg., LLC 2 v. James (In re Onecast Media, Inc.), 439 F.3d 558, 561 (9th 3 Cir. 2006). 4 A bankruptcy court’s order denying disqualification of 5 professionals is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 6 COM-1 Info, Inc. v. Wolkowitz (In re Maximus Computers, Inc.), — 7 — 278 B.R. 189, 194 (9th Cir. BAP 2002). 8 “The ultimate decision to confirm a reorganization plan is 9 reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Computer Task Group, Inc. 10 v. Brotby (In re Brotby), 303 B.R. 177, 184 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 11 A determination that a plan meets the requisite confirmation 12 standards necessarily requires a bankruptcy court to make 13 certain factual findings, which are reviewed for clear error. — 14 — Id. 15 We review the bankruptcy court’s decision to dismiss a case 16 for abuse of discretion. Leavitt v. Soto (In re Leavitt), — 17 — 171 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1999). 18 To determine whether the bankruptcy court abused its 19 discretion, we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo 20 whether the bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule 21 to apply to the relief requested” and (2) if it did, whether the 22 bankruptcy court's application of the legal standard was 23 illogical, implausible or “without support in inferences that 24 may be drawn from the facts in the record.” United States v. 25 Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 , 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 26 Findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 27 standard. A court’s factual determination is clearly erroneous 28 if it is illogical, implausible, or without support in the -271 record. Id. 2 We review a dismissal under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. 3 Barnes v. Belice (In re Belice), 461 B.R. 564, 572 (9th Cir. BAP 4 2011) (citing AlohaCare v. Haw. Dept. of Human Services, — 5 — 572 F.3d 740 , 744 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)). “When we conduct a de 6 novo review, ‘we look at the matter anew, the same as if it had 7 not been heard before, and as if no decision previously had been 8 rendered, giving no deference to the bankruptcy court's 9 determinations.’” Id. 10 V. DISCUSSION 11 A. The bankruptcy court properly applied California’s two-year statute of limitations and did not abuse its discretion in 12 denying CO’s motion for reconsideration (BAP No. 15-1167). 13 CO’s amended complaint alleged that “G2's operating 14 agreement has at all times been oral.” The complaint further 15 alleged that the “G2 operating agreement provided that Goldsmith 16 and Stephenson would be member managers.” — 17 — Cal. Corp. Code § 17701.02 (s) provides: 18 An ‘Operating agreement’ means the agreement, whether or not referred to as an operating agreement and 19 whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof, of all the members of a limited 20 liability company, including a sole member . . . . The term ‘operating agreement’ may include, without 21 more, an agreement of all members to organize a limited liability company pursuant to this title. — 22 — 23 The operating agreement is a contract among LLC members 24 that governs the members’ rights and obligations and is 25 construed according to general principles of contract law. 26 Ratliff v. Cochis Agric. Properties, LLC (In re Ratliff), 27 2010 WL6259955, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP October 13, 2010) (citing 28 1 Larry E. Ribstein & Robert R. Keatinge, Limited Liability -281 Companies § 4:16 (2003)). Under California law, it is the 2 policy of the limited liability statutes and the state “to give 3 maximum effect to the principles of freedom of contract and to 4 the enforceability of operating agreements.” See Cal. Corp. 5 Code § 17701.07(a). 6 In California, the limitations period for breach of an oral 7 contract is two years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 339. Although CO 8 did not plead a breach of contract claim, it sought a 9 declaration that it was a member of G2 entitled to 50% of any 10 distributions that went to G2's members. The underlying basis 11 for the requested declaration was necessarily based on the oral 12 operating agreement. Therefore, the related request for 13 declaratory relief is governed by the same statute of 14 limitations for oral contracts. See United Pacific-Reliance 15 Ins. Co. v. DiDomenico, 173 Cal.App.3d 673, 676-77 (1985); 16 Leahey v. Dep’t of Water and Power of City of L.A., — 17 — 76 Cal.App.2d 281, 286 (1946). 