Deidra Lintz v. John Potter

MEMORANDUM *** Deidra A. Lintz appeals pro se from the district court’s orders denying Lintz’s post-judgment motions in her employment discrimination action. We have jurisdiction *285 under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993), and we affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lintz’s motions for reconsideration because Lintz failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Garamendi v. Henin, 683 F.3d 1069, 1077-80 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth standard of review and factors warranting reconsideration under Rule 60(a)); Sch. Dist. No. U, 5 F.3d at 1262-63 (grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). We do not consider Lintz’s contentions regarding the merits of the district court’s original entry of summary judgment, or other prior rulings, because Lintz failed timely to file a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of judgment); Fed. R. App. P, 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), (vi) (required timing for post-judgment tolling motions); Swimmer v. IRS, 811 F.2d 1343, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (second motion for reconsideration does not toll time to appeal underlying judgment), abrogated on other grounds by Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1997); Fiester v. Turner, 783 F.2d 1474, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986) (“An untimely motion for reconsideration does not suspend the time to appeal from the judgment.”). We reject as unsupported by the record Lintz’s contentions that her “Rule 52 motion” was improperly docketed as a declaration, and that the district court erred in denying her motions without a hearing. AFFIRMED. Footnotes [***] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.