Kerr v. Parsons

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 Opinion Number: 3 Filing Date: June 2, 2016 4 NO. S-1-SC-35421 5 LIANE E. KERR, Esquire, 6 Petitioner-Pro Se, 7 v. 8 HON. KAREN PARSONS, 9 Chief Judge, Twelfth Judicial District, Div. III, 10 Respondent, 11 and 12 SANTIAGO VICTOR CARRILLO, 13 DIANA ATHENA MARTWICK, 14 Twelfth Judicial District Attorney, 15 THOMAS E. CLIFFORD, Secretary, 16 New Mexico Department Finance and 17 Administration, COMMISSION FOR THE 18 LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, and 19 JORGE ALVARADO, Chief, Law Office of the 20 Public Defender, 21 Real Parties in Interest. 22 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 1 Liane E. Kerr 2 Albuquerque, NM 3 for Petitioner-Pro Se 4 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 5 James C. Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General 6 Albuquerque, NM 7 for Respondent 8 Gary C. Mitchell, P.C. 9 Gary C. Mitchell 10 Ruidoso, NM 11 for Real Party in Interest Santiago Victor Carrillo 12 Office of the District Attorney 13 Diana Athena Martwick, Special Prosecutor 14 Matthew R. Wade 15 Khouldoud E. Pearson 16 Carrizozo, NM 17 for Real Party in Interest Diana Athena Martwick 18 New Mexico Department of Finance and Administration 19 Rebecca Barbara Jackson 20 Paul M. Kippert 21 Santa Fe, NM 22 Sheehan & Sheehan, P.A. 23 Barbara G. Stephenson 24 Leah M. Stevens-Block 25 Albuquerque, NM 1 for Real Party in Interest Thomas E. Clifford 2 Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Schoenburg & Bienvenu, LLP 3 Mark H. Donatelli 4 Marc M. Lowry 5 Maggie H. Lane 6 Santa Fe, NM 7 for Real Party in Interest New Mexico Public Defender Commission 8 Robert A. Mead, Special Assistant Attorney General 9 Karl Erich Martell, Special Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Real Party in Interest Jorge A. Alvarado 12 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 13 Brian Parrish, Assistant Attorney General 14 Sean Cuniff, Assistant Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Amicus Curiae Legislative Finance Committee of the New Mexico Legislature 1 OPINION 2 NAKAMURA, Justice. 3 {1} On petition for a writ of superintending control, we are called upon to review 4 an order issued by the Twelfth Judicial District Court in the criminal prosecutions 5 against Santiago Carrillo. The district court’s order held that the flat-fee rates paid 6 to indigent defense contract counsel by the Law Office of the Public Defender 7 (LOPD) contravened the right to counsel and nullified the Legislature’s prohibition 8 of the payment of hourly rates to contract counsel. The district court also issued a 9 remedial order directing the LOPD to pay every contract attorney no less than $85 per 10 hour and the State to provide the funding necessary for the LOPD to render such 11 compensation. We hold that the General Appropriations Act of 2015, Chapter 101, 12 Section 4(C) of New Mexico Laws of 2015, does not violate the right to the effective 13 assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 14 Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution. We do not 15 presume that the flat-fee rates paid to Carrillo’s contract attorney violate his right to 16 counsel. Accordingly, we grant the writ of superintending control, vacate the district 17 court’s orders, and remand to the district court with instructions to proceed with the 18 State’s prosecutions against Carrillo. 19 I. BACKGROUND 1 A. The funding of public defender contract attorneys 2 {2} In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to the effective 3 assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.M. Const. art. II, § 14. The Indigent 4 Defense Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 31-16-1 to -10 (1968), and the Public Defender 5 Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 31-15-1 to -12 (1973, as amended through 2014), frame 6 the statutory scheme by which the State ensures that counsel is provided to indigent 7 defendants. These statutes effectuate the constitutional right of counsel for the 8 defense of criminal charges. State v. Rascon, 1976-NMSC-016 , ¶ 5, 89 N.M. 254 , [9] 550 P.2d 266 . 10 {3} Under the Public Defender Act, the district public defender shall represent 11 every person without counsel who is financially unable to obtain counsel and who is 12 charged in any court in the district with any crime that carries a possible sentence of 13 imprisonment. NMSA 1978, § 31-15-10(C) (2001). If the district public defender 14 is unable to represent a person entitled to representation, the district public defender 15 shall notify the chief public defender. § 31-15-10(E). Where the LOPD lacks a 16 district office, or where the chief public defender has been alerted by a district public 17 defender of an inability to represent a person entitled to representation, the chief 18 public defender is required to provide representation by other means. Id.; see also [2] 1 NMSA 1978, § 31-15-7(A)(1) (2014). To that end, the LOPD may contract with 2 private attorneys to serve as counsel. See § 31-15-7(B)(11). In accordance with the 3 Procurement Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 13-1-28 to -199 (1984, as amended through 4 2016), the LOPD issues Requests for Proposals to elicit proposals from private 5 attorneys seeking to provide contract counsel. It then selects which candidates will 6 be offered contracts to provide indigent defense services. 7 {4} The roles of the legislative and executive branches in funding contract defense 8 counsel are clearly established. The Legislature delegated to the chief public 9 defender the authority to formulate a fee schedule for the compensation of indigent 10 defense contract counsel. § 31-15-7(B)(11). The expenses of the LOPD are “paid by 11 warrants of the secretary of finance and administration, supported by vouchers signed 12 by the chief [public defender] or the chief’s authorized representative and in 13 accordance with budgets approved by the state budget division of the department of 14 finance and administration.” NMSA 1978, § 31-15-5(B) (2013). Those budgets are 15 funded by appropriation legislation. See, e.g., 2015 N.M. Laws, ch. 101, § 4(C). 