18 Generally, the statute of limitations “begins to run upon 19 the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of 20 action.” Brisbane Lodging, L.P. v. Webcor Bldrs., Inc., — 21 — 216 Cal. App.4th 1249, 1257 (2013). However, the time period 22 may be tolled where the plaintiff does not immediately discover 23 or suspect that wrongdoing has occurred. Id. Under the 24 discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when the “‘plaintiff 25 either (1) actually discovered his injury and its negligent 26 cause or (2) could have discovered injury and cause through the 27 exercise of reasonable diligence. . . .’” Id. The discovery 28 rule has been applied in “cases where it is manifestly unjust to -291 deprive plaintiffs of a cause of action before they are aware 2 that they have been injured.” Id. However, a plaintiff is 3 “under a duty to reasonably investigate. A suspicion of 4 wrongdoing, coupled with a knowledge of the harm and its cause, 5 will commence the limitations period and those failing to act 6 with reasonable dispatch will be barred.” Id. A cause of 7 action invariably accrues when there is a remedy available. 8 Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 321 (1974). 9 Here, the bankruptcy court found that CO knew by no later 10 than April 20, 2010 — at the time Gurnett, Stephenson, and CO 11 entered into the JDCA with Goldsmith — that Goldsmith disputed 12 CO’s asserted 50% membership interest in G2. The JDCA 13 explicitly stated that Goldsmith disputed that CO or Stephenson 14 (Capital Parties) had any ownership interest in G2, that neither 15 of the Capital Parties had any right to share in any fees paid 16 to or owing to G2 by any clients, and that neither of the 17 Capital Parties had any separate or independent right to direct, 18 manage, or control the enforcement or disposition of any G2 19 claims against G2, clients or any other third party. As the 20 bankruptcy court found, this was direct notice to CO that there 21 was a dispute regarding its membership in G2 and entitlement to 22 distributions. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court correctly 23 found that the two-year limitation period applied to the oral 24 operating agreement and CO’s last day to file a complaint for 25 any claims against Goldsmith and G2 would have been April 20, 26 2012. This date was before CO’s chapter 7 bankruptcy case was 27 filed and more than two years before the amended complaint was 28 filed. -301 To show error on appeal, CO makes several tolling and other 2 arguments. 3 1. The fraudulent concealment discovery rule 4 CO also argues that the relevant statute of limitations was 5 tolled under the fraudulent concealment discovery rule. To 6 support this tolling argument, CO maintains that LLC members are 7 fiduciaries to each other, Goldsmith never “unconditionally” 8 refuted CO’s membership interest until the 2014 tax returns, and 9 Goldsmith concealed G2's books, records, and finances. CO 10 further argues that if the amended complaint did not 11 sufficiently plead fraud, it could have been amended.11 12 The principle of fraudulent concealment - a well 13 established ground for equitable tolling in California is 14 similar to the discovery rule. A defendant’s fraud in 15 concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable 16 statute of limitations, but only for that period during which 17 the claim is undiscovered by the plaintiff or until such time as — 18 — — 11 — 19 In connection with the request for declaratory relief, the amended complaint alleges that (1) the terms of Angstman’s 20 representation of G2 in the Morningstar matter have been actively concealed from plaintiff by Angstman and Goldsmith; (2) the 21 factual basis for Goldsmith’s claim to $130,000 of the G2 funds (the distribution from Morningstar) has been actively concealed — 22 — from plaintiff by Angstman and Goldsmith; (3) Angstman concealed 23 from plaintiff the fact of the transfer of G2 funds and the details thereof; (4) Goldsmith persuaded Angstman to divert G2's 24 Morningstar Idaho settlement funds in violation of Goldsmith’s statutory fiduciary duty to plaintiff as a member of G2; (5) the 25 location of the G2 funds from all sources, transferred by 26 Angstman has, at all times, been concealed by Angstman and Goldsmith from plaintiff. Given the pleading standards for 27 tolling a limitations period under a fraudulent concealment theory which we discuss below, these allegations are 28 insufficient. -311 plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have 2 discovered it. Fuller v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., 216 Cal. 3 App.4th 955, 962 (2013); Sanchez v. S. Hoover Hosp., 18 Cal.3d 4 93, 99 (1976). The burden of pleading and proving belated 5 discovery of a cause of action falls on the plaintiff. Inv’rs 6 Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt, 195 Cal.App.4th 1519 , 1533 7 (2011). 8 When a plaintiff alleges the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action, the same pleading and proof is 9 required as in fraud cases: the plaintiff must show (1) the substantive elements of fraud, and (2) an 10 excuse for late discovery of the facts. With respect to the fraud itself, ‘[w]here there is a duty to 11 disclose, the disclosure must be full and complete, and any material concealment or misrepresentation will 12 amount to fraud sufficient to entitle the party injured thereby to an action.’ As for the belated 13 discovery, the complaint must allege (1) when the fraud was discovered; (2) the circumstances under 14 which it was discovered; and (3) that the plaintiff was not at fault for failing to discover it or had no 15 actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry. — 16 — 17 Cmty. Cause v. Boatwright, 124 Cal.App.3d 888, 900 (1984). 18 A plaintiff who fails to sufficiently plead such facts 19 should normally be permitted to amend his or her complaint to do 20 so. The record does not show that CO moved to amend its 21 complaint to plead fraudulent concealment of the claims for 22 relief. Further, although California’s LLC law may have made 23 Goldsmith a fiduciary to other members of G2, CO does not point 24 to evidence in the record showing Goldsmith’s active concealment 25 of his dispute regarding CO’s membership interest in G2. 26 Finally, other than conclusory allegations that Goldsmith 27 concealed G2's books, records, and finances, CO does not suggest 28 there are additional facts it could plead to satisfy the -321 fraudulent concealment discovery rule. CO does not tell us the 2 time or manner of discovery or say it was not aware of facts to 3 make a reasonably prudent person sufficiently suspicious to 4 investigate further. 5 In short, CO has not shown in what manner it could amend 6 its complaint to meet the pleading requirements under the 7 fraudulent concealment discovery rule. Regardless, any amended 8 complaint could not plead around the fact that CO was on notice 9 no later than April 2010 that Goldsmith explicitly disputed CO’s 10 membership interest in G2. Therefore, the bankruptcy court 11 correctly found that tolling of the two year statute of 12 limitations for oral contracts was not proper under CO’s 13 fraudulent concealment theory. 14 2. Section 108 15 Raised for the first time on appeal, CO maintains that 16 § 108 tolled the two-year statute of limitations. In general, 17 we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, 18 although we have discretion to hear previously unconsidered 19 claims when the issue presented is purely one of law and does 20 not depend on the factual record developed in the bankruptcy 21 court. Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 22 2004). Section 108 tolls a statute of limitations period that 23 has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition. 24 § 108(a). As discussed above, the two-year statute of 25 limitations expired prior to the filing of CO’s petition. Thus, 26 § 108 does not apply as a matter of law. 27 3. Goldsmith’s absence from California 28 In its reply brief, CO argues that the bankruptcy court -331 erred by finding that Goldsmith’s absence from California did 2 not toll the statute of limitations. CO maintains that the 3 court found Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 351 inapplicable since it 4 impaired Goldsmith’s engaging in interstate commerce, but there 5 is nothing in the record that shows Goldsmith engaged in 6 interstate commerce at any time. We do not consider arguments 7 raised for the first time in reply and therefore there is no 8 need to address this contention. See United States v. Gianelli, — 9 — 543 F.3d 1178 , 1184 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008); Sophanthavong v. 10 Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859 , 871–72 (9th Cir. 2004) (refusing to 11 reach argument raised for the first time in a reply brief). The 12 Ninth Circuit explained in Tovar v. United States Postal Service 13 that it is improper to raise new arguments in a reply brief 14 because the opposing party is deprived of an opportunity to 15 respond. 3 F.3d 1271 , 1273 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993). 16 4 The motion for reconsideration: tolling due to the state court receivership action and applicability of 17 the four-year statute of limitations for written contracts — 18 — 19 CO argues on appeal that the state court receivership 20 action tolled the two-year statute of limitations. CO further 21 asserts that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to 22 written contracts applies due to Goldsmith’s representations in 23 emails and tax returns that CO was a member in G2 with a 50% 24 interest. Both these arguments were raised for the first time 25 in CO’s motion for reconsideration. The bankruptcy court 26 properly rejected the untimely arguments on the basis that they 27 could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation. 28 Marlyn Nutraceuticals Co., Inc., 571 F.3d at 880 . -341 To avoid this result, CO argues on appeal that the 2 applicability of the four-year statute of limitations was 3 “sufficiently developed” for the bankruptcy court to address 4 this issue in its motion for reconsideration. In this regard, 5 CO points to the bankruptcy court’s comments when it considered 6 the statute of frauds as a basis for dismissal of the complaint. 