Beckler v. Snerly

Hart, J., (after stating the facts). The record shows that the mortgage given on the rice crop by Beck to Snerly was filed for record prior to the mortgage on the same crop given by Beck to Beckler, and that no part of the mortgage indebtedness of either of said mortgages has been paid. This is conceded by counsel for appellant, B.eckler, but they contend that the description , of the mortgaged property in the mortgage to 'Snerly is void for uncertainty, and that for that reason the mortgage to 'appellant is a prior lien on the rice crop in question. Thus it will be seen that the sole question presented on this appeal is whether • or not the description of the mortgaged property contained in appellee Snerly’s mortgage is sufficient to create a lien upon the property sought to be embraced in the mortgage against a subsequent mortgagee. It will be seen from our statement of facts that Beck gave a mortgage to Snerly upon a sufficient portion of his undivided one-half interest in 200 acres of rice to be grown on his farm during the year 1923 to comply with the condition in the mortgage, and that the condition in the mortgage is that Beck shall pay to Snerly $1484 not later than November 10, 1923. In other words, this was a mortgage on a sufficient portion of the undivided one-half interest of C. S. Beck in a rice crop of 200 acres more or less to be grown on his farm during the year 1923 to pay an indebtedness of $1484 which Beck owed Snerly. The textwriters lay down the general rule to be that any description which will enable third persons to identify the property, aided by inquiries which the mortgage itself indicates and directs, is sufficient. A second rule is that any description which can be made certain by such inquiries is good. In short, if the description of the property in a chattel mortgage is sufficient to put third persons on inquiry, from' which inquiry they can ascertain what the property is which is attempted to be described in the mortgage, such description would be sufficient. Dodds v. Neel, 41 Ark. 70; Johnson v. Grissard, 51 Ark. 410, and Eades v. Simpson, 127 Ark. 162. In the application of this general rule, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Truss v. Harvey, 24 So. 927, held that a mortgage on a crop for a stated year, and for every year thereafter until the debt is fully paid, was not void for uncertainty as to crops raised subsequent to the year named. In that case, the property described in the mortgage was all of the crops of corn, cotton and other produce which the mortgagor might* raise or cause to be raised during the year 1893, and every year thereafter until the mortgage debt was fully satisfied. The court said that the description, although general and somewhat uncertain, was sufficient to put on inquiry; and that the purchaser of the cotton from the mortgagor was bound to ascertain whether the cotton he purchased was subject to the mortgage. The court also said that the mortgage was not void for uncertainty as to the debt secured, since parol evidence was admissible to show that it was still unpaid. The court cited with approval Varnum v. State, 78 Ala. p. 28. In that case the defendant was convicted of the statutory offense of selling cotton for the purpose of defrauding a named person having a lien created by a mortgage. The instrument in that case recited, “my entire crop of every description, raised by me, or caused to be raised by me annually, till this debt is paid. ’ ’ The defendant objected to the admission in evidence of the mortgage on the ground that it was void for uncertainty in the description of the crops intended to be included in it. The court said that, whatever force there might be in this objection to the instrument on its face, this alleged uncertainty was capable of being removed when read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the contracting parties at the time of its execution, by extraneous parol identification. Hence the judgment of conviction was affirmed. In First Natl. Bank v. Rogers, 103 Pac. 582, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a description in a chattel mortgage, which is sufficient to put a third person upon inquiry which, when pursued, will enable him to ascertain the property intended to be included in said mortgage, is good. In that case the words of description of the crop contained in the mortgage are as follows: “the product and proceeds of all my 1907 cotton and all my future crops until tlie above note is paid.” Tlie court said that the contents of the mortgage furnished the defendant information, which,, aided by extrinsic evidence at his command, would have enabled him to ascertain that the cotton in controversy was the product of the crop described in the mortgage, and that he was not an innocent purchaser for value. In the case of Smith v. Lafayette & Bro., 119 Pac. 979, the description in the mortgage was, all crops to bo produced by the mortgagor during the years 1906, 1907 and each succeeding year until the indebtedness described in the mortgage shall have been paid in full. There as here it was claimed that the description was too vague and indefinite to put a second mortgagee upon notice. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma was of the opinion that the description was sufficient, aided by extrinsic evidence, to put the second mortgagee on his guard, and to enable him to ascertain at the time he took his mortgage that the property in controversy was covered by the prior mortgage. In the case before us we are convinced that the description is sufficient, and that it comes within the general principles announced in the decisions above cited which we regard as sound and of controlling force. Reliance is placed by counsel for appellant upon the case of Williamson v. Steele, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 527, 31 Am. Rep. 652. In that case the description in the mortgage was so much of the cotton crop raised on a certain farm, describing it, as would be sufficient to make two bales of lint cotton, each weighing not less than 500 pounds. The description was properly held to be too indefinite, because it did not convey any aliquot part of the crop, and a mortgagee could have no right to select any particular part of the cotton raised to the extent of the quantity necessary to malee two bales. This description is more like the one referred to in Dodd v. Neel, 41 Ark. 70, where it was held that a mortgage of a specified number of articles out of a larger number will not be good against creditors of the mortgagor and others acquiring adverse rights, unless it furnishes the data for separating the mortgaged part from the mass. This rule was recognized in Watson v. Pugh, 51 Ark. 218, but it was there said that where the number specified is more than the whole number of such articles, there' is no other property of the same kind from which a selection is to be made, and therefore no uncertainty in the description. The description in the mortgage was “all my crop of corn, cotton or other produce that I may raise, or in which I may in any manner have an interest, for the year 1884, in Faulkner County, Arkansas.” The court held that the description could be macle certain by extrinsic evidence 'and was not void for uncertainty. In this connection it may be stated that the court cited with approval in the principles announced in Varnum v. State, 78 Ala. 28. The record of the mortgage by Beck to Snerly was constructive notice to all persons acquiring rights in the rice crop subsequent to its execution, and, having held that the description in that mortgage was sufficient to put third parties upon inquiry, they were bound to inquire whether the rice in question was covered by the mortgage of Beck to Snerly. The result of our views is that the decree of the chancery court is correct, and it will therefore be affirmed.