16 {5} Prior to 2014, the chief public defender had established a flat-fee schedule for 17 contract attorneys in all noncapital cases. In 2014, the rates paid to contract counsel 18 in Lincoln County were as follows: $180 per misdemeanor case, $250 per juvenile 19 case, $540 per fourth-degree felony case, $595 per third-degree felony case, $650 per [3] 1 second-degree felony case, and $700 per first-degree felony case, as determined by 2 the highest degree crime charged. The Legislature provides the funding for such 3 payments to contract counsel by appropriation legislation. See, e.g., General 4 Appropriations Act of 2016, H.B. 2, § 4, 52nd Leg., 2nd Sess. (N.M. 2016), available 5 at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/16%20Regular/final/HB0002.pdf (last viewed 6 May 17, 2016). In the General Appropriations Act of 2014, the Legislature 7 appropriated $10,653,600 to the Public Defender Department for the provision of 8 contractual services. 2014 N.M. Laws, ch. 63, § 4(C). 9 {6} We note that on September 2, 2014, the New Mexico Public Defender 10 Commission and the LOPD submitted a budget request for fiscal year 2016. See New 11 Mexico Public Defender Commission FY16 Budget Request, 12 http://nmcdla.org/docs/Budget%20Request%20Narrative%20FY2016.pdf 13 (henceforward “NMPDC FY16 Budget Requestion”) (last viewed May 17, 2016). 14 See also Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003 , ¶ 47 n. 7, 316 P.3d 865 (“[T]his 15 Court—or any court, trial or appellate—may take judicial notice of legislative facts 16 by resorting to whatever materials it may have at its disposal establishing or tending 17 to establish those facts.” (alteration original)); Attorney Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. 18 Comm’n, 1991-NMSC-028 , ¶ 24, 111 N.M. 636 , 808 P.2d 606 (noting our authority 19 to take judicial notice of agency actions); Rule 11-201 NMRA. The submission was [4] 1 the Commission’s first budget request. The Commission and the LOPD requested 2 over $96 million for the operation of the Public Defender Department. This budget 3 request contemplated an hourly compensation of contract counsel at $85 per hour, 4 and it estimated the costs of such compensation to be $45,726,000—more than four 5 times the 2014 appropriation for contractual services. Around the same time, in 6 November 2014, the LOPD and the Public Defender Commission established an 7 hourly rate for compensation, subject to upper limits, known as “markers,” for 8 contract counsel in five counties: Roosevelt County, Lea County, Lincoln County, 9 Luna County, and Eddy County. The LOPD and the Public Defender Commission 10 set hourly rates for the compensation of contract attorneys to ensure the provision of 11 adequate indigent defense counsel in those counties. 12 {7} The Legislature responded to the LOPD’s and the Commission’s request of 13 $45,726,000 for contractual services by appropriating $12,840,800 for the same. 14 2015 N.M. Laws, ch. 101, § 4(C). When making this appropriation the Legislature 15 explicitly provided that “[t]he appropriations to the public defender department shall 16 not be used to pay hourly reimbursement rates to contract attorneys.” Id. (emphasis 17 added). It appears that the Legislature’s condition on the appropriation for 18 contractual services was a reaction to the Commission’s large request for contractual [5] 1 services, which was based on the Commission’s plan to compensate contract 2 attorneys at a rate of $85 per hour. For instance, during the May 21, 2015, State 3 Board of Finance Meeting to consider an Emergency Funding Request by the LOPD, 4 Department of Finance and Administration Secretary Thomas Clifford indicated that 5 the Legislature included language in the 2015 appropriations statute to prohibit 6 hourly rates because the Legislature understood that the Commission’s plan to pay 7 contract counsel $85 per hour was the predominant cause of the Commission’s 8 significant budget request for fiscal year 2016. 9 {8} On June 29, 2015, in the matter of State v. Carrillo, the Twelfth Judicial 10 District Court decided that the Legislature’s requirement that the appropriation 11 designated for contract counsel shall not be used to pay hourly rates violated the right 12 to the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 13 United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution. 14 The district court issued an order entitled “Order Declaring Limits for Payment to 15 Contractors in Order for Contractors to Provide Effective Assistance of Counsel,” 16 which in relevant part provided: 17 The flat fee rates heretofore paid and to be paid to contractors/conflict 18 attorneys by and through the Law Offices of the Public Defender for 19 fiscal years 2016 and preceding fiscal years is not sufficient to comply 20 with Gideon v. Wainwright[], 372 U.S. 335 (1963), it is therefore [6] 1 ordered the State properly fund effective assistance of counsel for 2 indigent defendants and is therefore unconstitutional both under the 3 United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution; 4 The Public Defender Department shall pay to each and every 5 contractor no less than $85.00 per hour plus GRT (gross receipts tax) for 6 the attorney and $35.00 an hour plus GRT for staff, with appropriate 7 markers . . . together with costs of copies and postage to be sent to 8 indigent clients and/or other attorneys and experts, the costs of 9 transportation and overnight stay paid based on the New Mexico State 10 Per Diem rates and rules, and the costs of collect calls from the client to 11 the attorney; so the attorney may have at least the bare minimum of 12 monies to provide the effective representation necessary. 