7 In declining to dismiss the complaint on statute of frauds 8 grounds, the bankruptcy court observed that there was some 9 written evidence of CO’s membership in G2 due to the 2010 tax 10 return and the Schedule K-1. CO maintains that these findings 11 were sufficient to require the application of California’s four12 year limitations statute. We find this argument is not properly 13 before us. 14 Whether the emails and tax returns constituted sufficient 15 writings to satisfy the statute of frauds was not argued in the 16 context of the statute of limitations. Moreover, the matter was 17 not briefed and the case law supporting CO’s position on the 18 applicability of the four-year statute of limitations was not 19 cited until the motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the 20 issue was not raised sufficiently to permit the bankruptcy court 21 to rule upon it. Under these circumstances, our abuse of 22 discretion review precludes us from reversing the bankruptcy 23 court’s decision to decline to address issues raised for the 24 first time in a motion for reconsideration. 389 Orange St. 25 Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 666 (9th Cir. 1999). 26 In sum, we conclude that (1) the bankruptcy court properly 27 dismissed the adversary complaint against Goldsmith and G2 28 because it was time barred under California’s two-year statute -351 of limitations relating to oral contracts; (2) the bankruptcy 2 court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply any of 3 the tolling doctrines asserted; and (3) the bankruptcy court did 4 not abuse its discretion in denying CO’s motion for 5 reconsideration based on its untimely arguments. 6 5. Denial of CO’s motion for disqualification is moot 7 The bankruptcy court’s order dismissing CO’s adversary 8 complaint against Goldsmith and G2 with prejudice was a final 9 order. As a final order it incorporates and brings up for 10 review the preceding non-final order denying CO’s motion to 11 disqualify Goldsmith’s and G2's counsel, Osborn Maledon. We 12 conclude that disqualification of Osborn Maledon based on a 13 claimed conflict of interest is moot in light of the bankruptcy 14 court’s proper dismissal of the adversary complaint on statute 15 of limitations grounds. Due to the dismissal, even if we were 16 to reverse the bankruptcy court’s denial of CO’s 17 disqualification motion, the reversal would not afford CO any 18 effectual relief. 19 B. The bankruptcy court did not err by dismissing the Loomis/Baker adversary complaint under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) 20 (BAP No. 15-1165). 21 1. Jurisdiction 22 We first briefly address our jurisdiction over this appeal. 23 The order dismissing this adversary proceeding was without 24 prejudice. Generally, “[a]n order dismissing a complaint 25 without prejudice is an interlocutory order.” In re Belice, — 26 — 461 B.R. at 571-72 . Here, however, the dismissal without 27 prejudice was basically in lieu of staying the adversary 28 proceeding pending CO’s appeal of the Goldsmith/G2 matter. In -361 other words, if CO prevailed in its appeal of the Goldsmith/G2 2 matter, it could proceed to establish its membership interest in 3 G2 and then reinstate the Loomis/Baker adversary proceeding 4 which contained claims dependent upon that interest. Since CO 5 has not been successful in its appeal of the Goldsmith/G2 6 matter, we conclude that the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the 7 Loomis/Baker adversary proceeding without prejudice is 8 sufficiently final to support our jurisdiction.12 9 2. The parties’ arguments 10 CO argues on appeal that the bankruptcy court erred in 11 dismissing the Loomis/Baker adversary proceeding in its entirety 12 because not all of the relief sought was dependent upon a 13 finding that CO had a membership interest in G2. Specifically, 14 under the JDCA, Loomis and Baker as attorney members had the 15 authority and obligation to act jointly, unanimously, and in 16 writing to place any and all funds which are paid to G2 into one 17 or more bank accounts requiring the signatures of all attorney 18 members for withdrawals, subject to the effect of any future 19 court order to the contrary. This provision survived 20 termination of the agreement. According to CO, under the 21 amended JDCA, the attorney members were supposed to escrow the 22 settlement funds from third parties, including those received 23 from Atlas Free and Cusumano. CO further maintains that under — 24 — 25 12 Even if this were not the case, under Rule 8003, we may 26 treat a notice of appeal as a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. As it would be in everyone’s best interest 27 to decide this appeal now, we grant leave to appeal to the extent it is necessary. See Travers v. Dragul (In re Travers), 202 B.R. 28 624, 626 (9th Cir. BAP 1996). -371 the amended JDCA, it was the client members who would direct 2 them to distribute fifty percent of those funds to CO and fifty 3 percent to Goldsmith within two days of receipt. CO argued that 4 Loomis and Baker breached the JDCA by announcing in an email 5 that they intended to misapply the Cusumano/Atlas Free funds by 6 making various deductions. CO points out that its counsel 7 immediately objected to this arrangement, but none of the 8 Cusumano/Atlas Free funds were