Hardin v. Tucker

Hart, C. J., (after stating the facts). In Singer v. Naron, 99 Ark. 446, 138 S. W. 958, it was held that, in order for the possession of a tenant in common to be adverse to that of his cotenants, knowledge of his adverse claim must be brought home to them directly or by such notorious acts of unequivocal character that notice may be presumed. The reason is that the possession of one tenant in common is prima facie the possession of all, and the sole enjoyment of rents and profits by him does not necessarily amount to a disseizin. Hence, ■for the possession of one tenant in common to be adverse to that of his cotenants, knowledge of his adverse claim must be brought home to them directly or by such acts that notice may be presumed. Oliver v. Howie, 170 Ark. 758, 281 S. W. 17, and Bowers v. Rightsell, 173 Ark. 788, 294 S. W. 21. Tested by this well-settled principle of law, we do not think it can be said that the finding of the chancellor is against the preponderance of the evidence. The record shows that J. R. Hardin died owning the land, leaving his widow and three children. By some sort of family arrangement, a grandson of J. R. Hardin was put in possession of the land in order to help support his grandmother. He lived with her and supported her, so far as the record discloses, until she died, a few years thereafter. His mother, who owned a one-third interest in the land, conveyed her interest to him, and a child of a sister of his mother conveyed her one-ninth interest to him, so that he became the owner of a four-ninths interest. After his mother died he conveyed his interest to the appellee. None of the other heirs paid any part of the taxes on the land or asserted ownership in it in any way. They' knew that their mother had died and that there was no occasion for the grandson to longer remain in the possession of the land for her benefit. They permitted the land to forfeit for taxes in 1908, after their mother had died. Appellee went into possession of the land in November, 1909, and claimed it as his own until this suit was brought,.in June, 1926. During all this time appellants made no effort to redeem the land from the tax sale or to assert any rights in it. It is inferable from the record that they knew that F. M. Hardin had conveyed the land to some one, and that his grantee was in possession of it. Under these .circumstances we think the chancellor was justified in finding as a fact. that appellee had acquired title to the land by adverse possession. The decree will therefore be affirmed.