13 The district court’s order in State v. Carrillo precipitated the instant petition, and we 14 now turn to that case. 15 B. The district court orders that are the subject of review 16 {9} In the exercise of our power of superintending control, we may take judicial 17 notice of the proceedings in the district court. Rule 11-201 NMRA; see also State v. 18 Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, ¶ 13 , 123 N.M. 14 , 933 P.2d 223 (“[W]e may take judicial 19 notice of the record on file in this Court.”); but cf. Richardson Ford Sales v. 20 Cummins, 1964-NMSC-128 , ¶ 5, 74 N.M. 271 , 393 P.2d 11 (noting that on appeal the 21 facts necessary to present a question for review must be established by a certified 22 record). On November 28, 2012, the State filed a criminal complaint against Carrillo, 23 charging him with counts of voyeurism, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-20 24 (2007), possession of a controlled substance, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31- [7] 1 23(E) (2011), and possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 2 30-31-25.1 (2011). On December 21, 2012, Charles Hawthorne filed an entry of 3 appearance to represent Carrillo against the charges. On January 3, 2014, Hawthorn 4 moved to withdraw as Carrillo’s counsel because Carrillo had not remained in contact 5 and had not paid Hawthorn. The district court granted that motion on January 6, 6 2014. 7 {10} On January 23, 2014, the State filed a criminal information against Carrillo, 8 charging him with criminal sexual penetration in the third degree, contrary to NMSA 9 1978, Section 30-9-11(F) (2009). Shortly thereafter, on January 28 and 29, 2014, 10 Gary Mitchell entered an appearance to represent Carrillo as contract counsel against 11 both prosecutions. 12 {11} On April 23, 2014, Carrillo filed a motion in the first case requesting the 13 district court to compel the State to provide sufficient funds to his contract counsel 14 so that his attorney could provide effective assistance and to stay proceedings in the 15 matter until the State provided such funding. The district court understood the 16 motion to pertain to both prosecutions and held hearings on Carrillo’s motion on 17 September 23, 2014, and October 1, 2014. The district court issued an interim order 18 on December 4, 2014, making the LOPD a party to the case and requiring the LOPD [8] 1 to compensate Mitchell a minimum of $85 per hour to represent indigent defendants 2 in all cases assigned to him (including Carrillo’s cases), but not to exceed a total 3 compensation per case as set by the markers established by the Commission, on pain 4 of dismissal. 5 {12} On December 11, 2014, the LOPD filed an emergency motion to reconsider 6 and to stay the execution of the interim order. The LOPD argued that the district 7 court’s interim order would affect its operations statewide and that it could not 8 immediately implement the order without compromising representation in other 9 counties. On January 10, 2015, and March 23, 2015, the district court held hearings 10 to consider the LOPD’s motion to reconsider and stay. 11 {13} On April 15, 2015, Carrillo moved to dismiss his criminal complaint because 12 “no indigent person can be prosecuted unless and until the defendant has an attorney 13 who receives sufficient funds from the State to provide effective assistance of 14 counsel.” On June 4, 2015, after he became aware of the Legislature’s condition that 15 the appropriation designated for contract counsel should not be used to pay hourly 16 rates, Carrillo moved the district court to declare that the provision contravened his 17 right to the effective assistance of counsel. 18 {14} On June 29, 2015, the district court held a hearing on all pending motions. [9] 1 Shortly thereafter, it issued four orders: First, the district court entered an order 2 nullifying the provision of the General Appropriation Act of 2015’s prohibition of the 3 payment of hourly rates to contract counsel as violative of the Federal Constitution 4 and the New Mexico Constitution. Second, based on its conclusion that the flat-fee 5 rates paid to contract counsel by the LOPD contravene the constitutional guarantee 6 of effective assistance of counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 7 the district court ordered the State to “properly fund effective assistance of counsel” 8 and required the LOPD to pay “each and every contractor no less than $85.00 per 9 hour” plus additional monies “so the attorney may have at least the bare minimum of 10 monies to provide the effective representation necessary.” Third, because the LOPD 11 represented that it could not comply with its orders due to lack of funding, the district 12 court entered an order staying the prosecutions against Carrillo unless and until the 13 State provides the funding and the LOPD pays Carrillo’s attorney the amounts 14 ordered by the Court. Fourth, the district court ordered the Sheriff of Lincoln 15 County to release Carrillo and imposed conditions on Carrillo’s release. 16 C. The petition for an extraordinary writ 17 {15} Liane Kerr is an attorney who has contracted with the LOPD to represent 18 indigent defendants for the past 23 years. On July 17, 2015, she filed a petition in [10] 1 this Court for a writ of superintending control or alternative writ to vacate the second 2 order the district court issued on June 29, 2015. The petition alleged that because the 3 LOPD lacked the funds to comply with this order, the LOPD’s attempt to comply 4 would precipitate insolvency and threaten its ability to honor the contracts of the 5 Petitioner and other contract counsel. The petition named the following real parties 6 in interest: Diana Martwick, the District Attorney for the Twelfth Judicial District; 7 Thomas Clifford, the Secretary of the Department of Finance and Administration; the 8 Commission and its members; and Jorge Alvarado, then the Chief Public Defender. 9 We received responses from each of those parties. We also accepted an amicus curiae 10 brief from the Legislative Finance Committee. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 A. Our exercise of superintending control 13 {16} Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution confers on this Court 14 “superintending control over all inferior courts” and the power to issue “writs 15 necessary or proper for the complete exercise of . . . [our] jurisdiction and to hear and 16 determine the same.” “The power of superintending control is the power to control 17 the course of ordinary litigation in inferior courts.” Dist. Court of Second Judicial 18 Dist. v. McKenna, 1994-NMSC-102 , ¶ 3, 118 N.M. 402 , 881 P.2d 1387 (internal [11] 1 quotation marks and citation omitted). In contrast to the writ of prohibition, the writ 2 of superintending control is not limited to the correction of jurisdictional errors. 3 Albuquerque Gas & Elec. Co. v. Curtis, 1939-NMSC-024 , ¶ 7, 43 N.M. 234 , 89 P.2d 4 615. Where appropriate, the power of superintending control permits this Court’s 5 interposition to correct any specie of error. See id. ¶¶ 7, 12-14. We may exercise our 6 power of superintending control to control the course of ordinary litigation “if the 7 remedy by appeal seems wholly inadequate.” McKenna, 1994-NMSC-102 , ¶ 4. We 8 may also exercise the power of superintending control “where it is deemed to be in 9 the public interest to settle the question involved at the earliest moment.” Griego v. 10 Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, ¶ 11 , 316 P.3d 865 (internal quotation marks and citation 11 omitted). 12 {17} The district court’s constitutional holding and remedial orders call for the 13 exercise of this power. The Commission’s budget request for fiscal year 2016 14 exceeded $45 million to compensate contract counsel at $85 per hour, and the 15 Legislature appropriated over $12 million for contract counsel in the same time 16 period. Merely looking to the discrepancy between the Legislature’s appropriation 17 and the Commission’s estimation of what statewide compensation of contract counsel 18 at $85 per hour would require, it is readily apparent that the LOPD’s attempt to [12] 1 comply fully with the district court’s order would threaten its ability to perform its 2 duties. Further, the district court’s order to stay Carrillo’s prosecutions until the State 3 provides the ordered funding and the LOPD pays the ordered funding to Carrillo’s 4 contract counsel jeopardizes the administration of criminal justice in New Mexico. 5 It is in the public interest to settle the dispositive issue in this case now. Accordingly, 6 we grant the petition and issue a writ of superintending control. 7 B. Neither the current flat-fee schedule nor the Legislature’s prohibition of 8 hourly compensation rates for contract counsel violate Carrillo’s right to 9 counsel 10 {18} The parties raise two issues: First, does the current flat-fee schedule for the 11 compensation of contract counsel, solidified by the Legislature’s requirement that the 12 LOPD not use the appropriation for contract counsel to pay hourly reimbursement 13 rates, violate the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and the 14 New Mexico Constitution? Second, did the district court’s remedial orders requiring 15 the State to fund compensation to contract counsel at $85 per hour and the LOPD to 16 pay such a rate to Carrillo’s counsel contravene the separation of powers as 17 established by Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution? Because we 18 decide the former issue, we do not reach the latter. 19 {19} In support of the district court’s order, Carrillo argues that the current flat-fee [13] 1 arrangement for the compensation of contract counsel impinges upon his right to the 2 effective assistance of counsel. The Commission makes a similar argument to 3 support the district court’s order and contends that the current flat-fee scheme violates 4 the right to counsel of any indigent defendant represented by contract counsel. Both 5 Carrillo and the Commission root their arguments in State v. Young, 2007-NMSC- 6 058, 143 N.M. 1 , 172 P.3d 138 , and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 7 {20} Ordinarily, to make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal 8 defendant needs to establish both that their counsel’s assistance was not objectively 9 reasonable and that but for the counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would 10 have been different. State v. Grogan, 2007-NMSC-039, ¶ 11 , 142 N.M. 107 , 163 11 P.3d 494 ; see generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984). Both 12 Carrillo and the Commission contend that the test for ineffective assistance under 13 Strickland is inapposite. We agree. Because the district court stayed the prosecutions 14 against Carrillo, we cannot address whether the results of those proceedings would 15 be different if Carrillo’s counsel were paid according to a different compensation 16 formula. 17 {21} Some circumstances, however, “are so likely to prejudice the accused that the 18 cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 14 1 658; see also Grogan, 2007-NMSC-039, ¶¶ 12-13 (noting circumstances where 2 courts may presume prejudice). In certain cases, “the likelihood that any 3 lawyer . . . could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of 4 prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Cronic, 5 466 U.S. at 659-60 (citation omitted). The presumption of prejudice is justified, for 6 example, where “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful 7 adversarial testing.” Id. at 659. 8 {22} In State v. Young, this Court applied Cronic to presume ineffective assistance 9 of counsel because the attorneys for the defendants in that capital case were “not 10 receiving adequate compensation.” 2007-NMSC-058, ¶ 18 . In Young, we decided 11 in a specific capital case that a flat-fee arrangement justified the presumption of 12 ineffective assistance. Id. Young was “one of the most complex death penalty cases 13 ever tried in New Mexico,” and the defendants were appointed contract attorneys who 14 contracted to provide representation through trial for a flat fee of $19,500 for each 15 first-chair attorney and $9,500 for each second-chair attorney. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. One 16 attorney estimated that she and her co-counsel would spend a total of 2334 hours on 17 the case and moved to withdraw. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12. This Court found “that the attorneys 18 for the defendants . . . [were] not receiving adequate compensation,” id. ¶ 12, that [15] 1 capital cases are extraordinarily expensive and require specialized skills, id. ¶¶ 14- 2 15, and that the Young case was “unusually protracted because of its extraordinary 3 complexity,” id. ¶ 18. This Court concluded that those facts justified “a presumption 4 of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. ¶ 18. 5 {23} Young guides our review. In Young, we expressly noted that the holding was 6 cinched to its facts. Id. ¶ 27. Young did not hold that a flat-fee arrangement 7 necessarily abridges the right to the effective assistance of counsel in capital cases. 8 See id. In fact, we expressly refused “to condemn a flat fee structure or cap in all 9 capital cases.” Id. ¶ 18. When we expressly refused to presume that a flat fee entails 10 ineffective assistance in all capital cases, we necessarily implied that we would not 11 presume that a flat fee entails ineffective assistance in all criminal cases. 12 {24} We find no basis to depart from Young now. We cannot assume that any 13 contract attorney in New Mexico who represents an indigent defendant under the 14 current flat-fee arrangement necessarily will be unable “to subject the prosecution’s 15 case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 . Such a presumption 16 is too great a leap from Young where we were only willing to presume ineffectiveness 17 based on a flat-fee contract for one extraordinarily complicated capital case. This 18 presumption would also constitute a huge departure from Cronic, where the United [16] 1 States Supreme Court suggested a willingness to presume ineffectiveness under 2 circumstances in which an indigent defendant effectively has no assistance at all. See [3] id. We cannot make that leap. In its response to the petition, the LOPD tellingly 4 stated that “Public Defender contractors provide effective assistance of counsel in 5 thousands of cases under the present flat-fee contract.” This concession undermines 6 the contention that this Court is justified to assume that an indigent defendant 7 necessarily receives ineffective assistance when represented by contract counsel who 8 is compensated at the current flat-fee rates. 9 {25} Carrillo argues that flat-fee contracts are problematic because they “are rife 10 with financial incentives for lawyers to do as little work on cases as possible.” But 11 this argument also fails to justify the presumption of ineffective assistance. The first 12 term in the professional service contract that the LOPD offers to contractors requires 13 a contracting attorney to provide legal services in accordance with the Sixth 14 Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New 15 Mexico Constitution. We assume that attorneys represent their clients honorably, 16 consistent with both their professional duties and the terms under which they contract 17 with the LOPD to provide indigent defense. See People v. Doolin, 198 P.3d 11 , 32- 18 33 (Cal. 2009) (finding that the state’s lump-sum compensation agreement did not [17] 1 create a conflict of interest between the defendant and his attorney). In light of the 2 LOPD’s representation that contract counsel provides effective assistance in 3 thousands of cases across the state, we do not think that the current flat-fee structure 4 undermines this assumption. We find no basis to presume that any indigent defendant 5 currently represented by contract counsel necessarily receives constitutionally 6 deficient assistance. Accordingly, we will not presume that Carrillo will necessarily 7 receive ineffective assistance because he is represented by contract counsel who is 8 compensated by the current flat-fee arrangement. 9 {26} We also note that our refusal to depart from Young does not etch into stone the 10 fees currently paid to indigent defense contract counsel. The Legislature delegated 11 to the chief public defender the authority to formulate a fee schedule for the 12 compensation of contract counsel. In Chapter 101, Section 4(C) of New Mexico 13 Laws of 2015, the Legislature appropriated funds for contract counsel on the 14 condition that the appropriation not be used to pay fees based on hourly rates. We 15 note that the Legislature recently carried that condition forward in the General 16 Appropriations Act of 2016. H.B. 2, § 4, 52nd Leg., 2nd Sess. (N.M. 2016), available 17 at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/16%20Regular/final/HB0002.pdf (last viewed 18 May 17, 2016) (“Appropriations to the public defender department shall not be used [18] 1 to pay hourly rates to contract attorneys.”). 2 {27} “We have consistently maintained that the Legislature has the power to affix 3 reasonable provisions, conditions or limitations upon appropriations and upon the 4 expenditure of the funds appropriated.” See State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 1988- 5 NMSC-057, ¶ 17, 107 N.M. 439 , 759 P.2d 1380 (internal quotation marks and 6 citations omitted). On the facts presented, we do not conclude that the Legislature’s 7 condition is unreasonable. The chief public defender retains the discretion to 8 formulate a fee schedule that would establish higher flat fees than those currently paid 9 to contract attorneys. Moreover, the Legislature’s condition that appropriations for 10 contract counsel not be used to pay hourly rates is not itself constitutionally fixed; it 11 may yet be resolved by the normal democratic process. Therefore, while we 12 appreciate the roles and challenges of the LOPD, the Commission, and contract 13 counsel statewide to effectuate the rights of the criminally accused, we do not see that 14 a constitutional prohibition on flat fees is necessary to ensure those rights. 