ever distributed to it. 9 In response, Loomis and Baker maintain that this “secondary 10 claim” fails because (1) CO never raised this argument in its 11 complaint against Loomis and Baker and (2) the provision in the 12 amended JDCA upon which CO relies imposes obligations solely on 13 the “client members” under the contract, not on Loomis and Baker 14 who were expressly defined as the attorney members. Therefore, 15 since Loomis and Baker had no contractual obligation to turn 16 over any settlement funds allegedly owed to CO under the amended 17 JDCA, the claim fails as a matter of law. 18 In reply, CO argues that the JDCA was breached because 19 Loomis and Baker did not hold funds paid to G2 in escrow as 20 required by the agreement and the amended JDCA which 21 incorporated those terms. CO asserts that while the amended 22 JDCA provided that the client members would cause the 23 disbursement of the Cusumano/Atlas Free settlement funds, Loomis 24 and Baker ignored their obligation to hold the funds under the 25 JDCA. CO further contends that a plain reading of the JDCA and 26 the amendment establish that Goldsmith and CO were to direct the 27 attorney members to disburse the settlement funds. In sum, CO 28 maintains that Loomis and Baker completely ignored the issue of -381 their unconditional, contractual obligation to hold G2 funds 2 until a court says “disburse” or Goldsmith and CO agreed in 3 writing to a disbursement, as set forth in the JDCA. 4 3. Analysis 5 While the parties make numerous arguments supporting their 6 positions regarding the proper interpretation of the JDCA and 7 its amendment, the bankruptcy court never interpreted those 8 agreements because it was unnecessary to reach these issues. 9 The amendment was not pled in the complaint and the central 10 issue was whether the claims asserted were dependent upon CO’s 11 membership interest in G2. 12 In “Count One” of the amended complaint, CO seeks the 13 turnover of G’s books, records, accounts, ledgers, and other 14 records. CO alleges in ¶ 23: “As a 50% member of G2, plaintiff 15 is entitled to the information contained in the foregoing 16 records of G2 in the custody of Loomis and Baker.” In “Count 17 Two” of the amended complaint, CO seeks the turnover of estate 18 funds and alleges in ¶ 26: “Plaintiff . . . alleges that 19 defendants Loomis and Baker have received . . . not less than 20 $3,515,675, subject to proof at trial, which comprises property 21 of this estate by reason of being plaintiff’s 50% share of G2 22 funds . . . .” Finally, in “Count Three” of the amended 23 complaint, CO seeks damages for fiduciary misconduct. CO 24 alleges that Loomis and Baker owed a fiduciary duty to it at all 25 times with respect “to the plaintiff’s share” of G2 funds 26 received. Taken together, these allegations show that all of 27 CO’s claims for relief depended upon its membership interest in 28 G2. Without such an interest, it could not possibly win relief -391 against Loomis and Baker on the asserted claims. Accordingly, 2 as a matter of law, the bankruptcy court’s dismissal was 3 proper.13 4 C. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying confirmation of the Plan or in dismissing the 5 underlying bankruptcy case (BAP No. 15-1166). 6 1. Jurisdiction 7 Denial of plan confirmation is an interlocutory order. 8 Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S.Ct. 1686 , 1693–94, 1696 9 (2015). Moreover, as noted above, the dismissal of the 10 underlying case without prejudice, also an interlocutory ruling, 11 was done to allow CO to reinstate the case in the event it 12 prevailed on appeal in the Goldsmith/G2 matter. Under 13 Rule 8003, we may treat a notice of appeal as a motion for leave 14 to file an interlocutory appeal. Because we have decided that 15 CO’s adversary proceeding against Loomis and Baker was properly 16 dismissed, there is no possibility that CO could fund a plan. 17 There is thus no ground for the case to be reinstated. As it 18 would be in everyone’s best interest to decide this appeal now, 19 we grant leave to appeal to the extent it is necessary. See 20 In re Travers, 202 B.R. at 626 . 21 2. The merits 22 Turning to the merits of the court’s decisions to deny Plan 23 confirmation and dismiss the bankruptcy case, there is no basis — 24 — 25 13 CO did not request leave to amend its complaint at any 26 time, either in response to the initial motion to dismiss or after it received notice that Loomis/Baker intended to reargue 27 that motion. As a consequence, dismissal without a provision regarding leave to amend was a proper ruling of the court based 28 on the issues before it. -401 to find an abuse of discretion with either decision. Without a 2 membership interest in G2, CO has no money to fund a plan, so 3 denial of confirmation and dismissal were the logical rulings. 4 Therefore, we summarily affirm. 5 VI. CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s 7 decisions in these three related appeals. — 8 — — 9 — — 10 — — 11 — — 12 — — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 — -41-