Hays v. Goodwin

Hart J., (after stating the facts). T¡he evidence clearly shows that Francis Goodwin, in his lifetime exchanged a lot owned by him with the Methodist Church for the lot in controversy. The exchange was made in this way: Goodwin purchased the lot, and had the deed made direct to the Methodist Church; the trustees accepted the deed to the lot, and erected a church on it ; possession of the lot in controversy was taken by Francis Goodwin under the agreement, and in this way the exchange was consummated. If is true that no- deed or other instrument in writing was given to Francis Goodwin, but the oral contract for the exchange of the lots was taken out of the statute of frauds by the fact that Francis Goodwin entered into possession of the lot in controversy, and caused the lot which he had given in exchange for it to be conveyed to the Methodist Church. This is sufficient part performance of the contract to take the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds. Carnahan v. Terral Bros., 137 Ark. 107; Newton v. Mathis, 110 Ark. 252; Kilgore Lbr. Co. v Halley, 110 Ark 118; Beattie v. Smith, 116 Ark. 532; and Wilkinson v. James, 161 Ark. 175. It does not make any difference whether either Francis Goodwin or T. C, Goodwin has remained in the actual continuous and adverse possession of the lot in question so as to obtain the title by adverse possession. The title was obtained by the oral contract for the exchange of the lots, which was consummated by Francis Goodwin’s taking possession of the lot in controversy and paying the consideration therefor, which was done by causing a deed to the lot given in exchange for it to be made to the Methodist Church. After the exchange had been consummated by taking possession of the lot and paying the consideration therefor, it did not make any difference whether either Francis Goodwin or T. C. Goodwin remained in the continuous, adverse possession of the lot for the statutory period. The title by the exchange bad passed out of the church, and it did not make any difference to it or its trustees what the purchaser did with the lot. It is next objected that T. C. Goodwin did not have title to the lot, and could not maintain this action. On this point T. C. Goodwin testified that the lot belonged to his father’s estate, and that, after his death, be received a deed from the other heirs of his father to the lot. His testimony in this respect was not attempted to be contradicted. It follows that the decree was correct, and will be affirmed.