Chaney v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.

Hart, J., (after stating the facts). At common law, judgment notwithstanding the verdict could only be granted before judgment was entered upon the verdict, and the motion was based upon the record proper alone. The granting or denying the motion therefore depended upon the pleadings, but it is claimed that, by judical relaxation of this rule in this State, if the evidence is undisputed, and shows as a matter of law that judgment should be granted, the court will grant the judgment notwithstanding a verdict in favor of the other party. Scharff Distilling Co. v. Dennis, 113 Ark. 221, and Coleman v. Utley, 153 Ark. 233. Reliance is placed by counsel for the plaintiff upon § 6275 of C. & M. Digest, providing that, where special damages are given by statute, and it appears by the verdict of the jury that such special damages are recoverable, the court shall render judgment for them. We do not deem it necessary to decide whether or not this statute is applicable to cases of this sort. Even if it should be held applicable, the statutory damages must have been asked for before judgment was entered upon the verdict of the jury. In the instant case the motion was not made until after judgment was entered upon the verdict of the jury, and it was therefore too late, even if the statute is applicable. We now come to the question of whether a new trial should have been granted under the general rules of practice. This cannot be done by the appellate court unless the evidence is practically conclusive against the verdict. It is the duty of the circuit court to grant a new trial where it is of the opinion that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the weight of the evidence. On the other hand, it is the duty of this court to uphold the verdict if there is any evidence to sustain the verdict under any view of the law applicable to the case. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co. v. Ellenwood, 123 Ark. 428. Now it cannot be said that the undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict of $300. There was no dispute between the parties as to the amount of wages due the plaintiff and as to the fact that he was discharged by the defendant without being paid; but there was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to whether he asked for his wages to be sent to Delight, Arkansas, at the time he was discharged from the employment of the defendant. It is true that he so testified and that his testimony was corroborated by that of other witnesses.- On the other hand, the witnesses for the railroad company testified that he made no such request, and that the money was in due time sent to the station agent at North Little Rock, where the services were performed by the plaintiff, and that his wages would have been paid him if he had come there and requested payment. In other words, it appears from the testimony introduced by the defendant that he was not entitled to the penalty or statutory damages provided by § 6275 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest. The circuit court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, and, for aught we know, may have done so on the ground that the weight of the evidence showed that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover anything except the amount of the wages due him. In this view of the matter it could not have made any difference that the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in an amount greater than his wages; for this was a matter which did not work to his prejudice and of which he could not complain. It follows that the judgment of the circuit court must he affirmed.