Smith v. School District No. 89

Johnson, C. J., (after stating the facts). The trial court erred in submitting this controversy to a jury. The uncontradicted testimony shows that no' valid contract was made between appellant as a teacher and the appellee district. The testimony of Mr. Meadows, quoted in the statement of facts, demonstrates that the minds of the parties never met upon the terms and conditions of the contract of employment. Appellant had applied for the position of teacher for a nine months’ period at a salary of $95 per month. A majority of the board refused to employ him at this salary. A majority of the board also agreed that they would employ Mr. Smith as a teacher for the approaching term at $90 per month, and that this reduction of salary would be taken up with appellant for his acceptance, but this did not make a contract between the parties. The contract was actually made and consummated when appellant agreed to teach the school at $90 per month, which occurred some four or five days after the board meeting. All the witnesses agreed that no meeting of the board was had after March 20. Therefore the board was not in session when this contract was finally executed. It is elementary law that, where a party submits an dffer of a contract, this offer must be accepted without reservations. Any reservations or limitations in the acceptance in law is a rejection of the offer. The rule is well stated in 6 R. C. L., § 31, page 608, as follows: “* * *The acceptance (of the terms of a contract) must likewise be unequivocal and unconditional. If to the acceptance of the proposal a condition be affixed before the party to whom the offer is made, or any modification or change in the offer be made or requested, there is a rejection of the offer.” The rule is stated as follows in 13 C. J., § 86: “An acceptance, to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and unconditional. Where a person offers to do a definite thing, and another accepts conditionally or introduces a new term into the acceptance, his answer is either a mere expression of willingness to treat or it is a counter proposal, and in neither case is there an agreement. This is true, for example, where an acceptance varies from the offer as to time of performance, place of performance, price, quantity, quality, and in other like cases.” In the case of Weaver v. Gay, 31 W. Va. 736, 8 S. E. 743, 3 L. R. A. 94, quoting from the third paragraph of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of West Virginia held: “If to the acceptance of such proposal a condition be affixed by the party to whom the offer is made, or any modification or change in the offer be made or rejected, this will in law constitute a rejection of the offer.” The Supreme Court of North Dakota stated the rule as follows, in the case of Horgan v. Russell, 24 N. D. 490, 140 N. W. 99, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1150: “It is the settled law of this State that, -before an acceptance of an offer becomes a binding contract, the-acceptance must be unconditional, and must accept the offer without modification or the -imposition of new terms.” Since appellant had no valid contract with appellee district, he is not entitled to recover herein. This view of the situation makes it unnecessary for us to discuss or determine other questions presented in briefs. Since the judgment entered by the trial court is the only lawful one which could have been entered under the facts in this case, the- same is in all things affirmed. Kirby and Butler, JJ., dissent.