15 {28} While we note the Legislature’s broad power to appropriate funds and to affix 16 limitations on those appropriations, see Carruthers, 1988-NMSC-057 , ¶ 17, we also 17 recognize that some limitations on funding for the provision of indigent defense could 18 be so severe as to create a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel in [19] 1 particular cases. See Young, 2007-NMSC-058, ¶¶ 9-12 ; cf. also Lavellee v. Justices 2 in the Hamden Super. Ct., 812 N.E.2d 895 , 901 (Mass. 2004) (holding that scheme 3 for the provision of indigent defense, including a budget appropriation to fund county 4 bar advocates program, violated the Massachusetts constitutional right to counsel). 5 It is beyond our power to advise the Legislature as to which hypothetical limitations 6 on the funding of indigent defense would engender such a presumption. See Bell Tel. 7 Labs., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 1966-NMSC-253 , ¶ 39, 78 N.M. 78 , 428 P.2d 617 . 8 (“This court does not give advisory opinions.”). Nevertheless, we confront no 9 obstacle in saying that the rights to the effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed 10 by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 11 of the New Mexico Constitution, impose real constraints on the Legislature’s exercise 12 of its power to limit the funding necessary to the provision of indigent criminal 13 defense in New Mexico. Today, we hold on the record before us that the General 14 Appropriations Act of 2015, Chapter 101, Section 4(C) of New Mexico Laws of 15 2015, does not infringe constitutional guarantees to the effective assistance of 16 counsel. Future cases, however, presenting other record facts, could precipitate our 17 duty to enforce those same constitutional rights. 18 C. We do not reach the separation-of-powers issue [20] 1 {29} The district court’s remedial order that the State fund compensation to contract 2 counsel at $85 per hour and that the LOPD pay such a rate to Carrillo’s counsel 3 threatens to intrude into the prerogatives of the coordinate branches of government. 4 Whether the district court’s remedial order violates the separation of powers, 5 however, is a more complicated question and involves the subsidiary issue of whether 6 the district court had the inherent power to issue an order to compel funding. Cf. 7 State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 1993-NMSC-033 , ¶ 3, 115 N.M. 573 , 855 P.2d 8 562 (“There is no doubt that the judiciary has the inherent authority to guarantee the 9 enforcement of constitutional civil liberty protections in criminal prosecutions.”). 10 {30} We do not address whether the district court’s remedial order contravenes the 11 separation of powers because it is unnecessary to the disposition of this case. See 12 Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 28 , 267 P.3d 806 (“It is an enduring principle 13 of constitutional jurisprudence that courts will avoid deciding constitutional questions 14 unless required to do so.”). Where there is no violation of a right, a court lacks the 15 power to compel an officer of a coordinate branch of government to perform a duty. 16 See, e.g., State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-036, ¶ 12 , 128 N.M. 154 , 990 17 P.2d 1277 (“[A] writ of mandamus is available only to one who has a clear legal right 18 to the performance sought . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); [21] 1 Schein v. N. Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 1997-NMSC-011, ¶ 22 , 122 N.M. 800 , 932 2 P.2d 490 (“Relevant rights and duties must be established before a writ of mandamus 3 can issue.”). Hence, only if the current flat-fee arrangement and the General 4 Appropriations Act of 2015, Chapter 101, Section 4(C) of New Mexico Laws of 5 2015, violated a right held by Carrillo did the district court have the power to issue 6 the remedial order in dispute. Because the current flat-fee arrangement for the 7 compensation of indigent defense contract counsel and the legislation prohibiting 8 hourly reimbursement rates to contract counsel do not violate Carrillo’s right to the 9 effective assistance of counsel, we conclude that the district court lacked the power 10 to issue a remedial order directing the LOPD to pay hourly rates and the State to 11 provide additional funding. Accordingly, we need not reach whether that order 12 violated the separation of powers. 13 CONCLUSION 14 {31} For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for a writ of superintending 15 control and vacate the following orders of the district court: the December 2, 2014, 16 Interim Order; the June 29, 2015, Order Declaring the Prohibition Against Hourly 17 Rates to Contractors Unconstitutional; the June 29, 2015, Order Declaring Limits for 18 Payment to Contractors in Order for Contractors to Provide Effective Assistance of [22] 1 Counsel; and the June 30, 2015, Order Granting Stay of Proceedings and Releasing 2 Defendant from Custody. We do not vacate the June 20, 2015, Release Order, and we 3 remand to the district court with instructions to modify the release order if appropriate 4 and proceed with the State’s prosecutions against Carrillo. 5 {32} IT IS SO ORDERED. [6] 7 ______________________________ 8 JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice 9 WE CONCUR: 10 _________________________________ 11 CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice 12 ___________________________________ 13 PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice 14 _________________________________ 15 EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice 16 BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice, specially concurring [23] 1 VIGIL, Justice (specially concurring). 