Williams v. Brents

Hart, J., (after stating the facts). Onr Constitution provides that in all criminal cases, except in those of treason and impeachment, the Governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations of sentence, and pardons after conviction. Constitution of 1874, art. 6, §18. In Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, Mr. Justice Field, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: “A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender;' and, when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. ’ ’ Such is the effect of our own decisions. This court has also held that, where the Governor is authorized to grant pardons, he may do so under such conditions or restrictions as he may think proper. Ex parte Hunt, 10 Ark. 284; Baldwin v. Scoggin, 15 Ark. 427; Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321; and Ex parte Brady, 70 Ark. 376. A commutation of sentence is a change of punishment into one less severe, substituting ,a less for a greater punishment by authority of law. Mullen v. United States, 212 U. S. 516. This is the generally accepted legal definition of commutation of sentence. 29 Cyc. 1561, and cases cited. The legal meaning of reprieve is to suspend the execution of sentence for a definite time. 34 Cyc., p. 1621, and 20 R. C. L., p. 528. In the application of these definitions to the instrument under consideration, we all agree that it is'not a pardon, conditional or absolute, nor a reprieve. The court, however,- is of the opinion that the instrument is a commutation of sentence, and was therefore,' under our Constitution, an instrument which the Governor had the power to grant.' In this connection it m^y be said that the statute construed in Horton v. Gillespie, 170 Ark. 107, applies only to pardons. It is insisted that the instrument it not a commutation of sentence because, in the beginning of it, it is termed “an indefinite furlough.” It is true that the word “furlough” is a military term, and means leave given to a soldier to be absent from service for a certain time, but the name should not control where it is at variance with the substance of the instrument. The rule is that a pardon must be construed most strictly against the State and most beneficially for the convicted person. Ex parte Hunt, 10 Ark. 284; and Redd v. State, 65 Ark. 475. There seems to be no good reason why this rule of construction should not be applied to commutations of sentence as well as to pardons. Again, this court has held that the Governor may grant conditional pardons, and for the same reason we think that he may grant conditional commutations of sentence. If' commutation of sentence means to change from a higher to a lower or less severe punishment, the instrument in question should be construed as a whole, and that meaning given to it which it was intended by the Governor to have. As we have already seen, to commute means to change, and, as the Constitution vests this power in the executive as well as the power to grant pardons, the same rule of construction should be applied to both, and the instrument should be read and construed as a. whole in order to carry into effect the intention of the Governor. A judgment of conviction and sentence is the basis upon which the commutation is grounded. The prisoner was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary. The Governor first granted him a commutation which, by its own terms, ended on January 3, 1924, which was before his sentence of three years had expired. Again a commutation was granted to the prisoner, which would have terminated on the second day of January, 1925, which was also before his sentence had expired. On the 29th day of October, 1924, Governor McRae delivered to Brents the instrument under consideration in this case. It is true it is termed “an indefinite furlough,” hut it is coupled with such conditions and restrictions as show that they were only to be complied with during the period of the sentence. When the instrument is considered from its four corners, the terms of the commutation do not indicate that it was contemplated that the conditions should operate beyond the term of the sentence from which the defendant was released. In the absence of language showing such intention, there seems no good reason for holding that the conditions of the commutation were to be extended beyond the period of his sentence. He was required to refrain from the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage and the use of deleterious drugs. He was required not to carry a weapon, and not to gamble or be in possession of any gambling device. He was also required, on the first day of each month until the expiration of his sentence, to notify the warden of the penitentiary where he was and what he was doing. This indicates that, if he complied with the conditions of the commutation until the expiration of the period of his sentence, he was to be released and discharged from further punishment. The provision “that the time granted in this furlough is not to be counted' in computing said prisoner’s term of confinement,” when read in connection with the words preceding it, shows that it was intended that, if Brents should violate any of the conditions of his commutation of sentence and should be rearrested for violating such conditions, the time he had.been at liberty under the commutation should not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence. But, if he should not be rearrested during the period of his sentence for a violation of any of the conditions of his commutation, he was entitled to be free at the end of the term of his sentence. One of the main objects in granting the commutation was to look to the reformation of the defendant, and the special control of the conduct of the defendant ceased when his term expired, and there seems to be no controlling language in the commutation showing an intention on the part of the Governor to extend the conditions and restrictions beyond the expiration of the sentence, and, under the beneficent rule above announced, all doubts should be construed in favor of the defendant’s liberty. This is especially true when we consider that, under our Constitution, the Governor had the power to grant Brents a commutation of sentence, and had none to grant him a “furlough.” It is well settled that no technical words' or terms are necessary to constitute a pardon or a commutation of sentence. The instrument in question had the effect of remitting or releasing conditionally the punishment of Brents, without removing his guilt. It is only a full pardon of the offense which can wipe away the infamy of the conviction and restore the convict to his civil rights. Perkins v. Stevens, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 277, and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 333. It would take a pardon to restore his citizenship, but, having complied with the terms of the commutation of sentence during the period of his sentence, and this being the period of time provided for in the commutation, in the opinion of the court, the Governor had no right to have'Brents rearrested after his term of imprisonment had expired, and the circuit court properly released him from custody. It follows that the petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the judgment of the circuit court will be denied, and the judgment will be affirmed.