2 {33} The instant appeal highlights a chronic problem that plagues the criminal 3 justice system in New Mexico. The district court characterized the “major issue” in 4 this case as “the failure by the State of New Mexico . . . to provide sufficient funds 5 to pay for effective assistance of counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases.” 6 Thus, the district court’s orders were in direct response to a perceived crisis, fueled 7 by a shortage in human and financial resources available to the LOPD for its work in 8 Lincoln County. And because it is ultimately the duty of the courts to ensure the 9 protection of constitutional rights, the district court took action. Although I agree 10 with the holding and legal analysis laid out in the majority opinion explaining why 11 those orders must be vacated, I write separately to discuss other facets of this 12 important case which I believe are deserving of attention. 13 {34} In its landmark 1963 opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 344 14 (1963) the United States Supreme Court held that the obligation to ensure that 15 indigent defendants have access to counsel falls on the State, and where a defendant 16 cannot afford an attorney, the State is responsible for providing counsel “in order to 17 ensure fairness” in the proceedings. State v Brown, 2006-NMSC-023 , ¶ 12, 139 N.M. 18 466, 134 P.3d 753 . In response to Gideon, the New Mexico Legislature enacted the [24] 1 Indigent Defense Act (IDA), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-16-1 to -10 (1968), and the Public 2 Defender Act (PDA), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-15-1 to -12 (1973, as amended through 3 2014). The IDA specifically mandates that “[t]he attorney, services and facilities and 4 expenses and court costs shall be provided at public expense for needy persons.” 5 Section 31-16-3(A). The PDA created a centralized public defender department 6 (Department) and provides that the “public defender shall represent every person 7 without counsel who is financially unable to obtain counsel and who is charged . . . 8 with any crime that carries a possible sentence of imprisonment.” Section 31-15- 9 10(C) (emphasis added). 10 {35} Prior to these enactments, it was the responsibility of the courts to appoint 11 counsel upon a finding that a defendant could not afford to hire an attorney. See, e.g., 12 State v. Anaya, 1966-NMSC-144 , ¶ 13, 76 N.M. 572 , 417 P.2d 58 (“When the offense 13 with which the defendant is charged is punishable by imprisonment in the 14 penitentiary, the court is required to assign counsel ‘if the prisoner has not the 15 financial means to procure counsel[.]’ ” (citation omitted)). In New Mexico and 16 elsewhere, these appointed attorneys were not paid for their services. However, 17 systems in which attorneys were required to provide representation for free or very 18 little money have not passed constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, courts in several [25] 1 jurisdictions have determined that the failure to provide reasonable compensation for 2 legal services amounts to a taking of property, in violation of the attorney’s Fifth 3 Amendment rights. See, e.g., DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 , 442 4 (Alaska 1987) (“[A] court appointment compelling an attorney to represent an 5 indigent criminal defendant is a taking of property for which just compensation is 6 required.”); Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 302 (1991), holding modified by State v. 7 Post, 311 Ark. 510 (1993) (“[T]he burden imposed on [the attorneys] is excessive to 8 the extent that it constitutes a ‘taking’ of their property and to limit them to a mere 9 award of $1,000.00 for their work and skills is constitutionally unacceptable.”); State 10 ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 370 (1987) (“When the attorney is required 11 to advance expense funds out-of-pocket for an indigent, without full reimbursement, 12 the system violates the Fifth Amendment. Similarly, when an attorney is required to 13 spend an unreasonable amount of time on indigent appointments so that there is 14 genuine and substantial interference with his or her private practice, the system 15 violates the Fifth Amendment.”). While New Mexico courts still retain the authority 16 to appoint counsel, since the enactment of the PDA, the Department has the 17 responsibilities of determining eligibility and providing counsel to indigent 18 defendants, and it pays those attorneys using appropriations it receives from the [26] 1 Legislature. See State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 1993-NMSC-033 , ¶ 12, 115 N.M. 2 573, 855 P.2d 562 (explaining that the Department has the statutory authority to 3 establish indigency guidelines and, while courts should defer to the department’s 4 determinations, they “retain the ultimate authority to determine indigence and the 5 discretionary ability to order the appointment of a public defender when it is 6 necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional or statutory rights”). 7 {36} Over time, the Department has had to fulfill its duties with extremely limited 8 resources as it strives to provide the highest quality representation possible. The 9 Department recently underwent a significant change in its structure in 2012, when the 10 voters of New Mexico approved a state constitutional amendment to establish a 11 “public defender commission” to oversee the “public defender department . . . as an 12 independent state agency” and “provide guidance to the chief public defender in the 13 administration of the department and representation of indigent persons.” N.M. Const. 14 art. VI, § 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to the amendment, the 15 Department was “administratively attached” to the executive branch, and the 16 governor had the power to appoint the chief public defender. See § 31-15-4(A), (C) 17 (1985); compare § 31-15-5(A) (1978) with § 31-15-5(A) (2013). Now the Department 18 is overseen and the chief public defender is appointed by the independent [27] 1 commission. Section 31-15-4(A) (2013). Yet, the State’s obligation to pay the costs 2 of indigent defense through the funding of the Department remains unchanged. See 3 Section 31-15-5(B) (remaining essentially unchanged after 2013 amendments). 4 {37} The instant constitutional challenge to the Department’s fee schedule for 5 providing payment to contract defense counsel throughout Lincoln County was 6 presented in the context of one defendant’s case. Defense counsel argued that while 7 the lack of resources provided to him by the Department has made it difficult to 8 render effective representation, he would nonetheless be able to provide 9 constitutionally effective assistance to his client in this case. Defense counsel relies 10 upon Cronic and Young to support his constitutional claim, but as set forth in the 11 majority opinion, those cases each address a situation in which circumstances 12 surrounding a case impacted the defense attorneys’ ability to provide effective 13 representation in that particular case, not the type of systemic or structural problem 14 that the district court attempted to address below. Accordingly, the record before us 15 does not present a sufficient basis for declaring there has been a denial of the right to 16 effective assistance of counsel based on the wages paid to contract criminal defense 17 attorneys in Lincoln County. 18 {38} Other jurisdictions have been called upon to address structural problems like [28] 1 underfunding or low attorney compensation which amounted to a systematic 2 deprivation of the right to counsel. In such cases, 3 the focus is not on a post-hoc historical review of a criminal trial, but is 4 instead based on the structure through which indigent defense is 5 provided by the state. A structural challenge involves a realistic 6 assessment of whether the state has provided an adequate framework for 7 ensuring that the right to counsel is realized in cases involving indigent 8 defense. 9 Simmons v. State Pub. Def., 791 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Iowa 2010). Low pay for contract 10 counsel has been the basis of some structural challenges, and where the pay is so low 11 that it has resulted in a shortage of attorneys necessary to represent all defendants in 12 need, courts have found that such arrangements do not satisfy a state’s obligation to 13 provide counsel. See, e.g., Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 442 14 Mass. 228 , 246 (2004) (concluding there was a constitutional violation where low pay 15 for contract attorneys had led so many of those attorneys to discontinue taking on 16 contract cases that the nineteen petitioners had no lawyer to assist them during their 17 arraignments or bail hearings); N.Y. Cty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. N.Y., 763 N.Y.S.2d 397 , 18 399-400 (2003) (holding that the state’s failure to increase the rates paid to contract 19 counsel “violates the constitutional and statutory right to meaningful and effective 20 representation” because it had caused a shortage of attorneys and led to court delays, 21 denial of counsel, and ineffective assistance by the remaining attorneys who shoulder [29] 1 larger caseloads). At least one court has also found there was a constitutional 2 violation where defendants received appointed counsel, but the attorneys were paid 3 so low and had so many cases that it was “virtually impossible that the lawyer, no 4 matter how competent or diligent, [would] be able to provide effective assistance.” 5 Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1132 (W.D. Wash. 2013). In 6 Wilbur, the court found that the total payments to contract counsel worked out to $10 7 or less per case and concluded that this violated the defendants’ right to counsel. Id. 8 {39} In the absence of a constitutional violation, it is imperative in the 9 administration of justice that we respect the independence of the Department and the 10 Commission and refrain from interfering with their internal management decisions. 11 See ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System 2, (February 2002), 12 http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_d 13 efendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf (last viewed May 27, 14 2016) (emphasizing the importance of having a public defense function that is 15 “independent from political influence and subject to judicial supervision only in the 16 same manner and to the same extent as retained counsel”). It is the role of the chief 17 public defender and Commission to determine how best to allocate resources for the 18 functions of the Department as a whole. These administrators are legally responsible [30] 1 for deciding how to use the available funding in a manner most beneficial to the 2 overall needs of the Department. The judiciary will only intervene when presented 3 with a case that demonstrates that the Department’s operations violate the 4 constitution, either because of unlawful managerial decisions or a lack of resources 5 necessary for providing the effective representation required under our Constitution 6 and statutes. 7 {40} Keeping New Mexicans safe is the ultimate goal of our criminal justice system, 8 but we cannot expect this noble goal to be achieved without adequately funding all 9 the public partners responsible for the fair administration of justice, including law 10 enforcement agencies, district attorney’s offices, the public defender department, 11 independent crime laboratories, and the judiciary. Failure to fund the criminal justice 12 system will undermine the intended effect of laws enacted to ensure public safety. 13 While the record in the instant case did not demonstrate a constitutional violation, it 14 is a reminder that a system that effectively ensures public safety and protects 15 constitutional rights comes at substantial fiscal cost. Accordingly, I respectfully 16 concur. 17 ______________________________ 18 BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice